Bureaus in motion: civil servants compare the Clinton, G.H.W. Bush, and Reagan presidential transitions

Robert Maranto

Abstract

Much has been written about presidential transitions, but none have studied presidential transitions in the bureaucracy while a transition was under way. To study the 1993 William Clinton transition in the permanent bureaucracy, this paper presents insights from 55 interviews conducted in 1993, followed with data from a 1993-1994 mail survey of 1472 GM 15 and Senior Executive Service (SES) level career officials serving in the Washington offices of 20 federal agencies. Despite high personnel turnover in the study period, a 42 percent (n=612) response rate was achieved. Interviews and survey data suggest that relations between career bureaucrats and political appointees in the bureaucracy are determined by an agency's goal congruence/conflict with a presidential administration (and political party); thus defense careerists report smooth transitions under Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, but a rockier Clinton transition. Career executives from traditionally liberal social welfare and regulatory agencies, in contrast, report relatively good career-noncareer relations under Clinton, with more conflict in the first Bush administration and far more conflict with the Reagan administration. Still, all career executives saw the Clinton transition as disorganized.

Introduction

For so long as a tenured civil service has existed, presidential transitions have concerned federal bureaucrats, particularly after one political party dominated the White House for a long period. The 1913 transition ended 16 years of Republican rule, leading to Democratic calls for patronage from and control of the heavily GOP civil service. In the 1933 transition, President Franklin Roosevelt distrusted tenured careerists, few of whom had served Democrats, and accordingly created his own agencies staffed outside the merit system to implement the New Deal. As the first post--New Deal presidential transition, the 1953 Dwight D. Eisenhower transition was even more traumatic. The administration imposed the first reductions in force (RIFs) on domestic agencies and inaugurated the "Schedule C" personnel category to increase the number of formal political appointees. For the first time, many appointees not only distrusted the civil service, but also opposed the very missions of some agencies. Since the Roosevelt and Eisenhower transitions, Republicans have often opposed activist domestic agencies, pruning staffs, cutting budgets, and empowering political appointees. Democrats have never opposed agencies, but have not always trusted old-line agencies to carry out innovative policies. Accordingly, they create new organizations (initially outside the merit system) to implement new policies. (1)

Save perhaps in 1981, recent transitions have been more sedate, in part since from 1952 until 1988 no political party won three consecutive presidential elections. Alternating the presidency each four or eight years reduces pent--up demand for patronage and gives each party a store of "in-and-outers" with experience in the U.S. executive. In-and-outers tend to trust career bureaucrats more than Washington newcomers do, since they have worked with careerists. (2) In addition, when one party dominates any branch of government for long, party conflict becomes institutional conflict with partisans supporting the branch they dominate and opposing the structural power of the other. (3)

Much has been written about presidential transitions, but the most prominent works focus on the macro politics of managing the White House and relations with Congress, political parties, the media, and the public. (4) There is now a substantial literature on the ever-growing difficulties of making political appointments (5) and on presidential appointment strategies. (6) Only a few works, however, discuss relations between political appointees and career bureaucrats during a presidential transition, and these studies depend on subjects' ability to recall career-noncareer relations long after the fact. (7)

This paper furthers our understanding of presidential transitions by comparing the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton transitions in the federal executive, with a particular focus on the role of political ideology in determining how career government executives view a given White House and its political appointees. The analysis took two parts. First, I conducted 55 Washington interviews from February to August 1993, including 46 with career civil servants, political appointees, and military officers familiar with the functioning of 27 federal agencies. (See Appendix.) The interviews and the scholarly literature suggest a number of propositions, which are then tested with data from a 1993-1994 survey of 1,472 federal executives. Survey data indicate that the Clinton transition was less organized than those of its Republican predecessors, and that ideological goal conflict determines the tone of presidential transitions in individual bureaucracies.

Comparing the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton Transitions

Considerable research suggests that career-noncareer relations in the U.S. executive are at least partly determined by the goal conflict/congruence between an administration and sectors of federal agencies, (8) and this was particularly true for the Reagan administration. Despite the President's anti-government reputation, evidence suggests that in defense agencies career-noncareer relations started well and stayed that way during both Reagan terms. Career and noncareer officials in the Reagan Pentagon agreed on agency goals and had fairly similar ideologies. Most Pentagon careerists voted for Reagan, and a vast majority considered themselves moderate or conservative. In domestic agencies, in contrast, relations started badly. By 1983, political appointees perceived improved relations and came to trust their career subordinates, perhaps since the most liberal careerists left or were marginalized. In addition, the most controversial Reagan appointees were forced out of the administration by 1985, improving career-noncareer relations in the affected agencies. In most domestic agencies, however, careerists perceived career-noncareer relations as starting badly and staying that way. (9)

