Administration of Court-Ordered School Desegregation in Urban School Districts: The Law and Experience, The

Hunter, Richard C

It has been 50 years since the United States Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). This article discusses race relations and education before Brown and reviews both decisions in this important case that did so much to provide hope for African Americans that public education would be improved for their children in this country. The "massive resistance" movement in the South that delayed the implementation of public school desegregation for more than a decade and several seminal cases in both higher education and public school desegregation are reviewed. In this article, the impact of "White flight" and other demographic factors on urban public education are presented. Also, the administration of court-ordered desegregation in Bradley v. Richmond School Board (1971) is a primary subject of the article. Finally, a review of the effects of public school desegregation on public education in urban school districts are presented; including the economic costs, racial isolation, student achievement, metropolitan desegregation, and an outlook for the future.

BACKGROUND

It is useful to consider race relations and education before discussing public school desegregation in the period leading up to the now famous decision of the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 1954 (Brown I). The institution of slavery was the low point in race relations in America and was conceived by some as a means of converting Blacks to Christianity. Still others maintain that slavery was used to provide this rapidly growing country with a steady supply of inexpensive labor. Nevertheless, divisions over the treatment of slaves in the colonies developed and influenced several northern states to abolish slavery, including Pennsylvania (1780), Massachusetts (1783), Connecticut (1784), and Rhode Island (1784). Although sentiment against slavery was strong in the North, Blacks were denied the right to vote and to use public conveyances and in 1860 only 7% of free Blacks in the North were allowed to attend schools. Prior to the Civil War, public education was limited in most southern communities and formal education for slaves was illegal. However, after President Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, the Civil War ended, the 13th Amendment was passed, and race relations improved for Blacks in the United States. This period of good extended to all states in the union, particularly in the North. Unfortunately, once again racist Whites created "black codes" to restrict the rights and freedoms of the newly freed slaves. These codes did not permit Blacks to hold political office or to vote and influenced passage of the Civil "Rights Act of 1866, which was incorporated in the 14th Amendment. This legislation made it illegal for states to deny equal protection to anyone under their jurisdiction. Congress established the Freedman's Bureau for slaves, which operated from 1865-1872 and created 4,200 schools that enrolled almost 250,000 pupils. Nevertheless, only 5% of the Black, school-age population was served by the Freedman Bureau's schools. It was reported in 1871 that the State Supreme Courts of Ohio and Indiana decided that separate schools were legal, if they were equal. Because of this condition, the education of Blacks in the North was not much better than it was in the South. The right of Blacks to vote was ratified in 1868 by the 15th Amendment. However, because federal troops were removed from the South, Blacks were effectively disenfranchised from voting by poll taxes and literacy tests in every state in this region (Stephan, 1980).

SEPARATE BUT EQUAL

Homer Plessy, a Black man, challenged the right of the East Louisiana Railway to require him to sit in a section of a train that was reserved for coloreds. This action violated the 14* Amendment. The United States Supreme Court ruled in Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896, that segregation of the races was permissible and created the "separate but equal" doctrine that was the law of the land for 58 years. In 1930, Nathan Margold devised a plan for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to eliminate school segregation. His plan was to sue for equal schools and was later modified by another NAACP lawyer, Charles Houston, who focused his efforts on higher education, where he thought there would be less resistance to integration. One of the early cases under the Houston plan was Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada, 1938. In this case, the court forced the state of Missouri to admit a Black applicant to its law school. This challenge was based on the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy. Thurgood Marshall, chief counsel for the NAACP, won another school desegregation case in Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents, 1948, which required Oklahoma to establish a separate school for one student by assigning three teachers to instruct Ada Sipuel, a Black student in the law. Additional higher education desegregation decisions included Sweatt v. Painter, 1950, where the federal district court failed to require the University of Texas to establish a separate law school for Black students. In McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents of Higher Education, 1950, a federal district court judge's order forced Oklahoma to admit a Black graduate student. In the McLaurin decision, a Black student was admitted to the law school in Oklahoma but was segregated from the White students in the classrooms, cafeteria, and library (Raffel, 2002).

