South Korea: looking at the left

Martin Hart-Landsbert teaches economics at Lewis and Clark College, Oregon.

Nearly all the friends and comrades of my youth are dead, hundreds of them; nationalist, Christian, anarchist, terrorist, Communist. But they are all alive to me...On the battlefields and execution grounds, on the streets of city and village, their warm revolutionary blood flowed proudly into the soil of Korea, Manchuria, SLiberia, Japan, China. They failed in the immediate thing, but history keeps a fine accounting.

--Nym Wales and Kim San (1)

From reading the many books and articales celebrating the South Korean "iracle." it is easy to get the impression that almost all South Koreans have as their goal the creation of a "capitalist democracy" based on U.S. institutions and values. Whether by design or out of ignorance, most writers fail to mention the fact that when Korea was divided into North and South almost all Koreans opposed not only the creation of a separate South Korean state, but also its capitalist character. The era of Japanese colonialism (1910--1945) had given rise to an anti-capitalist progressive movement led by Communists. Although repression by the U.S. and South Korean governments eventually destroyed that movement, the dream of a non-exploitative, independent Korea never died. In the 1980s, a Left-led movement demanding a unified and progressive Korea fueled by decades of dictatorship, has reemerged in the South. In this paper I will describe its background and dynamics Japanese Imperialism and the Rise of the Left

Imperialism has played a crucial role in shaping twentieth-century Korea. With the support of the U.S. and British governments, Japan annexed Korea in 1910, thereby ending Korea's existence as an independent nation. Seeking to create its own onternational imperialist network, Japan restructured the Korean economy to produce first it steady stream of agricultural commodities, then raw materials, and finally manufactures for Japanese use. Japanese rule was harsh and "efficient." Millions of Korean peasants were driven off their land; in the 1930s and 1940s many were forced to become mining and manufacturing workers in Korea, Manchuria, and Japan itself. This brutal introduction of capitalist relations of production put an end to the agrarian-based social relations of over 500 years.

At first Korean nationalists of elite origin led the resistance to this colonization, but when the Japanese violently suppressed the March 1st Independence Movement of 1919, these elite leaders either left the country or accommodated to Japanese rule. Those who left soon lost contact with supporters in Korea and ceased to be active.

During this era of Japanese occupation the left played its first significant role in Korean history, establishing the Korean Communist Party in 1925 and becoming the main political group actively opposing Jampanese imperialism. Many Korean Communists also fought against the Japanese from locations in Manchuria and northern China (as did Kim San, who wrote the opening quote of this article). Although unsuccessful in maintaining a party structure in Korea, the Communists, especially during the 1930s and 1940s, led demonstrations, strikes, and rallies which strengthened popular resistance to foreign rule and capitalist domination.

Communist influence in the labaor movement was strong and very threatening to Japanese plans. A series of associated solidarity strikes by women rubber workers led to the 1925 formation of the Korean Labor Federation (KLF). In addition to better working conditions, the KLF called for the overthrow of' capitalism and liberation of the working class. As warrelated industrialization became increasingly important to the Japanese, they increased repression of labor activism. Driven underground, trade union organizers established direct links with the Communist movement. A labor slogan of the 1930s illustrates the resulting unity of labor and the Left: "Guarantee the rights to strike and to form or participate in a revolutionary organization!"

Given their underground strength, Korean leftists were prepared for independence when the Japanese surrendered at the end of the Second World War. Wlith leftist leadership, People's Committees formed to maintain law and order; and workers, peasants, youth, and women organized their own mass organizations. Immediately after the surrender, for example, workers' committees occupied most of the Japanesese-owned factotries (which accounted for more than 85 percent of all industrial capital) in order to prevent sabotage. Workers transformed their committees into unions and joined the unions to form the National Council of Korean Labor Unions (NCKLU). At its founding the NCKLU represented 25 percent of the entire Korean work force, a rate of organized labor membership still unequaled in South Korea.

