role of arms transfers in the quest for human security, The

Blanton, Shannon Lindsey

THE ROLE OF ARMS TRANSFERS IN THE QUEST FOR HUMAN SECURITY1

The global transfer of arms has long been a part of international relations. Since the end of WWII, however, the international arms trade has grown enormously and has assumed an increasingly significant role in international relations. During this same time, developing countries have come to play an expansive role as recipients in the global arms marketplace. This pattern of affairs raises a number of questions, among them one as to the nature of the relationship between arms transfers and the quest for human security in the Third World. This question is here explored by assessing cross-- nationally the linkage between arms imports and subsequent changes in the level of human security in developing countries. Employing a pooled time-series cross-sectional design, the patterns of arms acquisitions behavior and conditions of human security are examined for the years 1981 through 1995, with the empirical results suggesting a harmful relationship between the two.

Journal of Political and Military Sociology 2001, Vol. 29 (Winter):240-258

Arms transfers have long comprised an important dimension of international affairs. Indeed, the supply of and demand for arms has existed for as long as war and military preparedness have been aspects of international relations. Yet in the years following World War II, the international arms trade has become increasingly diffuse and has taken on an enlarged role in international relations. One of the most prominent trends is the expansive role Third World countries have come to play as recipients in the global arms marketplace. Indeed, as noted by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (Grimmett, 1994), near the end of the twentieth century "both arms transfers agreements with and arms deliveries to the Third World continued to comprise roughly two-thirds of all such arms trade activity worldwide."

This pattern of arms transfers raises a number of questions: What is the significance of the increasing military capabilities and military expenditures of developing states? What are the human consequences of the acquisition of arms for recipients? Furthermore, what is the relationship between arms transfers and the quest for security, which, as argued by Krause (1992:121), "in the broadest sense is perhaps the predominant concern of Third World states, regimes, and peoples?" This study explores such questions by examining the linkage between arms transfers and human security, broadly defined.

WHAT IS HUMAN SECURITY?

The quest for security is typically conceptualized in terms of attempts to reduce political-military threats arising from external sources (Goertz & Diehl, 1990). This understanding of security rests on the realist assumption that "the capacity to coerce, kill and destroy becomes the important source of power, and thereby, the safeguard for national security" (Azar & Moon, 1984:106; see also Ayoob, 1991). Consequently, the military aspect of security is at the top of the national security agenda.

However, a growing number of scholars contend that the traditional conceptualization of security presents a false reality of the security situations of most developing countries. In these countries, internal politics have as much an impact as the international environment in determining the nature and extent of security (Gasteyger, 1985). Domestic struggles such as those between "regimes...and citizens over the distribution of goods within society and the nature of political institutions" (Krause, 1992:121) overshadow or are entangled with externally oriented quests for security. The character of conflicts in the international system reflects this. Between 1989 and 1999, only seven of the 110 armed conflicts were between states; the rest were internal (Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 2000). Thus, in order to understand and explain the security needs and consequences of developing countries, an alternative conceptualization is required that taps into an internal dimension of security.

In this study, the term human security refers to the internal conditions needed to assure the political and personal security of the individual. Subsumed within the concept of human security are conditions that ensure political autonomy and are often associated with democratic forms of government, such as competitive political participation and freedom of expression. Also included are rights that guarantee personal security such as due process, fair and public hearings, and protection from arbitrary arrest, detention, exile, or torture. Additionally, conditions that "provide a social dimension to the ideal of personal autonomy" (Donnelly, 1993:24) are incorporated, such as access to food, health care, and education. Human security is thus conceptualized in terms of democratic, personal integrity, and human development conditions.

THE IMPACT OF ARMS ON HUMAN SECURITY

Arms transfers are a tangible characteristic of quests for security within developing countries. Intimately linked to the traditional perspective of security, they are perceived as a primary tool in a strategy of defense against threat. Yet it may be that instead of enhancing security, the acquisition of military weapons instead leads to an erosion of security. The paradox of extensive military buildup is that it often adds to the dilemmas of domestic insecurity faced by many developing countries (Ayoob, 1980). These insecurities can range from military challenges against the regime in power to an enhanced proclivity towards internal repression to the channeling of funds for arms purchases at the neglect of the populace's basic human needs.