THE BROWN DECISIONS

The McLaurin decision was struck down on appeal by a higher court. This decision encouraged Thurgood Marshall to challenge public school segregation in elementary and secondary education (Stephan, 1980). On May 17, 1954, Chief Justice Warren announced the unanimous decision of the United States Supreme Court in Brown I and ended the "separate but unequal" doctrine of Plessy (Raffel, 2002). The Brown I litigation consisted of five separate cases that were consolidated and argued under the legal theory that segregation in public education violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. The five cases in Brown I included: the school system of Clarendon County, South Carolina; the Topeka (Kansas) Board of Education; two small school districts in Delaware; the Prince Edward County (Virginia) Board of Education; and the District of Columbia School District. The Brown I decision did not result in any immediate desegregation in the South, but called for admitting students to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with "all deliberate speed" (Stephan, 1980).

Brown II

The Warren Court did not provide guidance on the implementation of Brown I until one year later in Brown v. Board of Education, 1955 (Brown II). This decision gave federal district courts authority to determine when dual public school systems would be eliminated. Furthermore, Brown II gave local school districts and state authorities responsibility for implementing the decisions of the federal district courts on school desegregation. Moreover, Brown Il required these courts to monitor the implementation of their orders in public school desegregation cases (Stephan, 1980).

MASSIVE RESISTANCE

The "all deliberate speed" language in Brown I was problematic for public school desegregation. This language was vague and gave Whites in the South a means to delay school desegregation. Clearly, the plaintiffs in Brown I underestimated the will of Whites to resist the law, even when it was decided by the United States Supreme Court. Instead of complying with the new law, White politicians all over the South responded by creating the "massive resistance" movement (Raffel, 2002). An example of "massive resistance" was Virginia Governor Stanley's efforts to organize an all-White legislative commission in 1954 to examine the problems created by the Brown I decision. This Commission recommended a Virginia Pupil Placement Board (VPPB) to:

* Take over the process of student assignment in all Virginia public schools.

* Require Black students who wanted to enroll in White schools to make an application to the VPPB.

* Avoid forcing children to attend integrated schools by recommending a system of tuition grants for private schools financed with state funds.

* Urge the General Assembly to amend the compulsory attendance law to permit students from being required to attend integrated public schools.

The recommendations of the VPPB were defeated by the General Assembly because they were viewed as too liberal, even though they were designed to minimize public school desegregation (Smith, 1998). In place of the Commission's recommendations, a tuition grant system for private schools and the doctrine of "interposition" was enacted in 1956 by the General Assembly of Virginia. The tuition grant system was later amended to permit the award of state grants to pupils attending private, nonsectarian schools and other institutions of learning. This permitted White parents to enroll their children in private schools and to avoid public school desegregation.

One of the most drastic examples of "massive resistance" also occurred in Virginia, when Prince Edward County, Virginia closed its public schools on September of 1959, rather than to desegregate. The parents of White public school children were given tuition grants from the Commonwealth of Virginia and advised to enroll their children in private schools. Prince Edward County also gave them real estate and personal property tax credits to defray the costs of a private education. On the other hand, Black public school parents, in the county, were not given any financial support and many of their children were without a public education for as long as five years. The Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County finally voted on June 23, 1964, to honor the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 1964 and reopened the public schools as desegregated (Murrell, 1998; Pratt, 1992).

Massive resistance to public school desegregation was not limited to Virginia. Federal District Court Judge, W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., issued a second order for public school desegregation in Boston on September of 1974, which led to the redistricting of schools and pupil transportation in 80 of the district's 200 schools. Mob violence erupted in South Boston and Hyde Park High Schools because of a lack of support for desegregation among politicians and the Boston School Committee (United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1976).