As Koreans attempted the restructuring of their country's political and economic institutions, they found themselves ill conflict with U.S. foreign policy. Worried that the Soviet military advance in Korea might jeopardize U.S. hegemony in the Pacific, thae U.S. government announced that its troops would receive the Japanese surrender and exercise political authority south of thc 38th parallel. The Soviet Union respected the announcement, but before U.S. troops could be sent to southern Korea, representatives of the People's Committees met in Seoul and established the Korean People's Republic (KPR); the various mass organizations including the new NCKLU quickly affiliated with it. The KPR offered a revolutionary economic platform, stressing, land reform and public ownership of mines, major manufacturing factories, railways, communications, and banking. In terms of rights, it pledged civil liberties, labor reform, the emancipation of women, and a nonaligned foreign policy.

Since the KPR enjoyed the support and leadership of both a committed Left and a highly politicized working class, it was in a strong position to implement its program of revolutionary transformation. Edwin Pauley, one of President Truman's closest advisers, agreed with this assessment. After a tour of Korea, Pauley wrote Truman: "Communism in Korea could get off to a better start than practically anywhere else in the world."(2) Subsequent U.S. actions altered the KPR's position.

U.S. Imperialism and the Fall of the Left

Recognizing KPR and NCKLU activities as it threat to its authority, the U.S. military government in southern Korea declared the KPR illegal, outlawed strikes, arrested NCKLU organizers, and created new institutions to replace People's Committees. Many South Koreans fought back with strikes and demonstratins, leading to a general strike and massive rioting in several provinces. The government declared martial law and U.S. troops were called out to break the strikes and restore order. Thousands of demonstrators were killed and imprisoned.

Opposition to U.S. plans for a separate capitalist regime in the South were broad-based. When the United States announced elections would be held to form a South Korean state, political forces from all over Korea, including most of the conservative opposition in the South, gathered at a conference. The participants called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and peaceful unification without foreign interference; they opposed the election, dictatorship, and monoply capitalism. When the United States ignored these demands, and elections resulted in the 1948 creation of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), southern leftists began a two-year guerrilla war.

The guerrillas' defeat was followed within months by the beginning of the Korean War--a final attempt by the left forces to unify the country.(3) As northern Korean troops swept South they joined with southern activists to reactivate People's Committees and carry out land reform. If the United States had not intervened militarily, this civil war probably would have elided quickly with the establishment of a united Korea under left leadership. But the United States responded with massive force (millions died in the three years of fighting) and successfully reimposed the South Korean regime led by Syngman Rhee whose officials murdered tens of thousands of civilians sympathetic to the Left. By the war's end, the Left had been eliminated as a significant political force in South Korea.

Government Policies and Liberal Resistance

Following the Korean War, anti-government forces still existed in South Korea, but were far less organized and radical than the left opposition had been before the war; they also faced tremendous state repression. The moderate Progressive Party, advocating socialist democracy, a planned economy, and peaceful reunification, received two million votes in the 1956 presidential election. In response, Rhee had its leader arrested and executed (on the false charge of spying for North Korea) and disbanded the party.

Rhee, autocratic and corrupt, was filially driven from office by a student uprising in April, 1960. Taking advantage of this political opening, South Koreans staged, in the ten months after the fall of Rhee, approximately 2000 street demonstrations involving over one million people; the most commondemands were for reunification and economic restructuring.

This popular mobilization, however, was not a direct continuation of the politics that had existed before the Korean War. Rhee had succeeded in destroying the Left and its ideological dominance, and opposition to the regime was now led by students with no strong ideological position or organizational links to the population at large. Thus, while dissatisfaction with the regime was strong, it also was politically unfocused and disorganized. Four days before a widely publicized and popularly supported meeting of students from the North and thc South was to take place, the military, under Park Chung Hee, seized power. Because the U.S. project still lacked legitimacy, it had to be saved by military dictatorship.

