Nationalism vs. liberalism in the Irish context: from a postcolonial past to a postmodern future - 1

   "Nationalism is all too often the enemy of democracy." (2)

THE re-emergence of ethno-nationalism and the increasing strife seen in many parts of the world arising from nationalistic tensions has quieted those who had predicted the end of history or the end of ideological conflict. (3) The ability of nationalistic and ethnic conceptions of identity to persist in the modern age has surprised those who believed nationalism to be a nineteenth-century ideology. Instead, the study of national identity continues to be an important means of understanding the political dynamic of change and continuity in many states. (4) With the decline of totalitarian ideologies, the resurgence of nationalism in the post-Cold War period is often presented as the greatest threat to the supremacy of liberalism as the ideology or philosophy of choice in the world. (5) While the confrontation of liberal values and ethnic identities is all too apparent in many regions, the Republic of Ireland provides an interesting and subtler example of the complex relationship that exists between nationalism and liberalism. Unlike the nationalism that emerged from a liberal tradition in many European states, Irish nationalism emerged first as an anticolonial movement. After independence Irish nationalism was quite conservative as the leaders of the postcolonial state sought to re-create a premodern and pre-liberal past. Thus Irish nationalism persisted as a parochial political identity far longer than others in the European context. While there has been a clear decline in nationalism in most member states of the European Union in recent decades, Mattei Dogan found Ireland still to be "the most traditionalist country in Europe" in terms of the intensity of the nationalism of its citizens. (6) Despite the persistence of nationalism in the Irish context, liberalism has begun to intersect with Ireland's traditional sense of national identity, revealing contradictions and tensions as Irish society transcends its postcolonial past and increasingly incorporates liberal postmodern values.

The origins of the tension between liberalism and nationalism in Ireland begin in a sense with the arrival and mobilization of nationalist forces in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Until that time the values associated with liberalism and nationalism did not seem to be in conflict. (7) As nationalist movements became increasingly mass-based, however, they began mobilizing the entire society behind the nationalist cause. In doing so, modern states exhibited an assimilationist tendency, striving for social homogeneity. (8) The Irish struggle to achieve independence and fulfill national aspirations in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries followed this pattern. The nationalistic political culture that emerged in this early postcolonial state reflected the conservative agenda of restoring Ireland's Gaelic past, preserving its Catholic traditions, and isolating itself from the perceived threat of an alien culture in Britain and the outside world. Increasingly, this traditional political culture has been challenged by liberal democratic values in the past several decades. Liberalism means more than support for democratic political principles. It also emphasizes individual rights, tolerance of diversity, and material prosperity. In the Irish context historic conceptions of identity continue to play important symbolic and emotive roles in political life but are increasingly at odds with liberal values and beliefs that have become more dominant. After a period of inward-looking nationalist policies, the Irish, like other postcolonial peoples, have found that isolation and autarchy cannot provide the material prosperity that those societies seek. By opening their economy to the outside world and especially to their fellow Europeans and by liberalizing their economic policies, the Irish have incorporated many Western cultural values as well. These include not only economic materialism but also a greater sense of individuation more generally. Ireland, as a postmodern state, is thus confronting more diversity and heterogeneity. Irish elites appreciate the contradictory impulses of historic nationalism and modern liberalism, but these contradictions are not as apparent to the Irish masses. The political debate in the Republic has yet to come to grips with these contradictions as politicians pursue economic growth and European integration that inevitably incorporate liberal values while claiming to remain loyal to the memory of Irish nationalists of the past.

THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF IRISH NATIONALISM

Like many states that later emerged from colonization, Ireland in the early years of the twentieth century was not composed of a single coherent ethno-national group that enjoyed a long common history, including an indigenous industrial revolution. In these social circumstances the origins of nationalism that led to the creation of European states were absent. (9) Instead, nationalism in postcolonial states such as Ireland emerges as a struggle to establish a national identity, to achieve self-determination, and to restore and reinvigorate the indigenous culture and practices that have been threatened by the imperial power. (10) Nationalism derives its strength in these circumstances from the vigor of the anticolonial movement, its reaction to oppression, and its hostility toward others. Typically, discontented intellectuals lead the nationalist movement for a collective political purpose. (11) It is through this process that the "imagined community" of a nation is created. (12) According to Declan Kiberd, the Irish nationalist project of state- and nation-building, however, was not completely successful because Irish nationalists insufficiently imagined the nature of an independent Ireland. (13) That is why Irish nationalism, as conceived in the latter part of the nineteenth century, has been challenged by liberalism more recently.