Interviews and published sources suggested that the Bush transition in most agencies was smooth because the administration did relatively little to change government, and respected the civil service. About one-third of Reagan appointees (mostly those with Bush credentials) stayed on in the new administration, though sometimes in different jobs. President Bush lacked an activist agenda, so bureaucrats faced a fairly stable policy climate. Perhaps most important, President Bush respected the civil service, praising the high level career Senior Executive Service (SES) in particular, and signing a law to raise pay and reform federal compensation. Indeed, Bush's first official speech as president was before an audience of career SES, a sharp contrast with the Reagan administration. (10)

In contrast, observers have noted a rocky Clinton transition in the bureaucracy. The president himself, one aid remarked, was someone who could "have a 10-minute meeting in two hours." This translated into a presidential transition which presidential scholar James P. Pfiffner characterized as "hitting the ground walking." (11) Similarly, Aberbach and Rockman write that in contrast to the Bush administration, the Clinton administration "wanted to spring into action, but could articulate neither where nor how to do so." (12)

Given his party's long absence from the presidency, President Clinton had relatively few experienced Democrats to call on for appointments. (13) Not surprisingly, interviews suggest that those who were appointed did not always know how to relate to their predecessors, nor to careerists. Relations in the pre--inauguration period were unusually difficult in one agency key to Clinton policy--making, since designated appointees had orders from Arkansas not to interact with careerists or Bush appointees in the transition period, an unusual degree of distrust. Unlike President Bush, President Clinton had very little Washington experience. In fact, since the Arkansas state government has only a handful of appointed positions, Bill Clinton had never before appointed numbers of officials, and had difficulty making appointment decisions. As one Arkansan "Friend of Bill" said in an interview:

   In policy decisions, you can go on reforming, revising, adding to,
   taking from, before, during and after you submit it. After all, the
   legislature is going to change it anyway. Whereas once you put a
   person in place, well, you can remove them, but it has a different
   kind of permanence to it. If you look at every president over time
   its taking longer and longer to make appointments. If you add to
   that Clinton's absolute determination to achieve diversity in
   appointments, it means you can't appoint people one at a time, you
   have to appoint a team to make it look like America ... because he
   is a policy wonk he has worked personally with hundreds of policy
   experts in education, welfare, health, and other policy areas. He
   personally knows people in every network, think tank, and state, and
   this is a very personal administration. It's not so much trouble
   identifying expertise as having to collect all those who might be
   good and clearing all the hoops and figuring out who to actually
   appoint.

President Clinton was determined to appoint a diverse team, and indeed his appointees were 15 percent African American, 6 percent Hispanic, and 46 percent female. (14) Interviews suggest that Clinton's emphasis on ethnic, gender, and geographic (or "EGG") diversity grated many high level careerists the vast majority of whom remain while males. (15) This seemed particularly true in the Pentagon, where many questioned the competence of Clinton appointees. A number of other factors slowed the pace of appointments. President Clinton appointed his personnel chief, former South Carolina governor Richard Riley, Secretary of Education. Clinton took more than a month before replacing him with Arkansan Bruce Lindsay in the week before the inauguration, a key time. The economic summit and the controversies over the Attorney General appointment and gays in the military also distracted the administration from making appointments. (16)

The slow pace of appointments was not entirely a function of Clinton's party, decisions, and style, however. As the above interview notes, each recent president has taken longer than his predecessor to finish appointments, in part due to a more skeptical media and Congress, and to ever growing ethics regulations. While John Kennedy took only two months to get nearly all of his administrative team on board, for Bill Clinton nine months barely sufficed. (17) Indeed, numerous modern political appointees have written books about the horror of the Washington appointment process and government service, books whose titles say it all: Are You Tough Enough? (by Reagan Environmental Protection Agency chief Anne Burford), Leaving Town Alive (by Bush National Endowment for the Arts Chair John Frohnmayer), and Locked in the Cabinet (by Clinton Labor Secretary Robert Reich). (18)

Of course, bureaucratic habits may also explain transition difficulties. Career bureaucrats value stability and predictability, and presidential transitions offer neither. As two longtime SES explained in interviews:

   It's been twelve years since we've had a real transition because one
   Reagan term to another was nothing and from Reagan to Bush was not
   radical ... Who was around back in 1980? For the SES, there's
   nothing to compare it with unless they have very good memories ...
   In [a regulatory agency] literally there were people who went out
   the day after the election and changed their voting registration. It
   was amazing! The naivete! Did they really think that would protect
   them?