Park moved quickly to establish control by outlawing all public demonstrations arid meetings; dissolving the National Assembly, political parties, and labor unions; and creating the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). These steps were manifestatiaons of the new new regime's slogan: "Victory over Communism." Recognizing that such policies would not be popular, Park sought support for his rule through economic growth. Powered by a state-directed program of export-led industrialization, the South Korean economy set records for GNP growth over the period 1963-1978.(4)

This economic growth, however, failed to legitimate the government in the eyes of most citizens; beginning in the late 1960s, they began to resist the oppressive social changes that were part and parcel of the South Korean growth model. As artifically low farm prices bolstered industrialization, peasants destroyed government property and demonstrated at government offices. As forced migration to cities led to the formation of an industrial labor force and to a concomitant rise in poverty, housing shortages and pollution, the urban poor demonstrated and burned down housing projects. As repressive labor conditions retidered export industries profitable, workers fought for better wages and working conditions.

Park responded to this challenge by heightening repression. After widespread fraud, bribery, and voter intimidation yielded only a slim victory over Kim Dae Jung in the 1971 presidential elections, Park decided that even sham democracy was too dangerous. He declared maritial law in October 1972 and wrote a new constitution which made him a "legal" dictator. From this time until his assassination in 1979, Park ruled by means of presidential decrees that outlawed criticism of himself and his policies, and by the KCIA, which routinely arrested and tortured dissidents.

Opposition to Park's regime, motivated largely by a liberal vision of "capitalist democracy," continued in spite of the dictatorship. But dissindents were slow to join their efforts together. In the 1960s students and religious activists had given little attention to the struggles of workers, farmers, and the urban poor in demonstrating against government policies. Moreover, no unions or other mass organizations were allowed to exist outside of government control. The 1970s, however, witnessed some progress in movement building. When Chum Tae-il, a young garment worker, burned himself to death in 1970 to protest oppressive working conditions, the tragedy jarred students and church activists into awareness of the desperate conditions many workers and farmers faced. Workers also were becoming better organized and receptive to alliances. The rapid pace of industrialization in the second half of the 1970s helped to strengthen labor's position. And after repeated attempts to improve working conditions were frustrated by the combined strength ofthe state, the police, bosses, and the state-controlled union federation, many workers became convinced that economic gains could come only through political action.

By the end of the decade, a number of anti-government activists had begun to relate the struggle for democracy to the demands of ordinary people. In so doing, they began to question the pro-capitalist reform agenda put forward by the liberal opposition movement's two main political leaders, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam. The two Kims (as they are called in South Korea) had risked life and freedom to oppose Park, but espoused only reformist politics: support for the United States and its policies; opposition to communism; and liberalization rather than transformation of the South Korean capitalist system. As we will see below, the objective realities of the democratic struggle-most dramatically the KwanLyju uprising-eventually led a critical mass of activists to reject the leadership of the two Kims and form an alternative, left movement based on far more radical principles.

The Kwangju Uprising and Resurgence of the Left

Park's regime came to a sudden end when a series of government provocations beginning in late summer 1979 led to riots in the industrial cities of Pusan and Masan. Differences emerged within the government over how to respond. Disagreeing with the government's proposed hard-line approach, the head of the KCIA shot and killed Park.

Park's death opened the political floodgates: Students marched for a democratic constitution, reunification, and dismissal of hard-liners in the government and military; workers struck for higher wages and labor reform. The interim civilian government raised hopes by pledging democratic reform, but members of the military soon were maneuvering for power behind the scenes. Before popular forces grew too strong, General Chun Doo Hwan pushed the weak civilian governmment into declaring martial law on May 17, 1980 arid ordered military to end all mass demonstrations and political activities.

South Koreans resisted this military takeover, most strongly in the city of Kwangju. When protesting students there were viciously attacked by soldiers, citizens, outraged at the violence, joined the protests. Encountering increased violence, the protesters seized weapons and drove the army from the city. A citizen committee formed to negotiate a peaceful end to the confrontation and asked U.S. officials to serve as mediators. The officials declined to mediate, citing a commitment to neutrality in the internal affairs of South Korea, but the U.S. commander in South Korea revealed the true interests of the United States when he gave General Chun permission to use U.S.-controlled South Korean troops to "restore order" in Kwangju. Teans of thousands of South Korean troops assaulted the city, killing over 2000 people in the nine-day uprising.