Irish nationalists sought to restore or re-create an idyllic and mythical Gaelic society. Beginning in the 1880s, organizations such as the Gaelic League fostered the image of the Irish as a unique people whose Gaelic ancestors and Catholic traditions differentiated them from others and defined their identity. The struggle of Irish nationalists to achieve independence ultimately resulted in the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 that created an independent Irish government with dominion status for all but six counties in Ulster. The policies of the new Irish Free State came to reflect the values of those who had led the nationalist movement. The fusion of Catholic identity and the identity created by the Gaelic revival resulted in what O'Brien has called Irish "holy Catholic nationalism." (14) This nationalism determined the political path that the Irish took after independence. Irish politics in this period was dominated by a postcolonial nationalism similar in many respects to that found in other postcolonial states after independence. (15)

After a brief but bloody civil war a consensus emerged condemning the use of violence for the cause of a thirty-two-county Irish Republic. After the civil war the twenty-six-county Irish Free State became fully legitimate in the minds of almost all who lived within its jurisdiction. In a relatively short time the Irish Free State had survived a civil war and emerged as a stable democracy. By 1932 leaders of the Free State who had been threatened by a populist nationalism a decade earlier allowed those who had been rebels to come to power peacefully after fair elections. This peaceful transfer of power was a major indicator that Irish democracy would not be fleeting but would endure into the foreseeable future. Yet the stable Irish democracy that emerged did not necessarily conform to liberal democratic principles. (16) Instead, it conformed to a conservative set of values not associated with modern liberalism. (17) The exclusive conception of Irishness associated with this historic nationalism has prevented Ireland from being considered a modern liberal state.

The conservative nature of politics in the Irish Free State and later the Republic was built upon a widely shared sense of identity that crystallized in the 1930s. Irish nationalism came to be seen as conservative, Catholic, and homogeneous. (18) There were several factors that contributed to the sense of nationalism that brought political stability to the Republic. First, the territory of the state included a population that was overwhelmingly Catholic and ready to identify with Ireland's Gaelic ancestors. The Protestant population of the southern twenty-six counties constituted less than 10 percent of the total population when the Free State was created. Since that time higher rates of Protestant emigration have resulted in the Irish population becoming even more Catholic. As a result, those who had a different sense of national identity based on their Anglo-Irish heritage were of little importance in defining the political culture and national identity of the Irish in the Republic. In addition, the personal dominance of Eamon de Valera as the great leader of independent Ireland provided the Irish with a national vision with which most could agree. This vision of Ireland precluded the possibility of urbanization and modern industrialization. (19) De Valera conceptualized the ideal Irish society as rural, athletic, agrarian, ascetic, religious, family-centered if not communal, and (many would argue) sexist. Collectively, these values make up what de Valera dedicated his long political career to achieving. Finally, it is important to note that statehood provided Irish nationalism with the political shell that Gellner claims every nationalism needs to survive. (20) State resources were used to promote those values that were associated with this exclusive sense of nationalism. Educational, economic, and social policies all came to reflect the nationalist vision and ultimately served to reinforce it as the popularly accepted conception of identity. (21)

While it is true that de Valera's pursuit of the ideal Ireland did not and could not re-create the land of the ancient Gaels or Celts, it did define Irish national identify in the southern twenty-six counties in the decades after independence. Irish nationalism after independence and its pursuit of a mythical Gaelic world was not a fantasy, but, like other identities, a social and political construction that has meaning because it successfully interacted with the memory of the Irish people. (22) The power of Irish nationalism, like many others in the world, is not based on historical accuracy but on its capacity to define and organize the political reality of a nation. Irish nationalism as it emerged in the early years of this century and crystallized in the age of de Valera thus became an important reality in terms of how the Irish chose to define themselves. (23)

SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE AND THE CHALLENGE OF LIBERALISM

When de Valera's tenure as taoiseach came to an end in 1959, the Irish government embarked on a new program of industrialization that has unravelled the nationalist consensus in Ireland. How and why did the cultural and philosophical basis of Irish politics change so dramatically after the late 1950s? My hypothesis is that the nationalistic policies of de Valera failed to insulate Ireland from Western liberal values that inevitably undermined the values of traditional Irish nationalism. As first Irish elites and later the Irish masses became more preoccupied with their own individual concerns, expressed in terms of increased materialist and consumerist demands, the traditional nationalism of de Valera lost its capacity to shape national policy. Increasingly, the Irish, like other postcolonial peoples, sought modernity in its Western manifestation while clinging to a traditional cultural identity. The contradiction between these aspirations accounts for and drives the contemporary crisis of postcolonial identity. (24) This contradiction is most significant, if not publicly debated in Irish society today. Leading intellectuals and commentators clearly identify the tension between liberalism (or what is often called revisionism in the Irish context) and nationalism. (25) Though revisionists are all too eager to illustrate the tension that exists between traditional nationalist policies and contemporary European and material aspirations, (26) their tendency to discount the nationalist past and to forsake it is necessarily unattractive to those who inherited this tradition. Though nationalists are often eager to critique revisionism, they need to confront the reality that liberalism has made a significant impact on Irish society in recent decades. Thus the real challenge in contemporary Ireland is to juxtapose successfully the new values of liberalism with those inherited from the Irish nationalism of the past.

Although Sean Lemass is typically depicted as the great modernizer, as the central figure in an elite-led revolution, Lemass was more than an economic liberal who sought to industrialize the Irish economy at the expense of traditional nationalistic polices. Lemass and his supporters recognized that in their era only the state would be able to coordinate and promote economic development in an increasingly interdependent world economy. Lemass realized that it was the responsibility of the state to satisfy the economic needs of citizens. But, by integrating the Irish economy with those in Europe and the rest of the world, he necessarily unleashed forces that would change not only the standard of living of the Irish but also their priorities and values in life. The materialistic mentality of the Irish proliferated as material conditions in Ireland dramatically improved in the 1960s. Even though Irish economic performance stagnated in much of the 1970S and 1980s, values and attitudes continued to change. By the 1980S the Irish had become the most materialistic nation in surveys taken of member states in the European Union. (27) The surge in economic growth that has occurred since 1993 as part of the Celtic Tiger phenomenon has added new momentum to social change in Ireland. Greatly increased female participation in the workforce, growing skepticism toward the Catholic church, a new era of immigration, and dramatically higher standards of living for many have challenged much of the inherited value structure of previous generations. What does it mean to be Irish and what do the Irish want for society are the questions that confront the country amid the challenge of liberalism and its meaning for the inherited national identity. Thus, in Ireland as in other nations, rapid social and economic change challenged a static conception of national identity and requires the Irish nation to redefine itself. (28)

NATIONALISM VS. LIBERALISM IN THE IRISH CONTEXT

To appreciate the relationship between nationalism and liberalism in the Irish context requires a larger comparison of these two ideologies or philosophies in a broader context. Historically, scholars have tended to take two differing approaches to the assumed relationship between nationalism and liberalism. Many scholars believed liberalism and nationalism to be "antagonistic principles" or in fundamental tension with one another. (29) Those from the functionalist tradition assumed that nationalism would wither away as liberal, enlightened values became dominant in society. For them the relationship between nationalism and liberalism was one of displacement. Lucian Ashworth summarizes this position quite well: "Nationalism is a symptom of liberalism's failure, not an external barrier to its success." (30) The resurgence of nationalism in the post-Cold War period has clearly confounded traditional functionalist arguments, and as a result scholars have increasingly sought to find a theory or philosophical argument that weds liberalism and nationalism.