   This transition, I think, is more comparable to the Reagan
   transition in '81 than to the Bush transition. These folks come in
   with an ax to grind ... Personally, I think the Bush appointees
   supported the civil service. The Reagan and Clinton people just
   wanted change no matter what.

Finally, simple goal conflict-congruence might explain the nature of career-noncareer relations in the Clinton transition. (19) Interviews suggest that in activist social welfare and regulatory agencies, many officials seemed pleased to serve a Democratic administration likely to support enhanced roles for their agencies. In contrast, some defense careerists (and military officers) were disturbed to serve a president seen as a former draft--dodger opposing military missions and budgets. In the early Cold War years both parties supported the Pentagon, indeed the Democrats often supported defense budgets more than Republicans. Vietnam undermined that support among liberal Democrats, though this was not reflected in Carter administration defense policies. The 1992 election, however, brought the first "1960's Democrat" to the White House, along with relatively young appointees more likely to have protested Vietnam than to have served there. The eruption of the gays in the military issue in the first weeks of the administration underscored these tensions. The slowness of Clinton defense appointments was a factor; during the Cold War the Pentagon was of such importance that its appointments were put on board quickly. The off--again, on--again Bosnia and Somalia policies also undermined Pentagon morale.

The above discussions suggest the following hypotheses, which are tested below:

H1: In all agencies, the Clinton transition will be seen as less organized than the Republican transitions.

H2: Defense careerists are ideologically closer to Republican appointees than to Clinton appointees.

H3: Social welfare and regulatory careerists are ideologically closer to the Clinton appointees than to the Republican appointees, particularly the Reagan appointees.

H4: Defense careerists see the Clinton transition as having more conflict than either the Republican transitions.

H5: Social welfare and regulatory careerists see the Clinton transition as having less conflict than the Republican transitions.

Method

From April through October 1993, I requested (often repeatedly) lists of career GM-15 and SES level officials serving in the Washington offices of 22 federal agencies. These agencies were chosen to represent regulatory, defense, social welfare, and miscellaneous policy areas, and to represent organizations whose personnel slots were notably increased, decreased, and kept stable in the relatively tumultuous early Reagan years--a good measure of accordance with Reagan administration goals. (See Maranto 1993, pp. 159-61 for details.) Notably, this sample is not representative of the federal service for a number of reasons. Agencies with controversial social welfare and regulatory missions are over-represented. Second, since officials are at executive levels (GM-15 and SES) and serve in Washington, their jobs are typically more "political" and less "technical" than are lower level positions and those in field offices.

From November 1993 through January 1994, a first wave of surveys with stamped, return envelopes were sent; with a second round following from February to May 1994. Where large numbers of GM-15 and SES officials served in the Washington offices of an agency, a random sample of 120 was sampled. Not counting returned surveys sent to officials no longer serving in government, the sample totaled 1472 career SES and GM-15's.

A 42 percent return rate was achieved (n = 612), somewhat above the 36 percent typical for mail surveys. (20) Notably, high turnover in the higher civil service in the study period, estimated at 11 percent, suggests that the actual return rate exceeds 45 percent. Turnover occurred since civil servants received a large pay-raise under President Bush in 1991, providing incentives to retire in 1994 on reaching the "high threes." (21)

Testing the Hypotheses

Problems Particular to the Clinton Transition

H1 suggests that the Clinton transition was less organized than the 1981 and 1989 versions. As Table 2 suggests, bureaucrats did indeed believe this true. In defense and to a lesser degree other agency types, the

Reagan and Bush agency level transitions were seen as fairly well organized. In contrast, overwhelming majorities in all agencies saw the Clinton transition as poorly organized on the agency level. Of course, the relatively low grades given the Clinton administration may reflect its recency; quite possibly, the Bush and Reagan administrations would have rated no better in their first year.

Notably, as interviews suggest, the mainly white male higher civil service did indeed believe that the Clinton administration strongly emphasized diversity in appointments. By 53-13 percent, career officials disagreed that the Reagan White House "emphasized gender or ethnic diversity in making appointments: a narrow 38-31 percent plurality agreed that the Bush administration did emphasize diversity. In sharp contrast, by an 82-7 percent margin career officials saw the Clinton administration as emphasizing diversity. Indeed, many careerists wrote comments to the effect that the Clinton administration put too much emphasis on diversity. A 57-22 percent majority of defense officials, a 39-38 percent plurality in other agencies, and a 44-31 percent plurality even in activist agencies supported "less stress on diversity in appointments." The survey did not ask race or gender in order to safeguard the anonymity of respondents, an omission necessary since the high level civil service is in many agencies overwhelmingly white and male; thus we cannot know how opinions vary by race or gender.

