silent war: The relevancy of Army National Guard divisions, The

For more than five years, the United States Army has been engaged in a "war." The conflict has been largely overlooked by the media, for it has not been a "war" of bullets fought on the battlefields of some distant land. Instead, it has been, and continues to be, a relatively silent "war" fought in Pentagon offices and the halls of Congress-a "war" of innuendoes, deception, unfair allegations, and outright distortions of truth against the relevancy of National Guard divisions. Sadly, in this conflict which has shaken "America's Army" to its roots, rhetoric has replaced logic, and the lessons of history have been largely ignored.

In order for the reader to better understand the relevancy of Army National Guard divisions. I will first briefly review their proud history then focus on the intent of the Total Force Policy. then I will contrast the inequitable standards established by the active component for Army National Guard units with the more enlightened total force policies of the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. Finally, the writer will present a summary, conclusion, and recommendations to make "America's Army" more than just the hollow term most Army National Guard members consider it to be today.

An Effective Insurance Policy

Army National Guard Divisions are critical to this nation's defense; a costeffective "insurance policy" for America that has paid dividends five times this century Army Guard divisions have also served as a significant, integral element of this nation's deterrent military power during the height of the Cold War Even so, the question is often asked within the Pentagon, "Do we need eight Army National Guard divisions?" Critics claim that these divisions are useless holdovers from the Cold War The argument is made to Congress and the American public that Army National Guard divisions are no longer relevant and are an expense that the defense establishment, and ultimately American people, can no longer afford. Yet, the briefest review of history clearly fails to support this narrow-minded proposition. To the contrary, the experience of this nation in the military conflicts of this century plainly warns us that, as the world seeks a new political and military order, now is not the time to cancel America's "insurance policy"National Guard divisions.

Mexican Border Service

In 1916, in response to raids on the border towns of the Southwest by the Mexican bandit Pancho Villa, the entire National Guard was called to active duty by President Woodrow Wilson. Within four months 158,000 Guardsman were in place on the border where their presence helped restore order.

World War I

In 1917, the Active Army was a small and dispersed force. When Congress declared war in April 1917, the Army found itself with a pressing requirement to expand itself rapidly-far beyond what had been anticipated by pre-war planners. Although at its core the Army was professional and competent, it was not trained nor prepared for battle on the scale of the war being fought in France. How was an army of less than 200,000 going to meet the requirement to expand overnight to an army of several million? Army planners turned to the Army's traditional primary combat backup force: the Army National Guard with its 17 divisions.

Without those organized and readily available Army Guard divisions, the United States could not have entered the war as early as the spring of 1918.

American troops in large numbers on the battlefields of France were critical to salvaging the military fortunes of Britain and France. By the time the United States entered World War I, both Britain and France were "on their knees," in desperate straits in a stalemated trench war of attrition. The only hope our European allies had for a successful conclusion to the war was for the United States to enter the conflict with a military force powerful enough to tip the balance against Germany.

General Pershing insisted that all U.S. Forces in France would remain organized into U.S. divisions under his command, employed in an American Sector of the Western Front. His policy would have been insupportable without the Army National Guard divisions. At the time, it was questionable whether the Army could enter combat in time to prevent Germany from defeating France and Britain. However, with the arrival of the Army National Guard and the Active divisions what remained of German morale began to collapse. Forty percent of the American Expeditionary Force was comprised of Army National Guard divisions. In fact, three of the first five divisions to enter combat were Guard divisions.

Following hostilities, the German General Staff named the eight toughest United States Army Divisions they faced. Six were Army National Guard divisions. There was no question in the mind of any American, that National Guard Divisions were very relevant to the Allied victory in France.

Interwar Years

After World War I America demobilized and the active component again returned to its traditional role of a small professional force. The Army National Guard remained this nation's primary backup combat force. The Army of the 1920s was designed to be an expandable Army-one that could be filled out rapidly, hopefully avoiding some of the hardships encountered during mobilization for World War 1. However, congressional defense budgets-as they are prone to do-became leaner and leaner, and by the period immediately prior to World War II, neither the Active Army, nor the Army National Guard, was able to maintain manpower objectives. On the eve of our entry into the war there was one Army National Guard soldier for each active component soldier.

World War II

World War II began in 1941and America again faced the challenge of an explosive expansion to meet the demands of a global war: a war on two fronts-three if one counts the China-Burma Theater. The United States, confronted with the largest mobilization in history, once again clearly would have been at a loss without the Army National Guard. The mobilization of the 18 Army National Guard divisions doubled the size of the Army overnight, and the cadre necessary to provide the required military leadership for this expansion was provided by regulars and Guardsmen alike. Again, the Army National Guard divisions were an essential strategic hedge which allowed this nation to pursue its military objectives during a very critical period.

The first Army divisions to deploy overseas in both Europe and the Pacific during World War II were Army National Guard divisions. Could the Active Army have accomplished their mission without the Guard? Possibly, but it is unlikely that it could have provided an Army trained and ready in time to reinforce Australia and England without the National Guard divisions. At the time, the majority of British combat forces were in North Africa and the Pacific. Those British forces in England were the remnants of an army ejected from France in 1940.

