U.S. proposes banning chemical weapons

It is an honor to come before this conference again today, on behalf of our President, to reaffirm our strong commitment to arms control.

And I have come to reaffirm, as well, a resolve that has dominated the American position in all arms control discussions over the last year: the resolve that the growth in the number of the most dreaded weapons of modern warfare must not simply be slowed; it must be reversed. In the master before us--chemical weapons--they must be banned, totally banned.

I have brought with me today the latest expression of that firm U.S. resolve--a draft treaty banning entirely the possession, production, acquisition, retention, or transfer of chemical weapons.

this draft treaty includes an entirely new concept for overcoming the great obstacle that has impeded progress in the past toward a full chemical weapons ban-namely, the obstacle of verification. This new concept is part of a package of sound and reasonable procedures to verify compliance with all the draft treaty's terms.

Except on close inspection, chemical weapons, these insidious chemical weapons, are virtually identical in appearnace to ordinary weapons; plants for producing chemicals for weapons are difficult to distinguish from plants producing chemicals for industry and, in fact, some chemicals with paceful utility are structurally similar to some chemicals used in warfare. So verification is particuarly difficult with chemical weapons. Review of Concerns

Our new concept is an arms controls verification procedure that we call the "open invitation." But before I outline this unprecedented procedure, let me review some of the concerns that have led the United States to propose such a step.

When I appeared before you in February last year, I quoted Franklin Roosevelt's comment that the use of chemical weapons "has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind." Unfortunately, despite the horror that these weapons evoke, really in all decent men and women; despite specific prohibitions such as the Geneva protocol of 1925 and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, there have been repeated instances of use over the past six decades, against combatants and innocent civilians alike--always, I might note, against those least able to defend themselves or retaliate against such an attack.

In the last 3 years alone, the world has heard frequent repors of violations of these agreements from such places as Southeast Asia, Agfhanistan, and the Middle East. One important reason that chemical weapons use continues is that chemical weapons use continues is that neigther the 1925 Geneva protocol nor the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention includes any form of effective verification or enforcement.

Parties signed a piece of paper, attached some stamps and some seals of their own. Arsenals remained, ready for use against any who lacked a deterrent.

The United States has advocated reinforcement of the existing agreements. We, together with other countries, have long supported proposals to direct the Secretary General of the United Nations to initiate investigations of reported violations.

We regret that some UN members have disputed the need for such investigations and have, to date, prevented or impeded inquiries. We believe that international investigations of this sort could serve as a step toward the kind of open-ness required for a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty that would work.

Surely the consequences of the absence of effective verification, as seen in the reports of continued use of chemical weapons, can only provoke profound concerns among all of us today.

First, there is this unspeakable horror visited upon the victims of such weapons, many of them innocents simply caught up in the path of war.

Second, the use of chemical weapons violates existing international agreements and so undermines the arms control process.

Finally, and perhaps most disturbing, there is the chance that, as reports of use continued, the world might actually get callous, get hardened to this news. It might come numbly to accept these weapons and to abandon efforts to rid future generations of this peril.

We owe it to ourselves and to our children to prevent this from happening.

For more than a decade, the United States has exercised restraint in the field of chemical weapons, and we will continue to do so. We desire an arms control solution to the chemical weapons threat. But our restraint has not induced all other states to exercise comparable restraint.

And this is why we are taking steps to prepare for the possibility that modern chemical weapons might have to be produced in the absnece of a comprehensive ban. however, we must and will do all that we can to achieve a treaty that eliminates any need for new production. The U.S. Proposal

The President asked me to come here again this year to stress the urgency of this issue. He believes that we must do all we can to eliminate existing stocks of chemical weapons and the facilities that produce them. He wants to ensure that such weapons will never be developed or used again.

Now to that end, the President has asked me to present to this conference today the U.S. draft text of a comprehensive treaty banning chemical weapons, and I ask that this draft be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

The provisions of the draft treaty closely follow the "detailed views" my government presented to this conference last year. They also incorporate the views of many other delegations who have given us the benefit of their thoughts.

This treaty would prohibit the development, the production, the stockpiling, the acquisition, the retention, or transfer of chemical weapons. The principal criterion for distinguishing between permitted and banned activities would be the purpose for which an activity is being conducted.