Goal Congruence

H2 and H3 suggest that domestic careerists, particularly those in social welfare and regulatory agencies (henceforth referred to as activist agencies), are ideologically closer to the Clinton administration than to the GOP administrations, particularly the Reagan administration. Self--reported 1992 presidential voting suggests this, with President Bush outpolling Governor Clinton and Ross Perot among defense careerists by 48-32-10 percent (with others choosing no answer). In contrast, Bush lost among career executives in activist agencies, winning only 14 percent compared to Clinton's 67 percent and 8 percent for Perot. Bush also lost in miscellaneous (other) agencies, by 20-69-4 percent.

Self-reported ideology tells the same story. Careerists were asked to rate their own ideology on a scale from 1 (very conservative) to 7 (very liberal), and to do the same for Reagan, Bush, and Clinton political appointees. IDDIF for each administration was calculated by subtracting the ideology rating of each set of political appointees from the self-rating for careerists: thus a 0 IDDIF means no difference between political appointees and higher numbers mean careerists are more liberal than appointees. Table 2 shows that for each Reagan administration, defense officials saw themselves as having ideals fairly close to those of

Reagan appointees; for the Bush administration the figure rose further to 69 percent, but for the Clinton administration this plummeted to 39 percent. In contrast, only about a quarter of those in activist domestic agencies and a third of those in other domestic agencies rated their ideals as close to those of Reagan appointees. For the Bush administration this was tree of 55 percent of other careerists and 43 percent of activist careerists. For the Clinton administration only 44 percent of other officials saw themselves as ideologically close to appointees, but for activist agencies the figure was 58 percent. Ideological divisions across agency types were highly statistically significant for the ideological Reagan administration, and particularly weak for the Clinton administration, perhaps since ideological divisions with Clinton appointees were not completely apparent by the time of the survey.

Similar findings come from answers to "Political appointees and career executives agreed on agency goals." As Table 4 shows, large majorities of defense careerists saw career--noncareer goal agreement in the Reagan years; slightly smaller majorities agreed for the Bush administration, perhaps because of the strains of developing a post-Cold War foreign policy, and because of the Gulf War, Somalia, and Bosnia. (I say this since, as is noted above, Bush political appointees were actually seen as ideologically closer to defense bureaucrats than were Reagan appointees.) Still, a two-thirds majority saw relative goal congruence under Bush, compared with a two-to-one plurality of defense careerists who saw discord with Clinton appointees. Domestic careerists tell a very different story. More than two-thirds of those in other agencies saw perceived goal conflict with Reagan appointees. A slight plurality saw goal agreement with Bush appointees. A slightly larger plurality saw agreement with Clinton appointees. Most dramatically, in activist agencies large majorities saw discord with the Reagan administrations and a plurality saw discord with the Bush administration. In contrast, pluralities saw agreement with Clinton appointees. Of course, for all agencies it was difficult for officials to rate the still new Clinton administration. Not surprisingly, 35 percent of officials chose the neutral position (3) on this question for the Clinton administration, as compared to 25 percent for the Bush administration and 15 percent for the first Reagan administration.

In short, H2 and H3 are confirmed. There was relatively high ideological congruence and goal agreement between defense careerists and Republican administrations, but not with the Clinton administration. Activist domestic agencies, on the other hand, had greater ideological and goal agreement with Clinton appointees. Interestingly, other domestic agencies had greater ideological accord with the relatively moderate and experienced Bush administration appointees than with either Clinton or (especially) Reagan appointees, though they saw slightly more career-noncareer agreement on agency missions with the Clinton appointees,

Career-Noncareer Relations Across Transitions

H4 and H5 suggest that defense careerists perceive the Clinton transition as more difficult than the 1981 and 1989 versions; domestic careerists, particularly in activist agencies, are expected to find relations easier under Clinton appointees than under the Republicans A number of variables can be used to measure this, including simple ratings of career-noncareer relations, perceptions of trust and respect, and whether appointees seemed to represent the White House to the agency or the other way round.

Table 5 tends to confirm H4 and H5. Three quarters of defense careerists perceive good relations in the last two years of the Reagan administration. These figures fall to two-thirds in the first year of the Bush administration, recover, then again dip again in 1992, and tumble in 1993. While two-thirds to three-fourths of defense careerists perceive good relations under the GOP, only a 35-32 percent plurality sees good career-noncareer relations under Clinton. For other domestic agencies, small pluralities saw relations as good or excellent in the last two years of the Reagan administration; these pluralities increased slightly in each of the first three years of the Bush administration, and in the first year of the Clinton administration.

