Civil disturbance lessons learned from Kopsovo

When the 793d Military Police Battalion moved into Kosovo, literally at the head of the first formations of Kosovo Force (KFOR) soldiers from the 1st Infantry Division (known as the Big Red One) in June 1999, they found an almost-vacant province. The cities were empty; only a few old, invalid, or rugged individuals chose to remain. The Serbian army had retreated from the province days before, and there were still some armed ethnic groups operating throughout the region. The soldiers of Task Force Spartan--as well as the Big Red One's 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in the first rotation--were overwhelmingly successful in achieving the conditions for the return of the refugees who had fled Kosovo during the recent period of oppression and fighting. By the time the second rotation of soldiers from the Big Red One's 3d BCT arrived in Kosovo five months later (November 1999), the dramatic change in demographics began to express itself through demonstrations and civil disturbances. While the 793d had to fight to establish the peace, the 709th Military Police Battalion aggressively patrolled throughout the province, maintaining the tenuous peace and engaging with the local leaders who were emerging with the return of refugees. The 709th's most significant action in Kosovo was dealing with a large number of demonstrations and several riots. Throughout its rotation, the battalion learned significant lessons in dealing with riots and civil disturbances, which may be of value to future military police deploying to peace-enforcement and nation-building missions.

Right of Assembly

The right of assembly is critical to a democratic country and is so important to Americans that it is protected in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It should be expected (and perhaps even encouraged) that populations transitioning to democracy under the protection of U.S. or international peacekeepers will exercise this right as well. Demonstrations are a good way to discover the true leaders and determine their driving forces and key concerns. It is recommended that peacekeepers establish a way for demonstrators to apply for a permit allowing them to hold peaceful demonstrations and rallies. Local law enforcement bodies (often made up of peacekeeping soldiers) need to ensure that there is a place to demonstrate. A circulation plan needs to be put in place that maintains the flow of traffic and supplies. Encouraging legal demonstrations and rallies can move dialog with local leaders forward, assist the people in participating in government, and encourage them to vote in upcoming elections. Many of the people that peacekeepers encounter are preparing to vote in elections (that will determine the future of their local governments in a large measure) for the first time. Encouraging this legal outlet for expression of ideas also decouples legitimate local leaders from the other groups choosing to employ demonstrations and civil disturbances as a weapon to apply leverage outside of the auspices of the transitional government.

Civil Disturbance Incidents

During the 709th's rotation with KFOR-1B (November 1999 to June 2000), there were several times when local leaders sought to apply leverage by blocking key roads. The purpose of these blockages ran the gamut from demanding that a town be renamed (from its Serbian name to an Albanian name) to demanding the release of a detainee and trying to barricade U.S. forces into a village and hold them hostage. During these events, traffic would quickly back up and block a two-lane main supply route (MSR) for hours. The military police were generally the first to detect these blockages and were able to surge forces and deal quickly with the demonstrators.

Civil Disturbance Management

When a civil disturbance blocking an MSR is reported, the first mission is getting eyes on it and establishing a liaison with the local leader. At the same time, the MP task force generates response forces in case force becomes necessary. We learned that it was best to have a commander engage with the local leader to assess if they could negotiate to move the demonstration out of the highway. Also, the commander should then determine if further forces are needed. Commanders are accustomed to dealing with local leaders, commanding attachments (such as military working dogs [MWDs], allied soldiers, or other task force assets), and are best suited to dealing with the multiple disciplines of conducting a civil-disturbance operation and keeping higher headquarters informed.

There is a tendency for soldiers outside the wire, away from the task force headquarters, to seek to resolve situations with their available resources at the lowest level. This sort of initiative is a core competency of our military police. However, it is critical to ensure that higher headquarters knows what is happening so it can anticipate your possible needs and plan to resource you for success rather than responding later to rescue you from failure. Requesting that an observation helicopter fly above the event, reporting on movement of the masses and providing overwatch of your forces, is an excellent way to record the event (through forward-looking infrared [FLIR] cameras) and provide early warning of unexpected movement against your soldiers.