To the shock of most South Koreans, U.S. President Jimmy Carter, contrary to his rhetorical commitment to human rights, supported Chun's actions and offered new loans to the government. Not long after, Chun received the "honor" of becoming the first foreign leader to meet with newly-elected U.S. President Ronald Reagan. Japan also showed its support when Prime Minister Nakasone, on a visit to South Korea, offered Chun a new aid package.

Kwangju and the events surrounding it were instrumental in moving many liberal anti-government activists to reevaluate the role ofthe United States (and Japan) in Korean history and contemporary South Korean politics. U.S. and Japanese support for military dictatorship stood out as a logical consequence of both countries' desire to maintain the division of the peninsula and existing South Korean political and economic structures. Since foreign interests and intervention set limits on change that were unacceptable to the democratic movement, activists realized that the struggle for democracy had to be broadened to a struggle for national liberation.

A significant core of activists formed explicitly anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist organizations in the South for the first time since the Korean War. First, in 1984, a number of unions and workers, blacklisted after Chun's takeover, formed the Workers' Welfare Association (WWA) to help rebuild the South Korean labor movement. WWA leaders saw their work as a continuation of the efforts of the left-led National Coalition of KoreanTrade Unions in the 1940s. Also in 1984, some twenty-three organizations representing writers and artists, students and professors, workers and farmers, and various religious and women's groups, formed the United Minjung (People's) Movement for Democracy and Unification (UMDU). The UMDU, in contrast to Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, called for a new "people's constitution" with a leading political role for workcrs and farmers; anti-capitalist structural change of the economy; an end to U.S. and Japanese intervention in South Korean affairs; direct popular initiatives for reunification; and closer identification of South Koreans with other Third World peoples.

The sutdent movement also went through major changes. Two radical groups emerged in 1986: Ja-min-tu (the Struggle Committee for Anti-Imperialism) and Min-min-tu (the National Democratic Struggle Committee for Anti-Fascism). Both groups oppose the present regime and imperialism and view the working class as the linchpin of successful revolutionary transformation of Korean society. Although they cooperate, the two groups differ on tactics, with the larger Ja-min-tu stressing U.S. imperialism and Min-min-tu targeting the South Korean ruling class as the main enemy.

This multi-centered Left shared the priority of strengthening the labor movement and concentrated on organizing workers, supporting strikes, and demonstrating for labor reform. They also agreed on the importance of increasing antiU.S., anti-imperialist consciousness, so they highlighted U.S. support for dictatorship and continued division of the peninsula.

By 1985, WWA, UMDU, and radical student organizers realized a significant measure of success in achieving their aims. Noteworthy in terms of labor struggles were the Daewoo Motor Company strike and the Kuro industrial area strike. In the former, WWA organizers led auto workers in a major action against an economically important South Korean joint venture with General Motors. In the Kuro action, students turned out to support women text workers striking Deawoo Apparel Co.; thousands of textile workers in ten other factories also went out in the nation's first sympathy strike since the 1940s; and a national consumer boycott of Daewoo Apparel Co. was organized by student and women's groups. Student demonstrations also multiplied against Chun and the United States: The largest occurred when over 80,000 students demonstrated against Chun and Iiis visit to the United States. Iii a number of highly publicized events, students attacked U.S. facilities in South Korea.

The 1987 Election and the Left's Lost Bid for Leadership of the Opposition

Not only the government but also the mainstream opposition was greatly concerned by the Left's organizational consolidation and growing influence among workers and students. Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam were leading a joint campaign to force thea gaovernment into allowing direct election of the president. Each ofthe two leaders felt that he could win the election, and each feared alternative actions which would deflect attention from the campaign, particularly radical activities which stressed anti-U.S. and pro-working class themes.