For instance, arms transfers likely constrain democratization in developing countries. As Maniruzzaman argues (1992:738), it may be that "by strengthening the armed forces, arms transfer facilitates and accelerates the process of military takeover of the powers of the state." The acquisition of sophisticated weapons creates a need for advanced training which in turn results in the professionalization of military personnel and the intensification of institutional loyalty. While the existence of military forces does not in and of itself preclude democratic government, a strong military creates a number of problems. Even after democratization, the military often still exists within the polity as a political actor, both as a strong organized institution and as a core of individuals that comprise a political-military elite. As such, the military often voices opposition to new democratic leaders (Gills, Rocamora, & Wilson, 1993). Indeed, in developing countries where there is a history of at least periodic authoritarian rule, the military tends to prize institutional loyalty and place societal order and political-economic stability above democratically resolving the socio-political challenges that often accompany democratic transitions (Kryzanek, 1995). Moreover, as the military commonly retains significant control over the management of violence, an intrinsic dimension of the modern state is removed from the scope of democratic politics (Stepan, 1988). Thus, in many developing countries, arms exacerbate the tensions between the military establishment and democratic government and consequently compromise democratic governance.

A second component of human security, internal repression, may be facilitated by the import of arms. Arms imports by developing countries may indicate a national environment in which maintaining political order is more important than respecting individual liberties (Blanton, 1999). To this end, military forces seek arms to support the residing powers controlling the state and to combat popular discord. Arms may also serve as the actual instruments of repression. Although arms transfer programs are officially designed to strengthen the ability of countries to fend off external threats, many of the weapons traded are used internally to control disorder and suppress dissent (Klare & Arnson, 1981).

Arms transfers also likely exacerbate the constraints on human development that many developing countries face. In terms of basic resource allocation decisions, a country's military burden competes with human development. According to critics of military spending, a direct and unfavorable trade-off takes place between military needs and state provisions of goods, services, and facilities for the general population's social and economic welfare. Thus, an enhanced military burden entails a "reduction of state spending on health, education, and so on, as a share of GDP" (Deger & Sen, 1987:92).

In summary, the predominant issue that this study investigates is whether traditional national security strategies, namely the acquisition of arms, can account for conditions of human security. Much of the literature on the arms trade and developing countries has either focused on the economic effects of the arms trade or emphasized the determinants of arms transfers from the perspective of major suppliers. The empirical analysis of the socio-political consequences of the arms trade from the perspective of Third World recipients has been neglected. Of those studies that do exist, a few found the presence of a military government (McKinlay & Cohen, 1975) and military expenditures (Park, 1987; Wolpin, 1986; 1991) to be most pronounced for violently repressive countries. Others have examined such factors as inequality of income distribution, socio-economic welfare, per capita economic growth, and military expenditures and found a negative trade-off between military expenditure and state provision of facilities, goods, and services (Deger & Sen, 1987; see also Sen, 1983). Overall, though, few studies "address the impact of the arms transfers on the developing countries at the receiving end" (Maniruzzaman, 1992:734). Yet the need for evaluation of the linkage between arms transfers and internal conditions of security is considerable. It is this gap in the literature that this study seeks to fill.

ORGANIZING THE INQUIRY

In this study, a comprehensive data set is used that includes information for 91 developing countries for a fifteen year period dating from 1981 through 1995. The year 1981 is an appropriate starting point because developing countries were sizable players in the international arms marketplace by the 1980s. The year 1995 is the latest year for which complete data for all the variables are available.3

The Human Security Variables

In this study, human security is conceptualized in terms of democracy, personal integrity rights, and human development. Thus, three models are analyzed with each of the human security elements serving as the dependent variable.

Liberal Democracy -- Liberal democracy represents the facet of human security concerning political autonomy. Many scholars (Vanhanen, 1990; Huntington, 1984) conceptualize democracy primarily in terms of the institutional dimension of democratic rule. However, others (Bollen, 1993; Dahl, 1971) conceptualize democracy in recognition of both political liberties as well as democratic rule. To capture the two-dimensional conceptualization of democracy, information is used from two data sources to create a democracy index. The first source is the Polity 98 data set, which focuses on the authority structures of polities (Jaggers & Gurr, 1999). The second source is the Freedom House index of political rights.4 The authority structure and the political rights data were each rescaled5 and then combined by averaging the two scores.6 The result is a six-point democracy index that ranges from a low of 0 to a high of 5.