By 1944, the United States had raised an Army of 89 divisions, but the bulk of those divisions were not yet committed to combat. Meanwhile, Army National Guard divisions had been fighting for more than two years in the Pacific and the Mediterranean theaters. What if those Army National Guard divisions had not been available? What divisions would have defended Australia and begun the long road back in New Guinea? At the time there were no questions about the relevance of Army National Guard divisions to the ultimate allied victory in World War II.

Following the atomic bomb's introduction into modem warfare, America saw little need for a large standing active component. Conventional military wisdom of the day believed that the Air Force and the Navy alone could handle any potential enemy. Nuclear weapons delivered by American airpower was the key element in America's strategic military planning.

Korean War

In 1950, on the eve of the Korean War, the active component stood at 591,000 soldiers and was formed into ten understrength divisions. Three of these divisions stationed in Japan were authorized a war-time strength of approximately 18,900 soldiers. In practice, defense budgets were such that each of these divisions was authorized a maximum of 12,500 soldiers (actually they were even below this strength). Army National Guard divisions were also authorized a wartime force structure of 18,900 soldiers, but were restricted to a peacetime strength ceiling of 55 percent of wartime strength. This held the Guard divisions to an authorized strength of approximately 10,000 soldiers-or only slightly less than the strength of each of the three active divisions initially committed to Korea in June and July 1950. Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, Army National Guard divisions did not have a wartime mission. In fact, the only time in this century that Army National Guard divisions were assigned wartime missions during peacetime was during the 1970s and the early 1990s.

The Korean War had caught this nation and its Army unprepared. The Army once again found itself in the difficult position of having to rapidly expand. Russia was threatening Europe, communism was advancing throughout the world, and the United States was involved in a war in Korea! The combat dynamics of the Korean conflict required the replacement of an average of one regiment per month-more than 3,000 soldiers every month for the first year! That number of replacements was required just to fill the gaps, due to soldiers killed, missing, wounded, injured, and sick. And the 3,000 replacements per month only maintained the status quo-it did not provide for increased combat power Not surprisingly, many of these replacements were, of necessity, members of the National Guard. The theater replacement policy manpower demands increased even more dramatically after the first year of the war.

We were engaged in a shooting war in the Pacific, while the Russian Bear was at our throat in Europe. The Army needed to expand-fast. Again the call went out for the National Guard. Four Army National Guard divisions were called to active service on September 1, 1950, and another two were called to active duty in January 1951, after the Chinese entered the war. Still another two divisions were called to active duty in January 1952. The Army National Guard's 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions deployed to Japan in 1951, and, in 1952, replaced the Army's 24th Infantry Division and the Ist Cavalry Division in Korea. The 24th Infantry and lst Cavalry divisions then returned to Japan. The Army was able to rapidly expand from 10 to 18 divisions thanks to the National Guard divisions. Those eight Army National Guard divisions provided an invaluable strategic hedge for the United States Army.

Berlin Crisis

When the Berlin Crisis arose, the nation once again turned to the Army National Guard and mobilized two divisions. The mobilization of these divisions had a profound effect on the Soviets. Mobilization of the large Army National Guard organizations signaled to the Soviets that this nation had the political and military will to face down any threat to Western Europe and NATO. Clearly, the Army National Guard Divisions continued to be an important and relevant strategic hedge when unexpected international threats surfaced.

Vietnam

During Vietnam, the Army leadership approached President Johnson for permission to mobilize Army National Guard and Reserve units for Vietnam. This request was, for the first time in American history, denied. There would be no Guard or Reserve call-ups-at least until 1968 when the "Pueblo Crisis" demanded a show of commitment and a show of force in Korea. Although no Army National Guard divisions were called to active duty, they clearly existed and were available. They continued to be a strategic hedge.

Total Force Policy

Following the Vietnam War, Army force levels fell from 1.5 million soldiers to 750,000; one out of every two soldiers was released from active service. To shore up America's weakened defense posture, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and GEN Creighton Abrams, then Army Chief of Staff, developed the Total Force Policy This policy provided the means for maintaining a large, credible deterrent army through the expanded use of the Army National Guard and the Reserve. This objective was accomplished by rounding out active divisions with Army National Guard brigades (ROUNDOUT). Also, for the first time, real wartime missions were assigned to Army National Guard divisions. Assigning wartime missions to the Army National Guard changed the National Guard in a very positive way For the first time, Guard soldiers felt they were accepted as Army professionals. At last, the elusive "One Army" concept appeared to be coming true. It is fair to assume that General Abrams, who had served with National Guard divisions during World War II, considered the Army National Guard divisions to be a relevant part of America's defense. Potential enemies of the United States certainly calculated these divisions as relevant components of the combat power of the United States Army through the 1970s and 1980s. General Abrams believed it, and the Russians, Chinese, and North Koreans also believed it. National Guard divisions continued to be an important strategic hedge.