OTHER IMPORTANT SCHOOL DESEGREGATION caseS

There are several cases that are extremely important to the public school desegregation movement. These cases have provided the case law that is used by federal district court judges and plaintiffs' attorneys to address the effects of discrimination against Black public school children.

New Kent County, Virginia

The federal district court in Green v. County Board of Education in New Kent County, 1968, identified six factors to determine if the vestiges of a dual educational system were present in this public school district. These factors (became known as the Green factors) and are extremely important to public school desegregation. The Green factors are student assignment, faculty assignment, staff assignment, facilities, transportation, and extracurricular activities. Today, they are used by federal district courts in unitary status hearings to determine if a school district that is found1 Io Lave discriminated1 agamsl Black public scLool students has ceased its discriminatory ways and should be declared as a unitary system. Green also questioned the use of "freedom of choice" plans and required results that actually achieved student racial balance in this important school desegregation case (Raffel, 2002; Rossell, Armor, & Walberg, 2002; Russo, 2003).

Charlotte, North Carolina

This case involved desegregating the public schools of the city of Charlotte, North Carolina, and the county of Mecklenberg, North Carolina, which were merged, prior to the desegregation litigation, into a local governmental unit known as the Charlotte-Mecklenberg Public Schools (CMS). Charlotte is a large predominately Black and Hispanic community that is surrounded by the largely White suburbs of Mecklenburg County. The Black, school-age population in 1971, at the time of the Charlotte desegregation, litigation was approximately 29% or 24,000 pupils of the total district enrollment of 100,000 students. Approximately 14,000 of these Black students attended 21 schools in the system with enrollments of at least 99% Black students. The merger of these units makes the Charlotte somewhat unique, as many public school desegregation cases involve only inner city school districts. The Charlotte desegregation plan restructured school attendance zones and utilized busing, which was ordered by the federal district court. The busing in this case was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 1971. Swann also reaffirmed the use of race-based numerical guidelines to determine what constitutes a racially integrated public school system (Raffel, 2002).

Denver, Colorado

School desegregation became a national issue when the U.S. Supreme Court in Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 1973 expanded the view of school desegregation by requiring the Denver Public Schools (DPS) to develop separate school desegregation plans for Black and Hispanic students. This requirement recognized that Hispanic students experienced similar discriminatory treatment in Denver, as did Black students. In the development of the desegregation plans, the court also required an emphasis on bilingual and bicultural education. Keyes was the first federal district court-ordered public school desegregation case in a northern school district and one that did not involve de jure segregation (Raffel, 2002; Stephan, 1980).

Detroit, Michigan

The school desegregation movement's next milestone was the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Milliken v. Bradley, 1974 (Milliken I). The issue in Milliken was whether the court should create a metropolitan district that included the predominantly Black City of Detroit and its surrounding White suburbs. This was the only viable option to create meaningful public school desegregation in Detroit. However, in a 5 to 4 decision written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Supreme Court did not sustain the lower court and ruled there was insufficient evidence regarding intentional discrimination on the part of the county school systems. The Supreme Court also found that a metropolitan system would place an undue burden on the county school systems, because they did not engage in either de jure (legal) or de facto discrimination against the Black students of Detroit. In Milliken v. Bradley, 1977 Milliken II, the Supreme Court faced the difficult decision of providing a remedy and ordered the state of Michigan to fund educational programs to repair the harm caused by the segregation of the Black students in Detroit. This was an important decision in school desegregation and led to other courts fashioning their remedies after those provided m Milliken II (Feagin, 1980; Gralia, 1980; Zirkel & Richardson, 1988).

Dayton, Ohio

The Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 1977 (Dayton I) provided a setback for public school desegregation regarding de jure segregation in a northern school district. The court held in Dayton I that the segregative acts of the board in some school attendance areas of the district did not rise to the level required by the court to order a system wide remedy. However, in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 1979 (Dayton H), the Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts ruling and found that the combination of intentional segregation of the Dayton Board of Education through its past practices and the consequences of a duel system constituted an appropriate basis for a system wide remedy (Zirkel & Richardson, 1988).