Buoyed by their success, and seeking to sharpen differences with the mainstream opposition, UMDU and radical student activists organized a major demonstration in the industrial port city of Inchon where, on May 3rd, 1986, thousands of students and industrial workers marched through the city shouting slogans against U.S. imperialism and military dictatorship and for people's revolution. The demonstrators were attacked by police, and street battles raged throughout the afternoon and into the evening. The government expanded its response into a major anti-Left crackdown; within days the entire leadership of the UMDU was either under arrest or underground.

The Left did succeed in sharpening the difference between the revolutionary forces who aimed to restructure South Korean society and the dictatorship with its pro-capitalist opposition. Both the radicalism of the demonstration and the violence of its suppression shocked the nation. Government leaders tried to use the incident to isolate and destroy the Left, but events surrounding the Inchon march turned out to spark public debate over many of the issues raised by the demonstrators: the U.S. and South Korean governments' attitude to reunification, the U.S. role in Kwangju uprising and economic dominance in general, and the speed and quality of democratization,

The Inchon demonstration also triggered debate among left activists over whether they were moving so fast that they risked alienating key sectors of the population. Maily argued that terms such its "people's revolution" and "Imperialism" did not yet have meaning for most people, so they decided on grassroots organizing around more accessible issues: release of political prisoners, end to torture and tear gas, arid freedom of press and assembly (to build anti-fascist consciousness); removal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons f'rom South Korea, an end to joint South Korean-U.S. war games, and independent initiatives toward reunification (to build anti-imperialist consciousness); reforms that strengthened working-class, student, farmer, and urban poor self-organization (to build support for people's revolution).

This strategy enabled the left and liberal opposition to renew their ties and form a coalition to advance the campaign (launched by the two Kim's) for constitutional reform and direct election of the president. It was the radical wing of this coalition that mobilized the millions of people who demanded democratic change during 1986 and 1987. Their efforts culminated in nineteen consecutive days of demonstrations following the ruling party's June 1987 antiouncement that its presidential candidate would be Roh Tae Woo, former general and Chun's accomplice. During the largest demonstration, over 2 million people in thirty-four cities turned out to demand the release of all political prisoners, an end to the use of tear gas, freedom of assembly, and direct presidential elections. Fearing popular insurrection, the government yielded by promising constitutional revision, greater civil liberties, and direct presidential elections.

Ironically, it was at this point of popular victory that the Left suffered a setback in its comptition with the liberal opposition for leadership of the democratic movement. Although the Left had powered the popular protests, the overwhelming desire of the population for an end to military dictatorship led most demonstrators to emphasize the demand for direct election of the president thereby strengthening Kim Dae Jung's and Kim Young Sam's leadership positions. After the government promised concessions, the mass movement retreated to the sidelines to watch the two Kims "battle" the government over constitutional reforms, and each other over who would oppose Roh in the elections. Left activists were powerless to influence these negotiations, which led to very modest constitutional revisions and the decision that both Kims would run against Roh.

When both Kims decided to run, the left movement split into factions: one supporting Kim Dae Jung; another trying to force one of the Kims to withdraw; and a third supporting an independent people's candidate. Because both Kims ran, Roh emerged victorious. Although there had been many cases of election fraud, the Left was too factionalized to mount a campaign discrediting the results. The United States rushed to congratulate Roh and trumpet South Korea's "march to democracy."

At this point, establishment analysts were quick to dismiss the Left as "an isolitted bunch of bomb-throwing students," but, as we have seen, leftists were neither all students nor a disorganized mob. The Left had succeeded in leading it mass "assault" on the government which resulted in the elections, but had failed to cast the election in terms of a pro-imperialist establishment versus anti-imperialist forces. Roh's victory and the Left's inability to lead the opposition marked a setback for theLeft.

The Revolutionary Process Regains Momentum

The Left may have lost ground to the liberals, but the liberals lost the election to the government. As popular disillusionment with the government and the opposition spread, the Left regained its momentum. The two Kims' political parties scored high in the 1988 elections for the National Assembly but disappointed many powerless people by failing to work toward structural changes. The Roh government also revealed the false nature of the "march to democracy" as it repeatedly broke promises for reform.