While liberal nationalists recognize the fundamental tension between liberalism and nationalism, they seek to reconcile these two philosophies and the contradictions between them by embedding nationalism in a liberal political tradition. (31) The scholar most associated with the development of the philosophy of liberal nationalism has been Yael Tamir. Her book Liberal Nationalism, published in 1993, began the debate regarding the possible positive relationship between nationalism and liberalism. Those who support the idea that we need not see these two philosophies as antagonistic reverted to some of the earlier work on nationalism. Specifically, they have focused on the work of Hans Kohn, who distinguished Western nationalism (seen as rational and liberal) from Eastern nationalism (seen as backward-looking and mystical), and later authors such as Anthony Smith and Michael Ignatieff, who distinguished a civic nationalism that could coexist with liberalism from an ethnic nationalism which was more alien to liberal principles. (32) Those who are sympathetic with liberal nationalism tend to assume that this philosophy can only or can best emerge from states with Western or civic nationalism, with nationalism emanating from a liberal political tradition. (33) Some recent research even contends that an ideology based on ethnicity may not be contradictory with liberalism. (34)

While liberalism is typically seen as a universal political philosophy or ideology, its peculiar emphasis and specific manifestation are embedded in the history of each state. (35) Thus the character of Irish nationalism was bound to affect the nature of liberalism in Ireland. Traditional Irish nationalism incorporated some liberal values that were important in creating a stable democratic order in independent Ireland, but the most recent period of Irish history has seen the arrival of new liberal values seemingly at the expense of traditional national ones. As Irish nationalism emerged in the late-nineteenth century, it accepted the liberal premise that all citizens were equal. Mass egalitarianism became a foundation of the political process from the earliest formulations of Irish national identity. Like many postcolonial nationalisms, Irish nationalism effectively fused traditional culture with this modern sense of equality. (36) Modern liberalism emphasizes equal opportunity for all in society as one of its most basic priorities, (37) and this was achieved by Irish nationalists after independence. After de Valera's decision to forego extraconstitutional means of achieving his republican political agenda, the Irish state and the nationalism that supported it accepted the principle that all should obey the laws and follow legal means of achieving one's political objectives. This acceptance of the rule of law is another of the most basic assumptions of liberal political philosophy. (38) Ultimately, that meant Irish nationalists came to share the liberal assumption that government exists based on the consent of the people, and democracy was widely accepted from the beginning of the Irish Free State. This helps to explain why the nationalist elements who first refused to accept the treaty lost the Civil War. They underestimated popular support for the principle of majority rule and democratic government in the newly created Irish state. (39)

While Irish nationalists came to share the constitutional and democratic values of liberalism, many of the remaining values that characterize modern liberalism on the one hand and those of Irish nationalism on the other were not in concert. The most important and fundamental value of liberalism was the focus on individual rights and liberties, (40) and this was de-emphasized in the Irish and other nationalist traditions, which focused more on the rights or collective good of the nation as a group. (41) For liberals the power and scope of state authority need to be limited so that government does not infringe on individual freedoms and liberty. (42) For liberal nationalists, rights to group identity flow from the freedom of individuals to associate and to form their own political identity. One can form whatever group one wants in pursuit of the good. (43) Despite their best reasoning and philosophical arguments, the supporters of liberal nationalism have been severely criticized for their tendency to diminish the fundamental antagonism between the collective commitment and particularism associated with nationalism and the stress on individual rights that is at the center of modern liberal political philosophy. (44) The vagaries associated with the relationship between liberalism and nationalism in the writings of Tamir and others have led Andrew Vincent to conclude that "liberal nationalism still needs to explain itself." (45) For Nicholas Buttle the flaw in liberal nationalist thinking is that it fails to distinguish a liberal nationalism that incorporates the Rawlsian conception of critical reflectiveness from a conservative nationalism that accepts tradition uncritically. (46)