Richmond, Virginia

The Richmond Public Schools operated an unsuccessful voluntarily desegregation plan for four years prior to being ordered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 1971 (Bradley I) to reassign students and teachers to promote desegregation in this school district of 52,114 students. The plan required extensive citywide busing to which there was considerable opposition and produced "White flight" to the surrounding counties and private schools. White flight seriously undermined desegregation in Richmond, even though the Supreme Court ruled the plan was constitutional. When the federal district court-ordered desegregation, the racial composition of students in Richmond was 21,139 or 42.18% White and 28,975 or 57.82% Black. These differences in the student racial composition of the district masked the extent of racial segregation that existed before desegregation for both racial groups. Because of de jure segregation, the schools were segregated by race, which meant that 100% of the students attended schools where their race was in consonance with the other students. This created a perception for some that there were more White students in the district, than there actually were. When the federal district court-ordered desegregation in 1971, the number of White students decreased from 21,139 to only 16,429. This change was attributed to "White flight" that altered the racial percentages for White students from 42.18% to 36.97%. During the second year of implementation, even more "White flight" occurred, and the percentage of White students dropped from 36.97% to 17% and Black students increased from 63.03% to 83% (Pratt, 1992).

Metropolitan Desegregation

Since "White flight" was anticipated in Bradley I, the Richmond School Board petitioned the federal district court to approve a metropolitan school desegregation plan. The metropolitan plan would have resulted in a single school district of 104,000 students made up of the public schools of Chesterfield and Henrico and the City of Richmond. The consolidated school district would have had a student racial composition of one-third Black and two-thirds White. This assignment plan would have created the opportunity for meaningful student integration. However, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 1973 (Bradley II) in a 4 to 3 decision that school consolidation in Richmond, like in Detroit, was unacceptable. There are those who will continue to contemplate what would have happened if Justice Lewis1 Powell, a prestigious Richmond attorney and former chairman of the Richmond School Board, had not recused himself from voting in this case. Many view the Supreme Court's decision on consolidation as unfortunate and permitted "White flight" to continue in Richmond (Pratt, 1992; Raffel, 2002).

THE ADMINISTRATION OF COURT ORDER DESEGREGATION

Background

As mentioned earlier, Richmond was disappointed but not surprised by the unfavorable vote of the U.S. Supreme Court on school consolidation and began immediately to shift its focus from desegregation to instructional improvement. This policy shift was done because the last opportunity to achieve meaningful school desegregation was now gone. Richmond will be used as a case study in this article to illustrate how court-ordered desegregation was administered in an urban school district. The author of this article was superintendent of this district for several years during court-ordered desegregation and has personal knowledge of the district's operations. The following background will provide greater understanding of the procedures used to administer court-ordered desegregation in Richmond:

* The scope of the remedy in Bradley I was limited, as it was in many public school desegregation cases before Milliken II. As you recall, Milliken II provided additional relief to remedy the segregation that existed in the Detroit Public Schools.

* The Commonwealth of Virginia was not a defendant in Bradley I and, therefore, was not required to share in the cost of providing a remedy in Richmond.

* Richmond is a fiscally dependent school district and derives the majority of its funding for operations and capital improvements from the City of Richmond.

* During my tenure with the district, the Richmond Public Schools deliberately did not seek to be awarded unitary status. This was done to ensure that the City of Richmond would not withhold funds that were needed to remedy the discrimination in this district.

* Richmond was required to address the Green factors that were discussed earlier and to report periodically on the status of implementation to the federal district court. Again, the Green factors are student assignment, faculty assignment, staff assignment, facilities, transportation, and extracurricular activities. These factors will be used as a theoretical framework to organize discussion of the administration of court-ordered school desegregation in this district (Raffel, 2002).

