Challenge of Institutionalizing Civilian Control: Botswans, Ivory Coast, and Kenya in Comparative Perspective, The

The Challenge of Institutionalizing Civilian Control. Botswana, Ivory Coast, and Kenya in Comparative Perspective by Boubacar N'Diaye. Lanah @ Maryland, Lexington Books, 2001 (pp. 191).

Thirty-six of the 53 African states south of the Sahara have experienced a military takeover since independence. Others have been threatened by conspiracies and/or mutinies. In seeking explanations for policies that would promote and sustain civilian control of Militaries, Boubacar N'Diaye carefully reviewed the literature on sub-Saharan military interventions, He concluded that both structural and nonstructural explanations lacked historical perspective, that few theories incorporated the effect of either the Cold War's end or economic structural adjustment programs, and that the existing studies did not suggest policies which would lead to effective civilian control. N'Diaye also concluded that it might be more productive to study civilian control strategies pursued by the countries which did not experience coups, and he proceeded to do just that and, moreover, to do it well.

At the time of N'Diaye's study, a mere eighteen sub-Saharan countries had experiencedcivilian government. From these, N'Diaye selected Botswana, Ivory Coast, and Kenya for an in-depth and comparative analysis. By the completion of his work, one of these, Ivory Coast, had experienced a military takeover. This did not invalidate NDiaye's work, however, for he distinguishes government strategies which institutionalize civilian control over the long term from strategies which may successfully prevent coups in the short term, but which may leave a government even more vulnerable over the long haul. While the Ivory Coast had enjoyed years of civilian government, N'Diaye saw its strategies as ones which made it moderately vulnerable to a coup.

N'Diaye assumes that civilian control of the military is enhanced by (1) a perception of the government as legitimate and (2) strategies which do not use the military against political opponents, which do not manipulate the military politically (particularly with regard to promotions and ethnic compositions, and which promote military professionalism and distinctiveness. He describes four overall approaches to control of African militaries. The first focuses on providing good government which results in the government's being seen as legitimate by both citizens and the military. The second emphasizes rewarding (paying off) senior military officers. The third (particularly true of former French colonies) relies on external guarantors, The fourth, characteristic of Marxist regimes, in particular Mozambique and Angola, politically penetrates, or better, permeates the military. N'Diany does not consider the fourth strategy, because both Angola and Mozambique suffered extended civil wars even if they did not have military regimes.

N'Daye believes Botswana enjoys low vulnerability to a coup because it has conscientiously provided "Good governance" (p. 59). Its elections have been free and fair, force has not been used to maintain political power, and government is perceived as responsive and honest. Botswana also delayed the creation of a military until some years after independence. When a military was established, constitutional and legal provisions and professional training lent support to civilian control. Further, once established the military was provided with a large budget. Finally, although most major military appointments were the responsibility of the armed services, the son of Botswana's first president was made second in command of the military.

Kenya is said to have pursued the "payoff" option. Its first president, Jomo Kenyatta (1963-78), faced a mutiny soon after taking office. His response was to provide lavish benefits, bonuses, and opportunities to senior officers. He also manipulated the ethnic composition of the military and created the General Service Unit, a well-disciplined and equipped semiautonomous military force within the Kenyan police (p. 127f). His successor and the current president is Daniel Moi, who followed Kenyatta's footsteps even to the strategies for maintaining control of the military. He, too, faced a coup attempt early in his presidency; he, too, reacted by providing great largesse to senior officers, by manipulating the military's ethnicity, and by supporting a paramilitary counterweight. Further, the legitimacy of Moi's government is low because of its record of abuse of human and political rights, its use of state-sponsored violence, and corruption "rivaling Mobutu's infamous regime" (p. 143). N'Diaye sees these factors combining to make the state highly vulnerable to a coup even though Kenya has thus far avoided a military takeover.

In the Ivory Coast, the civilian government relied upon the presence of French troops and bases to maintain its control. However, it also pursued secondary strategies which included a spoils system for the officer corps, ethic manipulation of the military, politicized military promotions, and the bringing of high-ranking officers into the government. N'Diaye concluded this does not auger well for a reduction in coup vulnerability (p. 109). This was particularly true after France announced (and in the case of Niger acted upon) a new policy of nonintervention with regard to regimes in its former Colonies (p. 120).

This is a well structured, instructive volume which tries to understand what makes a government vulnerable to a coup and what strategies reduce such vulnerability in the long run-as opposed to short-term measures which may avert an immediate coup but which actually make the government more vulnerable to a future coup. N'Diaye's strategy topology (seeking governmental legitimacy, offering payoffs, relying on external guarantors, and permeating the military) is a useful one. He emphasizes that choices, policies, decisions merit study. He does recognize that economic performance and income distribution are important factors in perceived legitimacy, but does not believe that they should be considered determining variables in coups or their prevention. He laments the expense and political interference typical of so many African militaries, but believes that emerging democracies can build on African traditions to create legitimate governments which then have the best likelihood of sustained civilian control of the military (p. 154). In his view, Botswana should be considered a model not an anomaly.

While confined to a study of sub-Saharan states, this study deserves consideration when the civil-military relationship of other states are under examination. There is a well-developed literature on that relationship in Latin American countries. But what is to be made of the deposition of elected heads of state and their replacement with women supported by the military but without military action in, for instance, Indonesia and the Philippines? Should states which assume the existence of civilian control be more conscious of policies which could lead to coup vulnerability? France suffered a mutiny within memory. All those relations merit reflection.

Reviewed by Judith Hicks Stiehm

Department of Political Science

Florida International University

Copyright Dr. George Kourvetaris Winter 2001
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