More often than not, military police dealt well with the local leaders, convincing them to move off of the highway to discuss the source of their concerns. When force was required, only the minimum, in a graduating scale, was employed. Military police in riot gear moved forward in concert with the MWD teams, securing the formations' flanks. "Snatch" teams apprehended the agitators who approached the shields of the advancing military police. We did not send our teams into crowds because it stirred up a tremendous commotion and put the snatch team at significant risk. Also, the agitators we had already identified tended to lead from the front in order to motivate the crowd and were readily available when actual physical confrontations arose. When agitators were apprehended, they were restrained with flexicuffs (on the hands and the legs) and carried away to the rear by the awaiting transportation. Their rapid disappearance had a very positive effect in quelling the crowd. Had they remained on the site, in restraints, they could have become a rallying point for demonstrators.

We used the winches on our high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) to pull vehicles (that had been parked to form a zigzag obstacle) from the highways. Before stepping forward, the winch cables were run out and the hooks were at the ready for attaching to anything that we wanted to remove. In the instance that we did this, as we were removing the first vehicle, the operators of the other vehicles ran from the demonstration and into their vehicles to avoid the same fate.

Camera teams were helpful in recording events and gathering information. They captured the conditions of the riot and the violence that our soldiers faced. This would be critical information in case there was a lethal event. This photo data should be linked to any biographical or other information from the event and passed up to the task force and down to the companies in the battalion as soon as possible. The nesting of this information within the police intelligence function of our military police is an area worthy of further effort. The Italian Caribinieri (the national police) seemed to have the best database for intelligence collection on personnel and was able to act on this intelligence very effectively.

Riot Training

After initial contact with riots in Mitrovitca, Kosovo, in February 2000, the 709th's leadership conducted an after-action review (AAR) that captured lessons learned and identified challenges in dealing with crowds. Employing Army training doctrine and experience from our Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany, we crafted a major training exercise in our own living space at Camp Bondsteel, replicating the stresses and challenges of an actual riot growing out of a cordon-and-search operation.

To maximize training value, a reinforced company task force was created (under one line company commander) that included platoons and elements--including K-9--from the entire battalion. The company task force trained for half a day on basic riot formations, drills (such as snatching and nonlethal [NL] fires), and supporting a cordon-and-search operation. At the same time, an opposing force of villagers, agitators, and rioters were being trained in the MP billets area. In the afternoon, the MP task force moved into position and began a cordon and search of designated buildings in the actual MP compound. As the search developed and weapons were found (they had been specifically stashed for this exercise), a demonstration began to develop that turned into a full-blown riot. By the end of the evening, a complete AAR was conducted, including digitized video (made using a soldier's camera) as well as digital film and soldiers' captured experiences. This AAR and the lessons learned from our training and first riot became the basis of all future success in riot operations in Kosovo. The value of this training was underscored by the fact that one of our companies had joined the task force right from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and didn't have the opportunity to train before with the battalion task force during the mission-rehearsal exercise for Kosovo. We also found that real riots are far more challenging than our predeployment training had prepared us for. After our first experiences in Mitrovitca, we were much better suited to develop more violent and challenging riot training than we had been willing to do previously.

Lessons Learned

Our experiences and training taught us many important les sons:

Mobility is always a key issue in responding to a riot. HMMWVs are inefficient at delivering a riot-control force, since the HMMWVs stack up quickly, with each vehicle just delivering a three-man force. The initial response force should deploy in HMMWVs because they are responding to the incident from their patrols. Follow-on forces, however, should be delivered by air or truck, allowing a large force to move together. Demonstrations create massive congestion quickly. It is best to analyze the demonstration area and redirect or hold traffic elsewhere. Air mobility of a riot-control force is the best way to quickly deliver a force of soldiers. Practice loading and unloading procedures well in advance. However, a riot-control shield could become a very damaging foreign object if it were to come loose and fly into a helicopter's prop wash. Additionally, all deploying troops need to know the basics, such as never going near the rear rotor of a helicopter under any circumstances.

Leaders need to conduct a good precombat inspection before moving out to a riot. Soldiers become tremendously thirsty during conflicts and should deploy with two full canteens. Side arms need to be secured (in holsters with a lanyard) to ensure that they don't become lost during a struggle. (We never lost one in a riot, but a HMMWV driver, with the help of his squad, spent considerable time looking for his weapon in the snow until finally locating it!) Soldiers should visit the latrine and relieve themselves before deploying to a riot--chances are, they will not have the opportunity again for hours. Manpack transceivers and small radios should get fresh batteries and be secured properly. Hoods should be removed from protective masks because they dramatically increase body temperature and water loss and make hearing more difficult. Finally, whatever riot-control forces are put together, they should conduct a hasty rehearsal of formations and movement before heading out. The reality is that the team that moves out to an incident is never exactly the same team that last trained together. There is always time for a quick rehearsal to do it right.