Student Assignment

The federal district court's interim school desegregation plan on August 31, 1970, in Bradley I, was designed to address the housing segregation that existed in Richmond and employed crosstown busing of approximately 13,000 students. On April 5, 1971, the federal district court-ordered a new and more comprehensive desegregation plan, which was later affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. This plan provided free busing to all students and required racial balance in the schools. Approximately 21,000 students were bused during the 1971-1972 school year (Pratt, 1992). Several changes were made to the student assignment plan during the years of my administration. Changes in the student assignment plan were subjected to a very deliberate and time-consuming process, which was designed to obtain the approvals of Judge Merhige's court and the Richmond School Board. It was not possible to implement changes in the pupil assignment plan without the approval of both of these groups. Court-ordered school desegregation presented an additional layer of decision making in the school district and limited the authority of school board and superintendent. The Richmond school officials could have elected to resist the orders of the federal district court but wisely decided to use them to the advantage of the students of the district. This principle guided all interactions between Judge Merhige's court and the Richmond Public Schools, during my administration.

The process of obtaining approvals for changes in the student assignment plan was sequential. It was developed by my administration in consultation with the school district's desegregation attorney. The process incorporated prior notification of all parties, including the plaintiffs in Bradley I and members of the Richmond School Board. The superintendent:

1. Conferred with the Chairman of the Richmond School Board on the proposed change(s) to the student assignment plan. If the chairman thought the rest of the Board would be receptive to the change(s), it was pursued further. If not, the idea was dropped and the administration moved on to something else.

2. Met with our desegregation attorney to ascertain what he thought the court's reactions would be to the proposed change(s).

3. Discussed the proposed change(s) in an executive session of the Richmond School Board. This was done to discuss the potential legal action the change would require and to ascertain whether to proceed. If there was no opposition, we proceeded to the next step.

4. Met with the plaintiffs' legal counsel and informed him of the proposed change(s). If he did not indicate any opposition, we proceeded to the next step.

5. Informed the President of the Richmond Council of Parent and Teacher Association (PTA) that we were considering making a change(s) in the pupil assignment plan.

6. Met with the district's desegregation attorney and requested they formally seek permission from the court to make the proposed change(s) in the student assignment plan.

7. Was notified by the district desegregation attorney if the court required a hearing on the proposed changes.

8. Requested that the proposed change be placed on the School Board's agenda for discussion, and the community was notified of a public hearing on the proposed change(s).

9. Presented the proposed change(s) to various stakeholders in the community and in the school district. This included meetings with the Richmond Council of Parent and Teacher Association (PTA), the Richmond Council of Ministers, student leaders, and employee and administrator groups.

10. Was notified by the district desegregation attorney that the court had approved/ disapproved the proposed change(s) to the student assignment plan.

11. Reviewed the responses of the groups with the Chairman of the Richmond School Board and, based on the responses, recommended that the board act on the proposed change(s).

12. Observed the School Board's approving/disapproving the proposed change(s).

13. Implemented the proposed change(s) of the student assignment plan.

Since most of the requests for changes in the pupil assignment plan were initiated in the schools or community, there were generally few objections. However, this was not the case when major changes were proposed. There was an additional step that was used in these cases. An example of a major change in the student assignment plan was when a new, system-wide feeder system was under consideration. The feeder system defined the movement of students through the grades from elementary to middle and high school and permitted them to remain together as student groups through each level of education. This resulted in most of the students in the district being reassigned to new schools. The additional step involved in considering this change involved the school desegregation attorney and the superintendent meeting with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) attorneys in New York. The purpose of this meeting was to personally present the district's rationale for the change and to ascertain whether we might expect opposition. This was done before the proposal became public, and it was designed to avoid any lengthy legal battles over the proposed change.