In activist agencies, results were comparable. Pluralities saw relations as poor in the Reagan administration. In each year of the Bush administration roughly two-to-one pluralities saw relations as good, and this did not change in the Clinton administration. In short, in domestic agencies from year one of the Bush administration career-noncareer relations seemed sound. The same was true in the first year of the Clinton administration. In contrast, defense career-noncareer relations were sound throughout the Republican administrations, but poor under Clinton.

As Table 6 shows, measures of career-noncareer trust tell a similar story. Solid majorities of defense careerists trusted GOP appointees, but solid pluralities did not trust Clinton appointees. Domestic agencies are very different. Especially in activist agencies, pluralities or majorities did not trust Reagan appointees. A majority of other careerists trusted Bush appointees, and a comparable plurality trusted Clinton appointees as well. For activist agencies, equal numbers trusted and distrusted Bush appointees, but a plurality trusted Clinton appointees.

Cross agency differences were particularly notable in the Reagan administration, somewhat less so for the Bush administration, and still less so for the first year of the Clinton administration.

Table 7 shows that in all administrations, newly appointed officials are thought to distrust careerists. Yet again we find relationships across agency type. Defense careerists are least likely to agree with the statement for the Reagan and Bush administrations, but most likely to agree for the Clinton administration. Activist agency careerists are most likely to see appointee distrust as a problem for both GOP administrations. Interestingly, however, they also saw distrust as more of a problem for the Clinton administration than do other domestic appointees, perhaps because of the controversies of regulatory and social welfare politics.

As Heclo, Pfiffner, Maranto, Aberbach and Rockman, and other scholars note, political appointees have a tough job in part since they must both represent their agency to the White House, and the White House to their agency, leading to role complexity. Presumably, career officials might find it easier to work with non-career officials seen as representing their view to the White House rather than the president's agenda to the agency. As Table 8 shows, all domestic careerists tend to see political appointees as representing the White House view to the agency rather than the agency view to the White House.

This was particularly true of the Reagan administration, and relatively untrue of the more centrist Bush administration. Save for the Clinton administration, activist agencies are more likely than other domestic agencies to see appointees as toeing the White House line. Among Pentagon careerists, on the other hand, pluralities felt that appointees represented the agency to the White House. Notably, defense careerists did not see the Clinton administration this way.

Whatever relations between careerists and political appointees, in all administrations careerists seem to prefer their own appointees to the White House. As Table 9 shows, careerists feel that only the Bush White House has respected the civil service. Solid pluralities of defense careerists and large majorities of domestic careerists (particularly in activist agencies), feel that the Reagan administration did not respect the civil service.

A solid plurality of defense careerists and a small plurality of other domestic careerists, however, saw the Bush administration as respecting the civil service. A plurality of activist careerists disagrees. For the Clinton administration, a large majority of defense careerists and solid pluralities of domestic careerists felt that the Clinton administration did not respect them.

To summarize, H4 and H5 are supported. Defense careerists saw career-noncareer relations in the Reagan and Bush administrations as good, even in the first year of the Bush administration. Careerists trusted Republican political appointees, and saw appointees as representing the Pentagon to the White House rather than the other way round. None of this characterizes how defense careerists view Clinton appointees. Domestic careerists, on the other hand, saw relatively poor career-noncareer relations in the Reagan years, but solid relations in the Bush years and in the first year of the Clinton administration. Careerists did not trust Reagan appointees, but did trust Bush appointees (save in activist agencies) and Clinton appointees. Particularly in activist agencies, careerists saw appointees as representing the White House rather than the agency. This was especially true in the Reagan administration. Interestingly, careerists agree that the Reagan and Clinton White Houses distrusted careerists. Save in activist agencies, careerists agree that the Bush White House did respect them. This probably reflects the Bush administration's pay raises, as well as the President's praise of the civil service and the relative experience of Bush appointees.

Conclusion: Transitions in Conflict

A small, but growing literature advises new and prospective political appointees about how to manage their own transitions into positions of leadership within the U.S. executive branch. In particular, new political appointees are to do their homework, and to consult and respect their career executives. (22) While such advice is useful, findings here suggest that the tone and coherence of overall White House personnel and policy actions may do as much to shape the tone of executive transitions within agencies as do the actions of individual political appointees. For the three administrations, in the bureaucracy as a whole surveys find the Bush administration having the most kind and gentle executive transitions. This makes sense given President Bush's long government experience, and deep respect for the career civil service. In contrast President Clinton was judged disorganized, while President Reagan and his appointees, at least for non-defense career executives, were seen as overly conservative.