Communications are absolutely critical in a riotous situation. In our largest riot in Sevce, we found that one company's assigned communications frequency had become the inadvertent network for the entire U.S. task force. Communicating was extremely difficult with so many levels of command crowding onto one network. Manpack transceivers and handheld radios ran out of power during the fight. As a result, those of us forward in the fight relied on our talk-about radios that are powered by AA batteries and are not secure. It became evident during the fight that our unsecure communications were being monitored. Communications need to be further developed for communicating within a riot-control force. Overall, we learned that communications training tends to get far less attention than it should.

Nonlethal Weapons

In the 4 April 2000 Sevce riots, our military police were attacked with clubs and barrages of large rocks. The protective gear that our soldiers wore--KEVLAR[R] helmets with face shields, ranger body armor, riot-control shields, and shin guards--was effective protection against clubs and rocks. However, soldiers who had joined the task force from the continental United States had older-style shields and face masks that shattered under the barrage of rocks. Rocks were injuring the soldiers and could kill them. Against this assault, military police fired back with NL munitions. The fires were surprisingly accurate and convinced any of the rioters who were struck to immediately head for home.

The employment of NL fires had tremendous effect. It allowed the commander and his military police to take back the initiative and bring the situation under control. The three types of NL rounds employed were the 40-millimeter stinger ball, the sponge grenade, and the foam-baton-type munitions. The stinger ball and sponge grenade rounds were effective. While the munitions come with varying tips on engagement ranges and methods, in the midst of a total melee, they were generally fired at very close range and at point-blank center of mass.

As a result of running ranges for our gunners in full riot-control gear (firing with the face mask affixed to one's helmet, in full body armor, carrying all equipment) before our actual engagement, our gunners were surprisingly accurate. The foam-baton munitions were not, however, as effective as the other two rounds. In fact, several gunners reported seeing the rounds slowly leaving the barrel of their weapon and striking the intended target with no visible effects. This was a nightmare because the target now thought he was invincible and had to be struck with a more convincing round. After our engagement in Sevce, foam-baton rounds were used only for training.

There is no question that the use of NL munitions at Sevce filled the tight gap between lethal and NL force with convincing results. Had the 709th not been equipped and trained to employ these fires, they would have certainly had to resort to lethal fires to deal with the situation at hand. The use of lethal means in this incident could have had a seriously destabilizing geopolitical effect for our efforts in Kosovo. It must also be noted that a supportive and understanding command climate that allowed commanders to employ these weapons (within the rules of engagement) was also critical.

Conclusion

It is clear that the Army will continue to play a leading role in peace-enforcement, peacekeeping, and nation-building missions. Encouraging the responsible exercise of democratic processes--which includes the right of assembly--while discouraging attempts to use demonstrations and riots as a weapon to hijack the development of representative governments, was an important aspect of our duties. Our military police are on the front line of this critical mission and need to be well-trained and well-equipped in advance to deal with these situations. The art of dealing with riotous situations is a challenging task requiring a tremendous amount of mental agility and physical stamina. This article is only a sample of the many lessons learned from the 709th's experiences in Kosovo. Successfully dealing with demonstrations and riots varies greatly based on the local culture and customs and the geopolitical situation. The purpose of documenting and sharing these lessons learned is to help other leaders prepare themselves and their soldiers better and to spur further development of NL capabilities that allow us to save lives while keeping the peace.

A Proposed Matrix for Dealing With Demonstrations

       Event                       Actions (in priority order)

Demonstration blocking    1. Alert higher headquarters.
MSR is reported.          2. Get eyes on and a second report (the first
                             report is always wrong).
                          3. Initiate movement of other MP patrols to
                             the area of concern.
                          4. Alert K-9 unit to prepare to move MWDs to
                             area.
                          5. Issue warning order to other MP units to
                             prepare to stand up platoons.
                          6. Request that task force check if air
                             transport is available. Coordinate for
                             truck to transport ground force, if
                             necessary.