Although the mid-1970s to 1990 was the only time when the Army finally came close to achieving the "One Army" concept, the original idea is most properly attributed to Secretary of War John W Weeks, and General of the Armies, General John J. Pershing. In 1921 they directed that the Army be composed of the active component, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserve. This force was to be "organized into one harmonious force." Many dedicated National Guard soldiers felt that the preceding years of discrimination and, in many cases open scorn, were finally a thing of the past. Unfortunately, this was not to be the case.

DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

Immediately prior to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, a new Army strategic policy was articulated. Refusing to recognize that a large standing military force was an anomaly of the Cold War, the Army struggled to justify a plan to continue to maintain a large active component. It proposed to "balance the budget" by drastically reducing the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve; in fact, two-thirds of the force structure cuts proposed by the Army would come from the Army National Guard and Reserve!

Inequitable Standards

DESERT STORM is a disturbing story While the active component focused critical media attention on the lack of readiness of Guard and Reserve units, it quietly deployed active units to the desert that were not combat ready For example, the 3d Battalion, 2d Air Defense Artillery Regiment, Fort Lewis, Washington, left its air defense weapons behind and deployed as a transportation truck battalion. The active component declared them instantly "combat ready." At the same time, mobilizing Guard and Reserve transportation truck companies were undergoing rigorous post-mobilization inspections and testing to "revalidate" unit status reports which reflected their combat readiness.

ROUNDOUT was ignored! Active divisions were filled with active brigades and deployed. Concurrently, Army leadership openly criticized the readiness of Guard and Reserve units. This political posturing on the eve of a war can only be described as "incredible!" But, then again, if Army National Guard combat units were allowed to perform well in the desert war, the result could be a shift back to this nation's traditional defense policy: a smaller active component backed by a large Army National Guard. The Army's chief concern appeared not to be that Guard units would fail-but that they would succeed!

Congress Misled

During the Cold War, Army National Guard divisions had been expected to mobilize and deploy in less than 180 days. Literally overnight, the Army announced to Congress that National Guard divisions were incapable of being ready for combat operations in less than 360 days! Army National Guard brigades, the Army said, could not be ready in less than 180 days. Furthermore, the Army claimed that it could organize, train and deploy a division from scratch in less time than a full strength Army Guard division could be mobilized, conduct post-mobilization training, and deploy. At least, that is what the U.S. Army told Congress. This position was, and remains, insupportable. Either the Army misled Congress during the 1970s and 1980s, or they are misleading Congress now.

With a stroke of a pen, Army National Guard divisions lost their assigned wartime missions; and were declared by the Army leadership to be no longer relevant to America's defense. Incredibly, ROUNDOUT was dead! Debate continued to rage over the question: Is it faster and more economical to form a division from scratch, or is it smarter and more economical to maintain divisions in the Army National Guard? The Army simply cannot have it both ways. The correct answer appears obvious. It is estimated that the annual cost of one division in the active component is approximately the same as all eight Army National Guard divisions.

Contrasting the Military Services' Treatment of Reserve Components

It is interesting to contrast the Total Force policies of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps during budget cuts with that of the U.S. Army. The Air Force fights with wings, and, when faced with budget cuts, it readily transfers those missions it can to the Air Guard and the Air Force Reserve. The Navy fights with carrier battle groups. When budget cuts are implemented, the Navy places its excess ships into reserve status where they can quickly be returned to active service. The Marine Corps has eliminated the designation "Reserve" from its vocabulary. "From now on," the Marine Corps states, "We are all Marines," and the Corps is not about to eliminate its reserve division. The active Army, on the other hand, fights with divisions. Yet, it proposes eliminating its only combat backup force-the Army Guard divisions-claiming that they are no longer relevant!

As long as the world's armies measure combat power by the number of divisions an army can field, Army National Guard divisions will remain relevant. The question is: Will eight-to-ten Active divisions provide a sufficient deterrent, or will a lesser number of Active divisions backed by eight Army National Guard divisions provide a more affordable, credible deterrence at a lower cost?

History has shown that we have rarely foreseen the future with a high degree of accuracy If history is to teach us anything about military preparedness, or the lack thereof, it is apparent that now is not the time to eliminate Army National Guard divisions. Their wartime mission has been-and should continue to be-this nation's strategic hedge in a very uncertain world. Army National Guard divisions are this country's dependable, proven, economical insurance policy.

The silent "war" between the active component and the Guard presents a dangerous "turf war" that not only threatens Total Force as a policy, but the very defense of our nation, as well. We must set aside such parochial pettiness! Army National Guard divisions must once again be assigned wartime missions and provide the combat backup force for the Army which will result in a stronger, more effective Total Force. History repeatedly has proven the wisdom of this proposition. The relevancy of National Guard divisions is abundantly clear: Guard divisions must continue to exist as a vital element of America's national defense.

Copyright National Guard Association of the United States Apr 1997
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