Even more important, findings show that a presidential transition in the U.S. executive cannot be considered a single transition. Rather, different parts of government view the same presidential transition in very different ways. The Republican oriented defense bureaucracies, not surprisingly, see incoming GOP presidents and their appointees as more akin to them ideologically, and view them more favorably than they do Democrats. In contrast, the relatively liberal career officials from social welfare and regulatory agencies feel closer to and report better relations with Democratic administrations. In miscellaneous agencies, the views of officials vary. In short, just as interest groups win and lose presidential elections, so too do federal agencies. In 1992, perhaps for the first time, the Pentagon lost.

The notion that goal conflict largely determines transition relations is not from a public administration standpoint a happy one. It suggests that to a considerable degree career-noncareer conflict is an inevitable part of executive branch politics, which is, after all, political. Even for bureaucrats democracy is political, and politics is not always for the faint of heart.

Appendix

All interviews were in 1993, and all are in-person unless otherwise noted. Interviews included 35 current or former career civil servants, including 27 at high (GM-15 or SES) levels: eight were in foreign policy/defense agencies (seven high-level); seven in social welfare agencies (six high-level); seven in regulatory agencies (four); and 13 in other domestic agencies (10). In addition, six former Reagan or Bush political appointees were interviewed, as well as a number of military officers, think tankers, academics, and journalists.

1. A former Bush domestic appointee, February 2; follow--up on February 16.

2. A former Reagan Administration defense appointee, February 3; follow up June 2.

3. Senior Executive Association officer, February 3; follow--up May 13.

4. Phone interview with a U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) career SES, February 19.

5. National Park Service career SES, February 23.

6. Heritage Foundation analyst, March 1.

7. Navy officer, March 4.

8. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) career SES, March 11; phone follow--up August 13.

9. Public administration/political science academic and former New Deal political appointee, early March, exact date not recorded.

10. Phone interview with former military officer and current academic, March 15.

11. Army officer, March 15.

12. Air Force civilian careerist, March 18, follow--up on May 6 and periodic follow--ups thereafter.

13. Phone interview with National Science Foundation (NSF) career SES, March 25.

14. Former Bush domestic appointee, March 29.

15. Internal Revenue Service career SES, March 29, phone follow--up on August 9.

16. A Transportation Dept. career SES, April 7.

17. Agriculture Dept., career SES, April 8.

18. Phone interview with Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) career SES, April 15.

19. National Academy of Public Administration analyst, April 15.

20. Air Force career officer, April 15.

21. Think tank member and former foreign policy/defense career bureaucrat, April 20.

22. Defense analyst and former military officer, April 21.

23. Resolution Trust Corporation career executive, April 21, with follow--ups later.

24. Public Administration academic, April 29.

25. Health Resources and Services Administration high level careerist, exact date not recorded.

26. Former Reagan domestic appointee, May 4.

27. General Services Administration career SES, May 6.

28. Marine career officer, May 7.

29. OSD career SES, May 9.

30. Washington journalist, May 13.

31. NSF high level careerist, May 18.

32. U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) careerist, May 20.

33. OPM careerist, May 20.

34. HUD high level careerist, May 21.

35. Air Force career SES, June 3, follow--up on

36. Public Administration academic and former careerist, June 4.

37. Commerce Dept. career SES, June 9.

38. SEA officer, June 10.

39. Phone interview with OSD career SES, early June, exact date not recorded.

40. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration career SES, June 11.

41. Heritage Foundation analyst, June 16.

42. Phone interview, U.S. Army career SES, June 21.

43. Former Bush domestic appointee, June 22.

44. Political Science academic, June 23

45. Washington Journalist, June 24.

46. Phone interview with EPA careerist, July 2.

47. Health and Human Services (HHS) career SES, July 15.

48. Phone interview with OSD high level careerist, July 28.

49. Phone interview with Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) careerist, August 1.

50. Former Bush domestic appointee, August 3.

51. Phone interview with HUD careerist, August 4.

52. Phone interview with Office of Management and Budget careerist, August 9.

53. Phone interview with PBGC careerist, August 10.

54. Phone interview with HUD executive level careerist, August 11.

55. Phone interview with Labor Dept. career SES, August 16.

Table 1. Return rates by agency

Defense          Sent   Returned   Percent

ARPA             67     19         28
OSD              129    74         57
NAVY             90     44         49
TOTAL            286    137        48

Social Welfare

HUD              114    49         43
HRSA             77     23         30
FNS              26     16         62
ACF              67     26         39
TOTAL            284    114        40

Regulatory

OSM              23     10         43
IRS              60     24         40
CPSC             43     17         40
NHTSA            114    52         46
OSHA             55     13         24 *
FWS              69     38         55
TOTAL            364    154        44

Other

NSF              120    21         18 **
FTA              57     18         32
USFS             21     7          33
NPS              49     23         47
SCS              63     34         54
OPM              108    44         41
FEMA             120    60         50
TOTAL            538    207        39

GRAND TOTAL      1472   612        42

* OSHA had internal distribution problems which delayed delivery of
surveys for over two months.