Personal Integrity Rights -- This element of human security represents the security of the individual and consists of such violations of personal integrity as murder, torture, imprisonment, and forced disappearance. The data used in this study were originally produced through content analysis of the Amnesty International and State Department reports (see Gibney & Dalton, 1996). Scales based on each of these sources range from one to five, with a one indicating a low level of repression and higher scores representing greater levels of repression.7 A single index was created by averaging the two scores.8

Human Development -- Human development reflects a social dimension of human security that involves such basic qualities of life as "the reduction of infant mortality, as well as increases in life expectancy, literacy, education, health and nutrition" (Deger & Sen, 1987:84; Donnelly, 1993). In this study, data on life expectancy and literacy are used to measure human development.9 To overcome problems of collinearity, each measure was converted to a z-score and then averaged together to produce a single index, with low scores indicating low levels of human development and high scores indicating higher levels of human development.

Arms Transfers

The independent variable of primary interest in this study, arms imports, is measured with data from the ACDA's World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers.10 In addition to major conventional weapons, the ACDA arms transfer data include "nonarmored military vehicles, communications and electronic equipment, artillery, infantry weapons, small arms, ammunition, other ordnance, parachutes, and uniforms" (ACDA, 1997:189). This is particularly useful in this study since "small arms are essential to understanding the domestic impact of weapons transfers" (Gerner, 1983:16). The ACDA also provides estimates of the value of items actually delivered during a particular year separate from the value of agreements that may result in a future transfer of arms. This too is important because "the most accurate indicator of the extent of and the impact of arms transfer activities is the delivery to other nations of weapons systems, equipment, and services -- not merely what was promised, authorized, or agreed" (Louscher & Salomone, 1987:23),11

Control Variables

In addition to arms transfers, there are other elements that likely affect human security in developing countries. To take into account such elements, several control variables are included in the model.

Domestic Production -- While most developing countries must turn to external suppliers for weapons,12 the past few decades have seen a growing number develop some form of domestic arms production (Rosh, 1990; Brzoska, 1989). Therefore a variable is included in the model to allow for the possibility that arms obtained from domestic manufacturers, rather than (or in addition to) arms obtained abroad, affect human security conditions. 13

External Conflict -- When a country is involved in an external conflict, the population is often called upon to sacrifice elements of human security. For instance, in times of war, the government may suspend political liberties and commit acts of domestic political violence, particularly against internal groups that are perceived as being sympathetic with the "enemy" (Krain, 1997; Poe & Tate, 1994). Additionally, the quality of life may decline if efforts to conserve a country's resources for the war effort require that the citizenry forego certain goods. However, it is possible that involvement in war may lead to a mobilization of a country's resources, and positive spillover effects may take place. A variable is thus included in the model to assess the linkage between human security and external conflict.14

Internal Conflict -- When a government is faced with domestic threats, it may seek to maintain order and enforce compliance to the state (Krain, 1997). Political and social liberties may be suspended and personal integrity rights violated. Thus, a variable is included in the model to estimate the impact of internal conflict on human security.15

Perceived Insecurity -- It is unlikely that constraints on human security end at the precise moment when a country's involvement in external or internal conflict comes to a close. Government is likely to continue to perceive threat for some time and thus will maintain a tight control over society (Blanton, 1999). Two variables are included to assess the potential impact of perceived insecurity. One indicates whether a country was involved in an external conflict in a preceding five year period; another indicates whether a country was involved in an internal conflict.16

Scarcity -- Human security is also likely affected by conditions of scarcity. When such conditions exist, a society is not able to meet its basic needs and human development suffers. Moreover, such conditions create social and political tensions in response to which governments are apt to forcefully maintain control and repress personal integrity rights and democratic political liberties (Davenport, 1995; Poe & Tate, 1994). In this study, GNP, per capita and population are used as indicators of scarcity.17

Method

Pooled regression is an appropriate technique to use when analyzing data that is gathered across time and space. With pooled regression, the model must be properly specified so that the summed residuals of the unit means approximate zero, there is equity between unit residual variance, and the pattern of autocorrelation within each unit is stationary (Stimson, 1985). Therefore, problems posed by autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity must be considered when selecting the appropriate estimator as they may lead to the inaccurate estimation of standard errors and consequently cast suspicion on the results of statistical tests.