With demands unsatisfied, working people resumed their protests with renewed militancy. The June 1987 concessions had not addressed labor issues and soon after their announcement workers launched a massive strike wave (averaging fortyfour new strike actions per day from the end of June to middle of lSeptember). Undaunted by state and corporate violence, workers orchestrated a second strike wave in 1988. This time, with the support of student groups and massmovemeant organizations, workers moved beyond isolated strike actions to establish independent regional trade union councils which later joined with other labor groups to form the National Council of Labor Movement Organizations (NCLMO). Similarly, farmers, students, and the urban poor have organized themselves and pressed their demands through militant protest.

Significantly, dissatisfaction with the current regime has led these new organizations to move beyond demands, for specific reforms to a broader political agenda. The NCLMO has declared its support for reunification and structural transformation of the South Korean political economy as well as basic labor rights. Organizations of farmers and the urban poor have also joined their specific demands with calls for reunification, removal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons, and transformation of political and economic institutions. Students have taken leadership in the struggle for reunification, a cause which, because it expresses the popular desire for democracy and national independence, strikes at the heart of imperialism's powcr and policy in Korea.

Demonstrating its growing stature and political maturity, the South Korean Left moved, in January 1989, to consolidate and deepen this leftward movement of workers, students, farmers, and the urban poor by forming a new organization: the National Democratic Movement Federation (NDMF). Replacing the UDMU which had been weakened by conflicts related to the 1987 presidential election, the NDMF represents an important political advance for several reasons. First, it is built on a structured base of mass organizations representing various social sectors (such as labor labor's NCLMO, the Preparatory Committee of National Farmers Movement, and the National Coalition of Women's Orgainizations). Secondly, these groups share a new commitment to discipline and unity of action. Thirdly, a majority of the NDMF steering committee is made up of representatives of labaor, armers, and the urban poor. FLinally, the NDMF efforts can be expected to increase the political clarity arid intensity of future struggles, thereby laying the groundwork for a new progressive political party.(5)

Establishment analysts continue to praise South Korea as a model of successful capitalist development, debating whether free-market or statae direction is responsible for the economic success. These writers ignore the rapidly growing number of citizens who not only consider the economy unsuccessful but also oppose the very existence of a separate, capitalist South Korean regime. The role of the radical Left in this growth is significnt, for it is leading cumulative revolutionary process with strong historical roots.

As I have tried to snow, the Left in Kore "failed in the immediate thing (several times in this century when they suffered setbacks), but history keeps a fine accounting." By studying and sharing this accounting with people in the United States, U.S. activists and scholars can help to realize Korea's revolutionary future.

NOTES

1. Nym Wales and Kim San, Song of Ariran: A Korean Communist in the Chinese Revolution (San Francisco Ramparts Press, [1941]) p.320.

2. Quoted in Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981) p.200.

3. See Jon Halliday and Bruce Comings, Korea: The Unkown War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988) for and excellent analysis of the origins and nature of the Korean War.

4. I discuss the evolution and performance of the South Korean economy in "South Korea: The Fraudulent Miracle." Monthly Review, December 1987.

5. Two excellent sources of information on current political developments in South (and to a lesser extend North) Korea are: Korea Report, published by the Korea Information and Resource Center (1314 14th St. N.W. #5, Washington D.C. 20005) and Korea Update, published by the Korea Coalition (110 Maryland Avenue N.E., Washington D.C. 20002).

If there is no struggle thereis no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom and yet depreciate agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up the ground. They want rain without thunder and fightning. They want the ociean without the awful roar of its many waters. This struggle may be a moral one; or it may be a physical one; or it may be both moral and; physical; but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did, and it never will. . . . If we ever get free from all the oppressions and wrongs heaped upon us, we must pay for their removal. We must do this by labor, by suffering, by sacrifice, and, if needs be, by our lives, and the lives of others.

--Frederick Douglass

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