Faculty Assignment

During the implementation of the interim plan in Bradley I, the faculty was not reassigned. However, Federal District Court Judge Merhige ordered faculty assignments in his 1971 order. This meant the racial composition of every school faculty was to reflect the student racial composition of the district, which at the time was 69.1% Black and 30.9% White (Pratt, 1992). Richmond had a large number of highly qualified Black teachers because of two historically Black universities in the area and the years of racial segregation in the schools. Because of these factors, the racial composition of the teachers was similar to the student body. In addition to reassigning faculty, it was necessary for the administration and its staff to be racially balanced. This meant hiring several minority assistant superintendents and departmental directors for the district. The administration reported periodically to the court on the racial composition of the faculty and staff.

Facilities

The federal district court did not order any school facility improvements for the district in its orders. However, the district requested that the superintendent survey all school buildings and develop a long-range capital improvement plan. This was done and the municipal government was asked over several years to fund the capital improvements. The City of Richmond was obligated to fund the needed capital improvements and understood that they might be asked to explain their actions to the federal district court. Many capital improvements were made, including major building renovations and the construction of several new schools. The Richmond school administration incorporated these improvements into Bradley I, by reporting them to the court and by requesting that it approve the capital improvement plan. Periodically, the administration reported to the federal district court the status of implementation of the capital improvement plan and requested that changes in the use of the school buildings was approved by the court.

Transportation

The federal district court-ordered major cross-town busing in the 1971 order. The City of Richmond was required to provide funding to purchase new school buses and to finance the costs of the transportation system. Over the years, the administration altered the transportation system and obtained the approval of the court for each change. A computerized routing and scheduling system was implemented, personnel monitors and cameras were installed on selected school buses, and a training program for bus drivers was instituted. During the 1980s, a lease-purchase plan was developed to replace the aging bus fleet of approximately 200 vehicles and a garage was developed to speed up the process of conducting state safety inspections and to make repairs to school buses. Because of these factors, the City of Richmond remained a vital partner in meeting the district's obligations to the court. The Richmond school administration incorporated the costs of transportation into Bradley I, by reporting them to the court and by asking it to approve them. The administration also reported periodically to the federal district court on the status of student transportation that was required to carry out the remedy in Bradley I.

Extracurricular Activities

Richmond provided free transportation for students to participate in extracurricular activities. This requirement was incorporated in the court's orders by requesting that it approve the overall transportation system. In addition, Richmond maintained extensive after-school and other extracurricular activities, such as interscholastic athletics, debate teams, music groups, and school clubs. Because of these factors, the City of Richmond continued to support the cost of extracurricular activities. The Richmond school administration incorporated plans for extracurricular activities into Bradley I by reporting them to the court and asking it to approve them. Periodically, the administration reported to the federal district court the status of extracurricular activities consistent with Bradley I.

EFFECTS OF DESEGREGATION

Economic Costs

The economic costs of school desegregation have varied considerably among school districts and have increased with a shift in policy from achieving racial balance to one that is focused on improving educational quality. This policy shift has been reflected in several court-ordered desegregation cases after Milliken II (Lindseth, 2002), and the economic impact of this policy change, in part, can be illustrated by comparing the estimated costs of the federal district court's 1971 order in the Bradley I with other cases that were implemented after Milliken II. judge Merhige, in Bradley, required the City of Richmond to provide the school district with sufficient funds to purchase 56 new school buses and to pay the increased operational costs of transportation. Both costs were estimated to be $517,000 annually (Pratt, 1992). These costs are far less than what the State of Missouri was required to pay in Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F.Supp. 19, 23-24 (W.D. Mo. 1985) and Liddell v. Board of Education of the City of St. Louis (1980), which amounted to over three billion dollars for the period of 1983-1997 to desegregate the public schools in Kansas City and St. Louis, Missouri. In Kansas City and St. Louis, funds were provided to pay for transportation and educational enhancements, including class-size reductions, expanded professional development and compensation for teachers, before- and after-school programs, early childhood programs, special literacy and educational reform programs, and extensive school capital improvements (Alexander & Alexander, 2003; Lindseth, 2002). The author of this article worked as an expert witness and consultant for several years in the Jenkins case and is familiar with the costs of Milliken II type remedies in this community.