Feasible generalized least squares frequently has been used to address these problems. However, this estimator violates the assumption that the error process is known and thus underestimates standard errors and exaggerates estimates of statistical significance. As an alternative, Beck & Katz (1995) recommend ordinary least squares regression with additional techniques to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.18

In this study, Cook-Weisberg tests show heteroscedasticity to be a problem for each human security model. Panel-corrected standard errors are used to address this as they perform better than OLS standard errors by taking into consideration the contemporaneous correlation of the errors (Beck & Katz, 1995). Durbin-Watson statistics indicate that autocorrelation is also a problem. These effects are addressed by controlling for panel specific autocorrelation within each model.19

RESULTS

To assess the impact of arms transfers across multiple dimensions of human security, I use three separate models. In the first model, democracy is the dependent variable. In the second and third models, personal integrity rights repression and human development are the dependent variables.

Democracy - As depicted in Table 1, the results show that arms imports, the independent variable of primary interest in this study, is significantly related to the human security element of democracy. The negative relationship between democracy and arms imports indicates that developing countries that import greater amounts of arms are less likely to be democracies. This suggests that in many developing countries, arms imports strengthen not only the military's capacity for the use of force but also the political position of the military vis-a-vis democratic civilian government. As a consequence, the development of democratic governance is inhibited.

Turning to the control variables, both domestic arms production and GNP per capita are positively related to democracy. The distribution of wealth measured by GNP per capita and the resources and infrastructure that are prerequisites to domestic arms production likely reflect conditions favorable to democratic governance. However, internal conflict and perceived insecurity from external threat are not conducive to democracy and may in fact enhance the role of the military in society.

Personal Integrity Rights - Arms imports and the abuse of personal integrity rights are positively related. In other words, developing countries that import greater amounts of arms have higher levels of human rights abuse. These results indicate that arms facilitate the repression of individuals. Arms may function as the actual instrument of abuse or they may contribute to a repressive national security environment.

Like arms imported from abroad, arms produced domestically also appear to impede respect for personal integrity rights. Similarly, external and internal conflicts, and the perceived insecurity resulting from such conflicts, are associated with increased personal integrity rights repression. A negative relationship between GNP per capita and personal integrity rights indicates that as GNP rises, the level of human rights abuse decreases.

Human Development - Though there is a negative association between arms imports and human development, the empirical estimates do not meet standards of statistical significance. Thus no relationship between arms imports and this element of human security was uncovered.

Domestic arms production is positively associated with human development. The ability to produce arms connotes a certain modicum of resources and infrastructure that are uncommon in the developing world.20 As with democracy, it may be that these qualities are linked to increases in human development. Not surprisingly, higher levels of human development were associated with higher levels of GNP per capita. The perception of external threat was also linked to increased levels of human development, suggesting that preparation to combat external foes has spin-off effects that enhance human development. Internal conflict and the perception of internal threats, however, translated into lower levels of human development.

Human Security: Comparison and Contrast - As shown in Table 1, the empirical results suggest a harmful relationship between arms imports and human security. Domestic arms production is significantly related to the elements of human security as well. However, while there is a negative relationship between domestic arms production and personal integrity rights, domestic arms production is positively related to democracy and human development. As discussed previously, while arms from both domestic and foreign sources may be used to repress the populace, domestic arms production may entail resources and infrastructure that are conducive to human development and democratic governance.

Both prior and ongoing internal conflicts are related to a decline in human security. Countries involved in internal conflict are more likely to repress democratic and personal integrity rights and have lower levels of human development. Moreover, perceived internal threat is associated with personal integrity rights abuse and a decrease in human development as well. This finding suggests that the achievement and maintenance of internal order receives precedence over the personal and political needs of individuals.

