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  • 标题:The importance of the MX Peacekeeper missile - transcript
  • 期刊名称:US Department of State. Bulletin
  • 印刷版ISSN:0041-7610
  • 出版年度:1985
  • 卷号:Sept 1985
  • 出版社:U.S. Department of State * Bureau of Public Affairs

The importance of the MX Peacekeeper missile - transcript

The Importance of the MX Peacekeeper Missile

I welcome this opportunity to appear before you to speak in support of the President's program of strategic modernization. This subject is of enormous importance to our diplomacy because of the direct impact of strategic modernization on our national security, our arms control objectives, and our most fundamental foreign policy goals.

Strategic Modernization and Foreign Policy

As Secretary of State, I am acutely conscious of the strength or weakness of American power because it directly affects our ability to achieve our most fundamental goals: the defense of our values and our interests and the construction of a safer, freer, and more prosperous world. Power and diplomacy are not separate dimensions of policy; they are inextricably linked together.

That is why I am here today to urge support for strategic modernization and, in particular, for the MX Peacekeeper missile program which is a central pillar of that modernization.

As leader of the democratic nations, we have an inescapable responsibility to maintain the strategic balance--and only we can maintain it. If our determination flags, we shake the confidence of our friends and allies around the world; we weaken the cohesion of our alliances. If we in America are strong and united in our commitment to peace and international security, then those who rely on us, and upon whom we rely, have the confidence to move together with us toward our shared goals.

Modernization of our strategic forces is essential. The Soviet strategic buildup has continued relentlessly. Since we deployed our most modern type of ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile], the Minuteman III, the Soviet Union has deployed three new types of ICBMs--the SS-17, -18, and -19--including 360 SS-19s roughly comparable in size to the MX, each with 6 warheads, and 308 of the much larger SS-18, each with 10 warheads. Moreover, within the next 2 years, the Soviets will begin deploying two additional new types--the SS-X-24 and -25. This means five new Soviet ICBMs compared to one--the MX--for the United States.

A credible, flexible American strategic posture is vital to the stable balance of power on which peace and security rest. And the MX is a vital element of that stable balance. It represents the response that four necessive administrations--both Democratic and Republican--have believed necessary to offset, at least partially, the formidable Soviet ICBM arsenal. It was permitted by the SALT II Treaty, and, indeed, its contribution to the strategic balance was one of the premises on which that treaty was based. The bipartisan Scowcroft commission concluded, and I am convinced, that the MX remains an essential component of a modernized strategic triad.

If the Soviets could strike effectively at our land-based ICBMs, while our own land-based deterrent lacked any comparable capability, they might believe that they had a significant advantage in a crucial dimension of the strategic balance; they could seek to gain political leverage by a threat of nuclear blackmail. Such a crucial imbalance in strategic capabilities could well make them bolder in a regional conflict or in a major crisis. As the Scowcroft commission put it:

A one-sided strategic condition in which the Soviet Union could effectively destroy the whole range of strategic targets in the United States, but we could not effectively destroy a similar range of targets in the Soviet Union, would be extremely unstable over the long run [and] would clearly not serve the cause of peace.

We must move ahead with deployment of the MX now because it represents a credible deterrent today. After years of planning and billions of dollars in effort, only the MX offers a way toward redressing the serious strategic imbalance now.

Many critics of the MX have focused on the issue of MX basing in relationship to survivability. There are three points I wish to make.

First, Soviet planners, in the uncertainty of war, would have to take into account that some of our MX missiles would survive attack and would be used to retaliate against those targets the Soviets value most highly, including Soviet missiles held in reserve for further attacks against our country.

Second, the survivability of the MX must be viewed in conjunction with the other elements of our strategic triad. The three legs of the triad--bombers, submarines, and land-based ballistic missiles --strengthen deterrence by greatly complicating Soviet planning. If the Soviets were to contemplate an all-out attack, they would be forced to make choices that would significantly reduce their effectiveness against one leg of the triad in order to attack another. For example, it is not possible to attack our bomber bases and our ICBM silos simultaneously, without allowing certain retaliation. Indeed, deterrence rests upon the Soviet planners knowing they cannot contemplate a successful, disarming first strike.