Clearly, many nationalisms in the world are guided by conservative traditions, and this is especially the case in a postcolonial state such as Ireland. Fred Halliday claims that we should recognize the fundamental tension between liberalism and nationalism and not seek to disguise it but subordinate nationalism to more important political principles. (47) One could argue that liberal nationalists do this by suggesting that the right to national self-determination and national identity are fundamental rights of individuals in a liberal polity. (48) Though liberal nationalists try to make or find an accommodation between liberalism and nationalism, they tend to favor liberalism at the expense of nationalism when a conflict between the two exists. They tend to justify nationalism only when it develops in a liberal political context. Postcolonial nations, such as Ireland, that have not developed a collective identity emanating from a liberal tradition are not really the focus of recent liberal nationalists. Hence, liberal nationalism, at least as previously conceived, does not help to explain much of Ireland's current situation in which liberalism has only recently arrived to challenge a historic conservative nationalism.

Not only does liberalism assume that individuals have fundamental rights which are inalienable, but also, following from this premise, liberals come to accept diversity and incorporate tolerance as important and necessary priorities. Will Kymlicka has especially emphasized how protection of minority and human rights is fundamental in modern liberal society. (49) Diversity of belief and values are to be expected in societies experiencing rapid economic growth and social change. (50) Thus the homogeneity of Irish society and the once general support for a traditional Irish nationalism are increasingly being challenged by the growing diversity of belief and behavior among the indigenous Irish as well as among recent immigrants, many of whom are from very different cultures and traditions. While Ireland's historic nationalism assumed a Gaelic or Celtic heritage, the Irish have experienced waves of migration that have most often incorporated the new populace into the Irish nation. Beginning with the Anglo-Norman invasion or settlement of the late-twelfth century and perhaps even with the Viking incursions earlier, Irish society has absorbed different peoples without losing a unique sense of self. While the Irish nation became very hostile to Britain as the colonial master inhibiting its own freedom, the Irish are by certain recent measures a quite tolerant people. Even though some discrimination and prejudice exists in Irish society, especially toward groups within society, (51) survey evidence demonstrates that the Irish are the most tolerant national group in the English-speaking world. (52) The Irish government's recent concessions and the favorable outcome of the public referendum on the deletion of Articles 2 and 3 from the Republic's constitution as part of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 provide further evidence that Irish nationalism is perhaps more tolerant of the unionist position than it has been in the past, and that its historic enmity toward Britain has subsided in the search for peace. While the Irish may not yet accept the liberal premise that the state should be neutral in regard to culture and nationalism, (53) they are clearly closer to this position than they have been in the recent past.

THE CONTEMPORARY CONFRONTATION AND THE FUTURE

Ireland has made the transition from a relatively underdeveloped society in the European context to a relatively prosperous and socially advanced democracy. The Irish economy and society are increasingly integrated in a European and global network of corporate, media, and personal relationships. While this globalization may threaten the sovereign nature of the territorial state, it has proven less able to destroy the bonds of nationalism that continue to persist in this age of economic interdependence and worldwide webs of communication and information. (54) Nevertheless, modernism is seen to erode those forms of community that provide for identity. (55) The impact of these social and economic changes has had differing effects in the Irish political context. Among elites these changes have led to a crisis of identity as the values of a materialist and increasingly pluralistic society become more common and stand at odds with the values inherited from previous generations. (56) David Cairns and Shaun Richards contend that it is the role of the artist to promote democratic pluralism at the expense of historic nationalism, (57) and much of contemporary Irish art, literature, and music is intended to advance the cause of tolerance and the acceptance of diversity and to promote liberal values in contemporary Ireland. (58)

Among the general public the changes have brought new and different values without the crisis of identity so noticeable at the elite level. For the masses these new materialistic and consumerist values have not replaced nationalist values as much as they have managed to coexist with them. (59) While many Irish behave according to the precepts of modern liberalism, they simultaneously cling to a historic national identity. Why? Joseph Rothschild provides a possible answer. He argues that in times of rapid social change "people often cleave to, or rediscover, or even invent their ethnicity ... for personal identity, emotional security, and communal anchorage." (60) The rational and nonmaterial bases of social identification may indeed conflict with the material demands and practical necessities of living on an island increasingly permeated with liberal values, but the historic basis of identity provides meaning in a rapidly changing social environment. Ireland may increasingly become a postmodern liberal state, but that need not mean that its historic national identity will be forgotten or dismissed. Instead, the Irish national identity will likely be reformulated, reimagined to conform to an increasingly liberal society. That is the task of the next Irish generation.