The perception of external threat is linked to the repression of personal integrity rights and a decline in democracy. However, it is positively related to human development. Perhaps the extensive mobilization required to combat external forces has spin-off effects that boost a country's level of human development. Ongoing external conflict is related only to the repression of personal integrity rights, a finding that may be due to the rare nature of interstate warfare during this period.

As an indicator of scarcity, GNP per capita is significantly related to all three elements of human security. Low-income countries are less likely to be democratic, respect personal integrity rights and provide for a basic quality of life. It is possible, then, that certain economic conditions are an important prerequisite to successful political and social development. Population, an alternative indicator of scarcity, is not statistically significant. Thus evidence as to the impact of population size on human security is inconclusive.

CONCLUSION

The findings indicate that the import of arms by developing countries fails to enhance human security. Specifically, increased arms imports are linked to weaker levels of democracy and harsher personal integrity rights conditions. Thus a paradox exists: though arms are commonly conceived as a primary tool for increasing "security" against threats, in reality they contribute to insecurity in the developing world.

Therefore, to the extent that policymakers seek to enhance the personal and political security of individuals in developing countries, a policy emphasis on nonmilitary means of attaining and promoting such conditions is needed. As the threats countries face increasingly become internal in nature, the conceptualization of security should change to reflect these new realities. In turn, the tools used in pursuit of security should also be considered anew.

Though arms transfers may provide short-term stability, the results here suggest that they are hardly an effective foundation for long-term political development. Within developing countries, policymakers need to break out of the vicious cycle of countering insecurity with increased armaments -- which in turn increases, rather than decreases, domestic insecurity. Indeed, it would be better to use political and financial capital to bolster domestic institutions, enhance governmental services, and constrain the role of the military as a political actor.

Given that the trade of arms is not likely to be abandoned, at the very least the findings of this study support policies and global agreements that recognize the importance of human security concerns in controlling the transfer of arms within the international community. To this end, arms suppliers could support an international "code of conduct" whereby arms suppliers constrain the export of arms to those countries that are democratic and respect human rights.

1 I thank Paul Hagner, Robert Blanton, Harvey Starr, and Charles Kegley for comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript. Thanks also to Samantha Bennet for her data entry endeavors. Any errors remain mine alone.

Many suffer from methodological limitations. For instance, in studies by Wolpin (1986; 1991) analysis was restricted to countries that imported arms as opposed to the universe of countries. Similarly, the focus was primarily on the U.S., and to some extent the Soviet, component of the arms trade rather than arms imports regardless of supplier. Also, the analyses were basically straight comparisons of raw data figures for arms transfers and human rights conditions in recipient countries and did not incorporate a full range of control variables. In the study by Deger and Sen (1987), the generalizability of the findings are similarly limited as the study examined data that was available for any year in the 1970s for just ten developing countries.

' "Developing" countries are those identified as such in the UN Human Development Report (UNDP 1994: 225).

4A number of studies have supported the Freedom House index of political rights as an appropriate and satisfactory indicator of democracy (Burkhart & Lewis-Beck, 1994; Poe & Tate, 1994; Bollen, 1993). It assesses a wide array of theoretically recognized political liberties, the measurement criteria has markedly improved over the years, and it has an extremely high validity rating in comparison to other indicators of democracy.

5 The Freedom House political rights scale was first inverted to increase readability.

6 High correlation between the two democracy indicators suggests the possibility of a collinearity problem in pooled regression. Thus, a single democracy index was created following John Fox's (1991: 14) suggestion that when "several regressors in the model can be conceptualized as alternative indicators of the same underlying construct... the measures can be combined in some manner, or one chosen to represent the others."

7 In the interest of maintaining a conceptual and operational distinction between personal integrity rights and democracy, the Amnesty International and State Department reports are used instead of the Freedom House indexes. These reports are more consistent with the narrow conceptualization of personal integrity rights as violations against the dignity of the individual.

For cases where data were missing for one of the sources but not the other, the available data were used as the score in the index (see Blanton, 1999, 2000; Poe & Tate, 1994).

9 Data are from the UN Human Development Report and the UN Statistical Yearbook. Missing data were interpolated to provide a smooth fit with the available data. This is a common technique of calculating missing data and provides a conservative estimation. However, analytical results should be considered in terms of trends with care taken not to place too much emphasis on slight variations.