In recognition of the need for confidence in such an agreemtn, the draft also contains sound and reasonable procedures--among these, "open invitation" inspections--for verifying compliance with all its provisions.

For a chemical weapons ban to work, each party must have confidence that the other parties are abiding by it. This elementary, common sense principle is the essence of what we mean by verification. No sensible government enters into those international contracts known as treaties unless it can ascertain--or verify--that it is getting what it contracted for.

Lack of effective verification and compliance mechanisms has been a major obstacle to achieving a true and effective ban on these weapons.

As I mentioned at the beginning, the technical similarities between chemical weapons production facilities and commercial production facilities, the similarity between chemical weapons agents and chemicals for peaceful uses, and the similarity between chemical munitions and conventional munitions makes discrimination impossible without very, very close observation.

And, perhaps most importantly, strict verification is needed to protect those who do not possess chemical weapons, or are willing to give them up, from those who might maintain possession surreptitiously.

The goal of our proposal is a treaty to require states to declare the sizes and locations of their chemical weapons stocks and production facilities, to destroy the stocks and facilities, and to foreswear creating new chemical weapons. If they are to sign a contract, states must have confidence, in particular, that they can know:

First, that all declared stocks have been destroyed;

Secnd, that all declared production facilities have been destroyed;

Third, that the declared stocks really do constitute all the stocks; and

Fourth, that the declared facilities are all the facilities.

Without such firm assurance--and I think everyone here knows this--we cannot claim to have banned chemical weapons. In this regard, my government has taken not eof the Soviet Union's announced willingness to consider accepting the continuous stationing of international inspection teams at the locations where declared stockpiles are to be destroyed. We welcome that. Overall U.S. Approach

* Complete worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

* Rigorous verification by a combination of national and international measures, including systematic international onsite inspection.

* A special anywhere-anytime onsite inspection procedure to permit treaty parties unimpeded access to suspected sites and facilities owned or controlled by the governments of other treaty partiess.

* Based on our "detailed views" paper (DC/343) presented at the CD in February 1983.

* Incorporates ideas presented by many other delegations. Scope of the Prohibition

* The treaty would prohibit:

-- Development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, or transfer of chemical weapons;

-- Other preparations for use of chemical weapons; and

-- Use of chemical weapons.

* The principal criterion for distinguishing between permitted wand banned activities would be the purpose for which an activity is being conducted. This general "purpose" criterion would be supplemented with toxicity criteria and lists.

* Lethal and incapacitating chemicals, and their precursors, would be covered. Chemical Weapons Stockpiles

* Declared in detail wtihin 30 days.

* Inspected promptly to confirm the declaration. Monitored until destruction by onsite instruments and periodic inspection.

* Destroyed within 10 years.

* Destruction verified by continuous monitoring with onsite instruments and continuous presence of international inspectors. Chemical Weapons Production Facilities

* Declared in detail within 30 days.

* Inspected promplty to confirm the declaration.

* Monitored until destruction by onsite instruments and periodic international onsite inspection.

* Destroyed within 10 years.

* Destruction verified by monitoring with onsite instruments and periodic international onsite inspection. Permitted Activities

* Activities to protect against chemical attack would be permitted to continue:

-- Production of supertoxic lethal chemcials and key precursors for protective purposes restricted to a single small-scale facility:

-- Quantities of such chemicals strictly limited; and

-- Single permitted facility subject to monitoring with onsite instruments and periodic international onsite inspection.

* Specific provisions would deal with chemcials which pose a particular risk:

-- Production and use of specified supertoxic lethal chemicals restricted;

-- Production of specified precursors and toxic chemcials subject to systematic international onsite verification; and

-- Data exchanged on production and use of toher specified precursors and toxic chemicals.

* The convention would be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hindering legitimate activities. Systematic international onsite verification would be mandatory for:

-- Checking the declarations of chemical-weapons stockpiles and production facilities;

-- Monitoring stockpiles and facilities until they are destroyed;

-- Confirming the destruction of stockpils and facilities;

-- Monitoring small-scale permitted production of supertoxic lethal chemicals and key precursors for protective puposes; and

-- Monitoring commercial production of specified chemicals that pose a particular risk.

* A special anywhere-anytime onsite inspection procedure would be established to permit treaty parties unimpeded access to suspected sites and facilities owned or controlled by the governments of other treaty parties.

COPYRIGHT 1984 U.S. Government Printing Office
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