Third, silo hardening can be improved significantly in the future and thereby increase the survivability for the MX force. The Scowcroft commission reported on this capability, and the Congress has funded its research. The prospects are firm and promising and will ensure the MX will remain a key element of the triad far into the future.

Additionally, it is important to understand that the whole of our strategic triad is greater than the sum of the individual parts. Viewed in the full context, the MX will strengthen the whole of our triad, on which our security has rested for many years, and, in so doing, it will strengthen the fabric of deterrence and peace.

Strategic Modernization and Arms Control

At this moment, the MX program plays a pivotal role in advancing our arms control goals as well. One thing we have learned over the years is that the Soviets respect strength and firmness. I am convinced that our firmness and that of our allies in the last few years--in proceeding with INF [intermediaterange nuclear forces] deployments and resisting Soviet efforts to drive a wedge between the allies--persuaded the Soviets that they could not achieve their objectives by political pressure, that they could not sit back and wait for unilateral concessions, but they must bargain at the table instead.

Thanks to the West's cohesion and determination over this period--and thanks to Congress' bipartisan support for the strategic modernization program over the past 3 years--our negotiating position today is strong. The Soviets must realize that we have the will to protect our security in the absence of arms control agreements and that it is in their interest, as much as ours, to seek ways to reduce nuclear arsenals and the dangers of war. This basis of strength improves the prospects for successful negotiations.

These new weapons are not "bargaining chips'; they are part of the very strength on which real bargaining rests. They represent much-needed modernization, consistent with existing arms control agreements; they are an essential element of our deterrent posture; and they are the foundation on which an effective and balanced arms control regime can be built.

Negotiating With Strength and Unity

As you know, a new round of arms control negotiations is about to begin in Geneva. The American people and their government--the Congress and the President--all share the hope that these negotiations will bear fruit. We must be prepared to defend our ideals and interests whether negotiations are successful or not. The United States has, however, long sought a more constructive and productive relationship with the Soviet Union. We emphasized throughout 1984 the importance of resuming a U.S.-Soviet dialogue aimed at reductions in nuclear arsenals.

The year 1985 has begun on a positive note. The outcome of the January meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko marked a potentially important beginning. The agreement to start new negotiations in Geneva on March 12 brings the resumption of the dialogue on the most important strategic issues now facing our two nations. We will use these negotiations to discuss fully our views on the evolution of strategic deterrence, including our hope that the Strategic Defense Initiative research will allow us to move to a new strategic environment, based on defense and not simply the prospect of mutually assured destruction. We are now engaged in a process that can product beneficial results for the United States, for our allies, and for world peace and security.

Success, however, will require firmness and determination, a degree of flexibility, and a degree of caution. It will also require something even more basic: unity at home on the importance of these requirements and of our fundamental strength.

As we move toward these negotiations, we must proceed as a united people. When we sit down at the table to discuss these questions with the Soviet Union, it is essential that we speak with one voice, that we not present the picture of a nation in conflict with itself, giving the Soviet Union either openings to exploit or false hopes that we will make unilateral, unreciprocated concessions. The negotiations we are about to embark upon are between the United States and the Soviet Union. We cannot and must not allow them to deteriorate into negotiations among ourselves.

The negotiators the President has chosen to represent us at Geneva, including your former colleague John Tower, are among the most intelligent, able men in the land. They are tough negotiators. They will represent our country, defend our interests, and pursue our goals with skill and dedication. In a sense, however, these men are only the tip of the pyramid: their work in Geneva will be supported by their respective delegations and by the expertise and commitment of hundreds of people in the U.S. Government. But the real foundation of the whole edifice--on which its strength really depends--is the degree to which they are supported also by our Congress and public. Our arms control efforts cannot succeed without this support.

This is no time to cast doubt on our national resolve. When we send our negotiators to the table in Geneva, we owe it to them and to our country to send them in with the strongest possible negotiating position and with the full backing of the nation. And that means not suggesting unilateral concessions that might diminish the incentives the Soviets have to talk. That means not cutting programs vital to our strategic posture. It means coming together behind a solid negotiating position that offers the best hope for achieving the goals I know we all seek.

COPYRIGHT 1985 U.S. Government Printing Office
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group

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