10 Arms imports are measured in millions of U.S. constant 1991 dollars. Constant (instead of current) dollars take into account effects of inflation and minimize artificial growth. However, some scholars still question the use of dollar value measures (Baugh & Squires, 1983; Sherwin & Laurance, 1979). Measures that focus on the quantity and characteristics of weapons depict arms transfers as multi-dimensional and avoid problems of valuation, deflators, and exchange rates. However, operationalization encounters serious difficulties. Not only are linkages between weapons characteristics and political behavior not robust enough to be uncovered by minor differences in weapons systems, the decision makers of recipient countries are not likely to discern distinctions in weapons characteristics (Louscher & Salomone, 1987).

11 As an indicator, arms imports have a greater degree of validity and reliability than military expenditures in general. Not only do governments purposefully restrict the availability of military expenditure information to other governments, data on military expenditures are based on widely varying domestic definitions. This causes a problem because countries often include different items under the categories of armed forces or defense, move military expenditures from one category to another over a period of time, and arrange their budgets so that it is difficult to identify security-related outlays by ministries other than the Ministry of Defense (Ball 1988). In contrast, arms transfer data are more readily accessible and avoid some of the dollar valuation and conversion problems associated with military expenditures. In this study, arms import data were logged to correct for skewness.

12 Furthermore, as Frederic Pearson (1989: 157) argues, "states' ability to produce weapons does not necessarily lessen their desires or needs to import weapons or parts for them."

13 In this study, a dummy variable indicates the presence or absence of indigenous arms production capabilities in any given year. Data for this indicator were obtained by compiling, from a number of articles on the topic (Looney 1989; Deger, 1986; Evans, 1986), a list of countries that met the criteria of being able to produce at least one major weapons system. Additionally, a country was assessed as having domestic production capabilities if it demonstrated a record of exporting arms as indicated by the ACDA's

WMEAT.

14 Data for 1981-1992 are from J. David Singer and Melvin Small's Correlates of War Project (1994). The external conflict variable indicates the number of months in a year in which a country was involved in either an international war or intervened into a civil war in another country. However, since COW data were not available beyond 1992, data from Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1997) were used for 1993-1996 following the 1000 battle death criteria. Because Wallensteen and Sollenberg do not provide the exact date of initiation and termination of the conflict, the variable was coded 0 for the absence of conflict and 12 for its presence (see Blanton, 2000).

15 Data for 1981-1992 were drawn from the civil war data set of Singer and Small's Correlates of War Project (1994). The internal conflict variable reflects the number of months in a year in which a country experienced civil war on its own territory. This indicator of conflict was selected, as opposed to non-violent forms of dissent, because other studies have shown that "violent strategies of conflict provoke a greater repressive response from the regime" (Davenport, 1995: 687). For 1993-1996, data from Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1997) were used, with a code of 0 indicating the absence of civil war and 12 its occurrence.

16 These dummy variables are based on data from Singer and Small's (1994) Correlates of War Project.

17 GNP per capita is used as a measure of economic development. Measured in constant 1991 US dollars, data are from the ACDA's World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers and are logged to correct for skewness. Population data are also from the ACDA's WMEAT. Large populations may indicate scarcity as they place a lot of stress on a country's resources (Poe & Tate, 1994).

18 Beck and Katz maintain their recommendation even though there remains a chance of bias as OLS ignores the pooled structure of the data and treats each case as "independent of all others, not as part of a set of related observations" (Stimson 1985: 918).

19 Some studies have addressed autocorrelation by lagging the dependent variable by one year and including it in the model as an independent variable (Blanton 1999; Davenport 1995; Poe & Tate 1994). However, STATA version 6.0 provides an option that explicitly controls for panel-specific autocorrelation.

20 Only 15 of the countries in the data set have domestic arms production capabilities.

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SHANNON LINDSEY BLANTON University of Memphis

SHANNON LINDSEY BLANTON is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Memphis. Her research interests focus on political violence and human security, with a particular emphasis on human rights, democracy, and the arms trade. Her recent research has appeared in such journals as the American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Peace Research, and International Interactions.

Copyright Dr. George Kourvetaris Winter 2001
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