Time For A New Course On Colombia - US-Columbia relations - Brief Article

Besides coffee and cocaine, Colombia now has another major export--people. Last year, some 300,000 Colombians fled violence internally, while many more sought refuge in surrounding countries and the United States. Marxist guerrillas operate freely in about 70 percent of the territory and this nation of 40 million now accounts for half of all abductions worldwide. To Colombians, the problem is weak government and too much violence. But to U.S. officials who must connect national interests to the narrow focus of local politics, it is drug trafficking. Until the United States and Colombia see eye to eye, neither problem is likely to be adequately addressed.

Endemic Disorder

Disorder is endemic to Colombia. Throughout its history as a democracy, Colombia has had weak public institutions and minimal control over its vast rugged landscape. Since the late 1940s, low-level Marxist insurgencies have attacked villages, blown up power lines, and kidnapped landowners for ransom money--at first with little prospect of toppling the national government. But that changed after 1992 when local cocaine production boomed. The guerrillas soon latched onto a $500 million-a-year bonanza protecting drug lords and one group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) even engaged in production itself. While insurgents have forced the police and military into retreat, self-styled paramilitary groups have stepped in with indiscriminate attacks on suspected guerrillas or supporters.

Based on self interest to reduce illegal drug flows, the United States has given modest amounts of counter-narcotics aid to the government. But there is a new sense of urgency. Americans now spend about $62 billion on illegal drugs and the social costs in lost productivity and health care are $110 billion at last count. Because coca cultivation has more than doubled since 1992 and an estimated 90 percent of cocaine reaching U.S. borders comes from Colombia, the Administration hastily put together a $1.6 billion emergency assistance request to demonstrate commitment on this issue through the end of its administration. It was based on Plan Colombia, a program U.S. officials helped the Pastrana Administration write more than a year ago to interdict traffickers, foster respect for human rights, and encourage alternative development.

Narco-Guerrilla Mayhem

Both Plan Colombia and the U.S. aid package were crafted to avoid involvement in a "dirty" war with Colombia's guerrillas and to placate international human rights monitors, potential European aid donors, and liberal members of the U.S. Congress who wanted to keep a tight rein on Colombian security forces. The result is a disjointed effort to go after drug traffickers and disband paramilitaries, while turning a blind eye toward narco-guerrilla mayhem.

So far, the police and army seem unwilling to disband the paramilitary groups while President Pastrana's ongoing attempts to negotiate with the guerrillas have taken several wrong turns. In 1999, he granted the FARC a "safe zone" the size of New Jersey without getting any substantive concessions. In February of this year, he arranged for FARC leaders to visit European leaders to "educate" them on milder forms of socialism to no avail. In May, he generously suggested the creation of another safe zone for the smaller National Liberation Army (ELN), even though it had no bargaining strength and Colombian citizens overwhelmingly opposed it.

Government negotiators now argue such ridiculous points as whether insurgents may use children as combatants or if kidnapping is permissible. And while the guerrillas consistently refuse any concessions, no one can get to the field to make meaningful progress on alternative development or crop substitution. Expecting success in the midst of such confusion is madness.

Recently, there were signs our government might be coming to this realization. Phil Chicola, State Department's director of Andean affairs, told the Associated Press that he had misjudged the intransigence of the Colombian guerrillas. At the same time, U.S. officials now say the main objective of Plan Colombia should be for the Colombian government to extend its authority throughout its national territory. These views come on the heels of pointed criticism from the U.S. House Government Reform Committee on the Department's poor management of current and past assistance efforts.

Negotiations, a Waste of Time

Whatever new administration takes over the White House this January should consider recasting U.S. goals to go beyond anti-narcotics and to see the Colombia problem through Colombian eyes. It should lay the groundwork for a cooperative effort to help Colombia develop public institutions capable of serving and protecting all citizens throughout its territory. It should recognize that negotiating with guerrillas in meandering peace talks has been a waste of time and urge President Pastrana to impose conditions and state clear goals. Furthermore, the United States should encourage Colombia to regard insurgents and paramilitaries alike as illegal armed groups and work to disband both. Guerrilla political agendas should be reserved for the ballot box instead of being imposed by force or by negotiators.

Colombia's citizens have tolerated violence and indecision to the point that is has become habit. As a partner in the drug fight, the United States should realize this and promote a more comprehensive course before no one is left but the kingpins and their rebel partners.

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