** NSF was moving to new offices and was unable to furnish updated
addresses.

Table 2. "The transition in my agency was well organized" by agency
type

A. Reagan Administration 1.

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      50%    43      41         .58342   6.57215    8
disagree   23     30      30

B. Bush Administration.

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      55%    43      37         .09495   13.52738   8
disagree   20     25      31

C. Clinton Administration.

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      12%    19      8          .00534   21.77883   8
disagree   70     57      71

Table 3. IDDIF across administrations and agencies: Percentage of
careerists who consider their ideals within one unit of political
appointee ideals

          DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

REAGAN1   53%    33      25         .00082   51.83365   24
REAGAN2   58     38      27         .00052   50.41495   22
BUSH      69     55      43         .02283   34.51693   20
CLINTON   39     44      58         .22653   26.61154   22

Table 4. "Political appointees and career executives
agreed on agency goals" by agency type

A. Reagan Administration 1

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ     D.F

agree      78%    28      20         .00000   128.95511   8
disagree   9      57      65

B. Reagan Administration 2

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ     D.F

agree      81%    29      20         .00000   128.95511   8
disagree   7      49      59

C. Bush Administration

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ     D.F

agree      66%    40      30         .00000   60.11916    8
disagree   14     35      42

D. Clinton Administration

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ     D.F

agree      20%    43      39         .00047   28.04303    8
disagree   43     24      24

Table 5. Percentage of careerists rating career-noncareer relations as
good/excellent-fair/poor, across agency types. Missing cases not
included.

       DEF     Other   Activist

1987   77-6    41-30   30-39
1988   75-7    39-31   29-34
1989   65-6    46-26   44-23
1990   69-6    50-23   44-17
1991   73-4    57-22   44-23
1992   64-12   54-23   44-24
1993   35-32   57-16   43-23

Table 6. "I trusted the appointees in my agency" by agency type

A. Reagan Administration 1

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      61%    33      26         .00000   69.03221   8
disagree   17     51      62

B. Reagan Administration 2

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      59%    37      25         .00000   69.28156   8
disagree   14     43      58

C. Bush Administration

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      60%    54      40         .00000   42.56532   8
disagree   16     30      41

D. Clinton Administration

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      33%    47      38         .00048   27.98103   8
disagree   41     24      23

Table 7. "When  first appointed, noncareer executives
did not trust agency careerists" by agency type

A. Reagan Administration 1

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      54%    66      75         .00000   36.29990   8
disagree   14     13      7

B. Reagan Administration 2

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      39%    62      71         .00000   45.79372   8
disagree   22     13      9

C. Bush Administration

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      41%    45      55         .02991   17.01886   8
disagree   23     27      19

D. Clinton Administration

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      66%    40      54         .00030   29.10478   8
disagree   10     27      17

Table 8. "Appointees represented the White House view to the agency
rather than the agency view to White House" by agency type

A. Reagan Administration 1

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      30%    57      70         .00000   59.98866   8
disagree   37     20      12

B. Reagan Administration 2

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      24%    53      68         .00000   74.07930   8
disagree   44     20      11

C. Bush Administration

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      19%    36      49         .00000   41.69476   8
disagree   47     26      22

D. Clinton Administration

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      48%    43      41         .07891   14.11146   8
disagree   22     22      15

Table 9. "The White House respected the civil service" by agency type

A. Reagan Administration 1

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      26%    15      7          .00000   46.61150   8
disagree   48     69      77

B. Reagan Administration 2

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      27%    16      9          .00000   42.68220   8
disagree   44     66      75

C. Bush Administration

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      47%    42      26         .01269   19.43665   8
disagree   30     22      42

D. Clinton Administration

           DEF.   OTHER   ACTIVIST   SIGN.    CHI. SQ    D.F

agree      9%     25      19         .01240   19.50080   8
disagree   60     43      48

* I wish to thank the Brookings Institution, Lafayette College, Villanova University, the Federal Executive Institute, James P. Pfiffner, Charles Walcott, Jason Price Everett, and Andrea Costello for their assistance during various phases of this project, as well as two anonymous reviewers. The usual caveats apply.

(1) See, for example C. M. Brauer, Presidential Transitions: Eisenhower through Reagan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); P.P. Van Riper, History of the United States Civil Service (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1959). For Republican presidents in particular, see R. Maranto, "The administrative strategies of Republican presidencies from Eisenhower to Reagan." Presidential Studies Quarterly 23 (1993): 683-697.