Racial Isolation

Another view of the increase in the proportion of Black students in public school districts is attributed to not only "White flight" but to differences in birth rates and immigration patterns of student populations. This position is supported by estimates of the United States Census, which indicate that the number of Black students enrolled in the public schools increased by 3%; while Latino student enrollment increased by 89% and White student enrollment decreased by 14% from 1972-1992. The data on the increases in student enrollment of various racial groups were augmented by information presented that indicated that in 1992, 89% of Whites, 95% of Blacks, and 92% of Latinos attended the public schools in the United States. Public school desegregation actually decreased the racial isolation of public school students in southern states, where the percentage of Black students who attended White schools in the South increased from .001% in 1954 to 39.2% in 1991. However, there are growing concerns that districts in the South will begin to re-segregate, that is, as they receive unitary status from the federal district courts. In addition, student racial isolation is occurring in the states of Michigan, New Jersey, Tennessee, Alabama, Connecticut, and California (Orfield, Schley, Glass, & Reardon, 1993).

Student Achievement

Did student achievement increase with public school desegregation? Apparently, the type of school desegregation influences Black student achievement. The first type of school desegregation was found in pre-Milliken II cases, where the focus was primarily on achieving racial balance. As commonly understood, the primary objective of public school desegregation was to dismantle the duel educational systems that existed for Whites and Blacks in public school districts, which were primarily located in the South. The second type of school desegregation was post-Milliken II cases, which were focused largely on instructional policies that might be used to improve Black student achievement. Furthermore, Rossell (1983) maintains that metropolitan school desegregation plans have demonstrated better Black student achievement effects when compared to other types of school desegregation plans. Also, Black student academic achievement is directly related to the percentage of White students. The higher achievement for Black students in these situations might also be attributed to the school's overall increased socioeconomic level that tends to follow increased levels of White participation. (Armor, 2002; Mahard & Crain, 1983).

Metropolitan Desegregation

Metropolitan school desegregation cases appear to be more successful with regard to producing less "White flight" than inner city plans. Rossell (1983) notes that county wide desegregation plans experienced less "White flight" because the cost for families to relocate is greater than in city school districts. It is unfortunate for children who attend the public schools in urban districts, such as Richmond and Detroit, where the United States Supreme Court did not authorize metropolitan or consolidation desegregation plans. With school district consolidation, perhaps the quality of public education would have been enhanced for the students in these locations.

CONCLUSION

Desegregation has been an extremely difficult policy change to implement in communities throughout the United States. This is particularly true for southern school districts like Charlotte and Richmond, where racial segregation in the public education was required by state laws. However, from 1966 to 1975, a total of 518 public school districts were desegregated. Of these districts, 40.7% were desegregated by the courts, 34.1% through the efforts of the Health, Education, and Welfare Department of the federal government, and 19.9% by local initiative (United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1977). Today, public school desegregation is less viable than it was in the decades following the Brown decisions. There has been a change in view of the courts and the executive branch of the federal government regarding the importance of public school desegregation, has now been replaced with charter schools, state-funded vouchers programs, and statewide accountability systems. These are the new strategies to improve the education of minority students in public education and only time will tell if they are successful (Brown, 2003a; Brown, 2003b; Hunter, 2003, pp. 10-12).

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Richard C. Hunter University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

AUTHOR

RICHARD C. HUNTER is Professor of Educational Administration at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and a former superintendent of the public schools in Richmond, Virginia; Dayton, Ohio; and Baltimore, Maryland. he has worked as a consultant and expert witness in several school desegregation cases.

All queries or comments regarding this article should be addressed to rchunter@uiuc.edu.

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