Commentary: On Civil Procedure - Eye on Maryland pleadings

The Court of Appeals and Court of Special Appeals issued several important opinions in 2004 that will continue to shape Maryland pleading and practice. We hope to outline the cases and their potential impact in our supplement to the current Third Edition of Pleading Causes of Action in Maryland, due out in June. In the interim, this update on the most consequential cases of the past year may come in handy.

We start with Tierco Maryland Inc. v. Williams, an interesting case that brought home the importance of properly matching the causes of action pled to the facts alleged and all relevant evidence.

Tierco, 381 Md. 378, 849 A.2d 504 (May 14), involved claims by patrons of an amusement park against the park for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and negligent supervision in connection with alleged mistreatment at the park. There was no mention of race in the complaint, but race was injected into the trial.

Reversing a judgment for the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals observed that [t]he mistreatment of individuals on the basis of race, if that is what occurred, is deplorable and, if properly pled, actionable, but it cannot be the focus of a trial where it is not relevant to proof of any element of the theories of recovery pled by [the plaintiffs].

The court homed in on Md. Rule 2-305, which requires that a complaint contain a clear statement of the facts necessary to constitute a cause of action. The paramount purpose of this requirement, wrote the court, is to give defendants notice of the claims against them.

A practice tip from Tierco: be sure that the facts you allege constitute, and support, the causes of action you plead. Those allegations may well have ramifications with respect to the evidence you are permitted to present at trial.

What's in a name?

Here's another tip: Think twice about trying to keep a client's name out of a lawsuit. Last year, the Court of Special Appeals reconsidered the Maryland Rule 1-301 (a), which requires that original pleading contain names and addresses of all parties unless they are unknown.

Usually, that rule can be taken for granted, but it became pivotal in King v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 157 Md. App. 287, 850 A.2d 428 (2004). The case involved a breach of contract suit by two insureds against their insurance carrier for damages they alleged were covered by their policy. At the request of the insurer, the trial court forbade the parties from identifying the insurer as the defendant before the jury. The Court of Special Appeals reversed.

The court held that the John Doe procedure was inappropriate in the circumstances of King. The court cited case authority in describing instances where parties are permitted to proceed anonymously (i.e., when some sort of social stigma or physical threat to the plaintiffs could result from a disclosure of their identities). The court then held that State Farm's request that its identity be kept secret was merely a concern over potential adverse economic consequences, a reason generally held to be insufficient under the cases.

Negligence

Finally, we turn to a tragic case of potentially great consequence to those working in the public sector. Horridge v. St. Mary's County Department of Social Services, 382 Md. 170, 854 A.2d 1232 (2004) contains the past year's most detailed analysis of pleading requirements for negligence causes of action.

The case concerned a child who had died from multiple blunt force injuries. After the crime, allegations arose that prior reports of abuse of this particular child had been ignored without follow up by a local department of social services (DSS), a unit of the State Department of Human Resources. Nine counts ensued in Horridge, including three negligence counts that became the focus of the plaintiff's appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Referencing Scott v. Jenkins, 345 Md. 21, 690 A.2d 1000 (1997), the majority opinion by Judge Alan M. Wilner comments that:

We confirmed in Scott that, in a negligence action, a complaint must 'allege, with certainty and definiteness, facts and circumstances sufficient to set forth (a) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (b) a breach of that duty and (c) injury proximately resulting from that breach.'- Merely stating that a duty existed, or that it was breached, or that the breach caused the injury does not suffice-.

(Emphasis in original.)

With that foundation, the court turned to the central questions, namely, whether (1) the statutory obligation to conduct a thorough investigation and take appropriate steps to protect the child creates a civil duty on the part of DSS to the child who is the subject of a report of abuse, and (2) if so, and subject to the State Tort Claims Act, liability exists on the part of the State or individual social workers if harm ensues to a child because of a negligent breach of that duty.

The majority answered both questions affirmatively, sparking a vigorous dissent from Judge Dale Cathell in an opinion joined by Judge Lynne A. Battaglia.

The following excerpt from this dissenting opinion underscores the potential significance and scope of the majority opinion in Horridge:

The majority creates today the template for tens of thousands of lawsuits that heretofore did not exist. For the first time in the history of this State, an employee of the State who does not commit an affirmative act placing a victim in danger and who investigates the matter prior to the injury to the victim and makes a discretionary determination that no further action is needed, but is mistaken and the subject of investigation is later injured, now creates liability for himself or herself and the State. The majority's holding cannot be logically limited to the factual parameters of this case - the death of a child. The majority's reasoning does not, and cannot, logically limit the applications it now creates, by the result of the mistake in the exercise of the social worker's discretion, i.e., that it will only apply if the injury to the child exceeds a certain level. Duty, if it exists, is not determined by the degree of injury. Once a duty is created, as the majority creates it, a breach of that duty will be actionable if any injury occurs.

Watch and wait

Time will tell if Horridge spawns tens of thousands of lawsuits. Certainly, it should catch the attention of plaintiffs suing the state for negligence.

Next week, we'll consider other recent cases touching on the entitlement to a trial by jury and, while we're at it, offer a few lessons learned from our review of past year's highlights.

James K. Archibald is a partner at Venable and co-author, with Paul Mark Sandler, of Pleading Causes of Action in Maryland, 3rd Edition, published last June by MICPEL. Trial lawyer and author Paul Mark Sandler is a partner with Shapiro Sher Guinot & Sandler in Baltimore. His weekly column for The Daily Record, Raising the Bar, will not appear this week or next.

Copyright 2005 Dolan Media Newswires
Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights Reserved.