(2) J.E. Michaels, The President's Call (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997); J.P. Pfiffner, The Strategic Presidency: hitting the ground running (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996); D. Schultz and R. Maranto, The Politics of Civil Service Reform (New York: Peter Lang, 1998). Regarding pent-up demands for patronage, the author found many Democrats in Washington in spring 1993 anxiously awaiting "the call" to join the Clinton administration. With Republicans holding the White House for 20 of the previous 24 years, some Democrats teared this might be their last chance to join the executive branch.

(3) T.M. Moe, "The Politicized Presidency," p. 235-71 In J. Chubb & P. Peterson (Eds.) The New Direction in American Politics (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985): R. Maranto, Politics and Bureaucracy in the Modern Presidency: careerists and appointees in the Reagan administration (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993).

(4) See, for example Brauer, op.cit., Pfiffner. op.cit., L.L. Henry, Presidential Transitions (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1960); P. C. Light, The President's Agenda (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983).

(5) S.L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess (New York: Basic Books. 1994); G.C. Mackenzie & R.L. Shogun, Obstacle Course (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1996); G.C. Mackenzie with M. Hafken, Scandal Proof: Do Ethics Laws Make Government Ethical? (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2002).

(6) R.G. Brown, "Party and Bureaucracy: from Kennedy to Reagan," Political Science Quarterly 97: 2, 279-94 (1982); R. P. Nathan, The Administrative Presidency (New York: John Wiley, 1983); G.C. Mackenzie, The In-and-Outers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1987): R. Rector and M. Sancra, (eds.) Steering the Elephant: How Washington Really Works (New York: Universe Books, 1987); T.J, Weko, The Politicizing Presidency (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995).

(7) H. Heclo, A Government of Strangers (Washington: Brookings Institution. 1977); P. Lorentzin, "'Stress in Career-Political Executive Relations," Public Administration Review 45: 3: 411-14 (1985); Pfiffner, op.cit; R. Maranto, "'Coping with your political boss," Government Executive (November 1997) 29:11; p. 72-3.

(8) J.D. Aberbach and B.A. Rockman, In the Web of Politics (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2000).

(9) Regarding regulatory agencies, see R.A. Harris and S.M. Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); for regulatory and social welfare agencies see I.S. Rubin, Shrinking the Federal Government (New York: Longman, 1985); for natural resources agencies see R. Durant. The Administrative Presidency Revisited (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992); for a broad range of organizations. including defense agencies, see Maranto, Politics and Bureaucracy, op.cit.

(10) See, for example, R. Maranto, "'Government Service is a Noble Calling: President Bush and the US Civil Service," p. 97-108 in L.D. Feldman and R. Perotti Honor and Loyalty: Inside the Politics of the George H W. Bush White House (Westport: Greenwood, 2002), as well as J.E. Michaels op.cit, and Michaels' "George Bush's People in Washington--or, How I learned to Stop Worrying and Love (or at least respect) the Government,'" p. 109-27 in Feldman and Perotti. Notably, Bush's speech before the SES was widely criticized by conservatives, including some in his own administration. See J. Podhoretz, Hell of a Ride: Backstage at the White House Follies, 1989-1993 (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1993).

(11) J.P. Pfiffner, op.cit, p. 148-49.

(12) Aberbach and Rockman, op.cit., p. 40.

(13) J.A. Barnes, "Changing Company Town," National Journal. February 4, 1989, 278-82.

(14) Schultz and Maranto, op.cit., p. 202.

(15) J. Dolan, "The Senior Executive Service: Gender, Attitudes, and Representative Bureaucracy," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10 (2000):3, 513-29.

(16) Schultz and Maranto, op.cit, pp. 199-203.

(17) See Carter, op.cit.; Mackenzie and Shogun, op.cit.

(18) R. Maranto, "Coping With Your Political Boss." op.cit.

(19) There is a substantial literature on how ideological goal conflict influences career-non-career relations in the bureaucracy, including Aberbach and Rockman op.cit., Maranto, Politics and Bureaucracy, op.cit.: M M. Golden, What Motivates Bureaucrats? (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

(20) D.A. Dillman, Mail and Telephone Surveys: The Total Design Method. (New York: John Wiley, 1978).

(21) T. Shoop, "Exodus," Government Executive. 26 (1994): 42-47.

(22) See, for example J.H. Trattner, A Survivor's Guide for Government Executives (Lanham: University Press of America, 1989); J. Martino, A Case for the Orientation of Political Appointees (Penn State/Harrisburg: M.A. Thesis, 1994). For a more nuanced view, see R.P. Nathan, So You Want to be in Government (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000).

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