Too Much, Too Fast

When the Air Force began to lay the groundwork for its future force, the Air National Guard seized the opportunity to develop a roadmap that would shape the Air Guard as an integral part of the "new" force.

That effort was called Vanguard.

It represented a systematic approach to shaping the Air Guard that would fly and fight in 2025.

The Air Guard conceptualized Vanguard out of a number of assumptions offered by the Air Force.

A year later, however, many of those assumptions have changed, and we must revisit these plans.

Several actions proposed by the Air Force simply don't appear to make good business sense, and may in fact violate the militia concept.

The Air Force wants a robust number of new F/A-22 and F-35 fighters to replace a large portion of the current F-16/F-15 fighter force.

While no one would question the wisdom of acquiring these new systems, the plan to eliminate significant numbers of Air Guard fighters raises some interesting questions to which the Air Force has so far been reluctant to provide detailed answers.

First, consider the actions and timelines to accomplish the move to a future total force.

The theory is relatively straightforward: Divest older aircraft, replace with new aircraft, re-role units to meet future threats, provide the appropriate training and creatively weave the active, Guard and Reserve components into a seamless and lethal force.

The realities don't match up.

Originally, this effort was to be accompushed by 2025. The Air Force now wants completion by 2015.

The Air Force Staff has said that the Air Guard end strength will not be reduced. It has not, however, provided detailed replacement missions for the trained aircrews, maintenance teams and support personnel that will be "out-of-work."

Proposals to integrate these Guard assets, beginning now, into new weapons systems on a broad basis also have met with little enthusiasm by the Air staff.

There seems to be no solid understanding of our needs for air defense requirements from NORTHCOM, for intra-theater airlilt or the tanker force. It is unrealistic to think that skilled airmen will stand around and wait for a new mission for months or perhaps years.

Finally, we know of no military budget analyst who will argue that the proposed buys of F/A-22, F-35 or other future airframes will move in any direction but downward in the current and future budget cycles.

Perhaps we won't end up with as many new airframes as we would like. And lurking in the weeds is the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). Might not be a bad idea to see just where that's heading before we board the train.

I'd like to think those Air Guard F-16s with Litening pods, that are carrying the precision-strike mission in Iraq, have a lot yet to offer in the future force. That's just one example.

Just in case the original plan has an increasing margin for error, let's err on the side of caution. Before we do significant harm to the defense of the the United States, lets slow down.

It's too much, too fast!

Robert V. Taylor, Chairman of the Board, NGAUS

Copyright National Guard Association of the United States Dec 2004
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