Demonstration             1. Ensure that commander is en route.
is confirmed and          2. Establish operational frequency for
will not leave               event--pass to all units and task force
the road open.               headquarters.
                          3. Update higher headquarters.
                          4. Alert MP units to prepare to deploy.
                             a. Rehearse riot-control formations and
                                commands before boarding vehicles
                                or aircraft.
                             b. Perform precombat inspections for
                                water, ammunition, and communications
                                equipment.
                             c. Ensure that soldiers relieve themselves
                                and are well hydrated.
                             d. Ensure that a medic is moving with the
                                force.
                          5. Ensure that a photographer records the
                             event and gets pictures of agitators
                             and leaders.
                          6. Request air coverage from helicopter
                             (with FLIR camera).
                          7. Determine with task force headquarters if
                             air movement is available and will be
                             used. Initiate movement.

MP forces established     1. Establish enough forces at the
on ground to deal with       demonstration to physically win
demonstration.               confrontation.
                          2. Ensure that there is an ample security
                             force securing vehicles, rear, and
                             flanks. Expect the unexpected.
                          3. Establish and ensure that demonstration
                             leader knows consequences of not clearing
                             road. Give a specific time to accomplish
                             movement. Stress liability for damages
                             caused by removing blockage from road.
                             Encourage leader to avoid injuries and
                             damages by moving people from road. Offer
                             opportunity for full negotiations and
                             talks if this is done. Try to prevent
                             leader from loosing face. You will want
                             continuous dialog to prevent this type of
                             event.
                          4. "Mark" key agitators to be snatched by
                             snatch teams (NCOs and junior leaders do
                             this). Snatch teams are designated and
                             prepared.
                          5. Clear flanks on side of leader
                             negotiating with MWDs, in front of his
                             line of military police. Military police
                             keep shields at their sides and show force
                             through presence, attempting to keep
                             tempers cool.
                          6. Prepare to treat wounded and establish
                             evacuation plan (medics).
                          7. Report final situation to higher
                             headquarters before clearing road.

Blockage cleared.         1. Report to task force headquarters.
                          2. Return snatch teams' detainees to task
                             force headquarters. Photograph,
                             question, and determine if detainees have
                             outstanding charges. Return them to
                             village as soon as is reasonable. Treat
                             all detainees with dignity and
                             respect.
                          3. Get accountability of personnel and
                             equipment.
                          4. Establish follow-on meeting with local
                             leaders. Discuss why this occurred
                             and prevent reocurrence. Ensure that
                             leaders know how to contact local
                             officials and task force headquarters
                             with grievances before resorting to
                             demonstrations.
                          5. Get a good estimate of damages and
                             injuries.
                          6. Pull out excess forces as soon as
                             possible, and push through backed-up
                             traffic. Ensure that road shoulders are
                             kept secure from rock throwers or
                             other impediments.
                          7. Link support to town with behaviors.
                             Ensure that local leaders understand
                             that blocking roads and demonstrating
                             without a permit has an associated
                             cost.

Conditions restored.      1. Increase patrolling and presence in area
                             for immediate future.
                          2. Conduct AAR immediately with all
                             batallion task force headquarters leaders
                             and elements.
                          3. Establish lessons learned to improve
                             response time and tactics, techniques.
                             and procedures in your area of operations.
                          4. Review digital photos and capture
                             biographical data and other information to
                             improve intelligence understanding of key
                             players/situations. Update task
                             force headquarters intelligence section
                             and subordinate elements.
                          5. Develop training plan addressing
                             shortcomings or implementing improvements.

U.S. Army Nonlethal Center of Excellence (Points of Contact)

U.S. Army Nonlethal Center of Excellence

401 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 1088 Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929

Phone (573) 596-0131, ext XXXXX DSN 676-XXXX

Fax (573) 596-0131, ext 35490

Nonlethal Concepts Officer

MAJ Bob Buzan, ext 37092 buzanr@wood.army.mil

Nonlethal Concepts NCO

SFC Raymond Spain, ext 37029 spainr@wood.army.mil

Nonlethal SME (Contractor)

Mr. Tim Lee, ext 37033 leeti@woodarmy.mil

Lieutenant Colonel Brown entered the U.S. Army as a private first class in June 1977. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1982 as an MP second lieutenant. He holds a master's in national security studies from Georgetown University, is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and is currently attending the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. He has had a series of operational assignments in Germany and the United States. LTC Brown served as an assistant professor of German at the U.S. Military Academy and as the chief, Combined Arms Training Center, 7th Army Training Command, U.S. Army Europe. He commanded Task Force 709 MP in Kosovo from November 1999 to June 2000.

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