(1) I would like to thank Sarah Castner, Katherine Kirk, and Anthony Sculimbrene for their research assistance and Paul Power and Robert Snyder for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. This article was completed while I was the Irish American Cultural Institute's Visiting Fellow at the National University of Ireland--Galway. I am especially appreciative of the support of the institute that allowed me to complete work on this article. Of course, all errors and omissions are solely the responsibility of the author.

(2) Craig Calhoun, "Nationalism and Civil Society: Democracy, Diversity, and Self-Determination," in Craig Calhoun, ed., Social Theory and the Politics of Identity (Cambridge, 1994), 325.

(3) Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaca, N.Y., 1994) and Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York, 1993).

(4) William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations (New York, 1990); Consuelo Cruz, "Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures," World Politics 52:3 (April 2000), 275-312.

(5) Homi K. Bhabha, "Culture's in between," in David Bennett, ed., Multicultural States: Rethinking Difference and Identity (New York, 1998), 29-36.

(6) Mattei Dogan, "The Decline of Nationalism within Western Europe," Comparative Politics 26:3 (April 1994), 300.

(7) E.J. Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, 1982), 14-15.

(8) R.D. Grillo, Pluralism and the Politics of Difference: State, Culture, and Ethnicity in Comparative Perspective (Oxford, 1998).

(9) M.E. Chamberlin, Decolonization: The Fall of European Empires (New York, 1985), 14.

(10) John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (2nd ed., Chicago, 1994), 156-98; Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism (New York, 1983); Dawa Norbu, Culture and Politics of Third World Nationalism (New York, 1992), 23.

(11) Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (3rd ed., London, 1966).

(12) Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1991).

(13) Declan Kiberd, "Modern Ireland: Postcolonial or European?" in Stuart Murray, ed., Not on Any Map: Essays on Postcoloniality and Cultural Nationalism (Exeter, 1997).

(14) Conor Cruise O'Brien, God Land: Reflections on Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge, 1988).

(15) David Cairns and Shaun Richards, Writing Ireland: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Culture (New York, 1988); Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York, 1993), 236.

(16) Brian Girvin, "Change and Continuity in Liberal Democratic Political Culture," in John R. Gibbins, ed., Contemporary Political Culture: Politics in the Postmodern Age (Newbury Park, Calif., 1989), 39-51.

(17) Terrance G. Carroll, "Secularization and States of Modernity," World Politics 36:3 (April 1984), 304-36.

(18) D. George Boyce, Nationalism in Ireland (3rd ed., New York, 1995), 353, 387.

(19) Mary E. Daly, "The Economic Ideals of Irish Nationalism: Frugal Comfort or Lavish Austerity?" Eire-Ireland 29:4 (Winter 1994), 77-100.

(20) Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y., 1983).

(21) Maurice Hayes, "`Local Differences': Ireland in the European Mosaic," Eire-Ireland 28:1 (Spring 1993), 124.

(22) John R. Gillis, "Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship," in John R. Gillis, ed., Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton, 1994), 3-24.

(23) Timothy J. White, "Where Myth and Reality Meet: Irish Nationalism in the First Half of the Twentieth Century," European Legacy 4:4 (Aug. 1999), 49-57.

(24) Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (London, 1986).

(25) Terry Eagleton, Crazy John and the Bishops and Other Essays on Irish Culture (Notre Dame, Ind., 1998), 317.

(26) For an example, see Edna Longley, The Living Stream: Literature and Revisionism (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1994).

(27) Timothy J. White, The Political Consequences of Culture Change: The Case of Ireland (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, 1990), 113-19.

(28) Josep R. Llobera, The God of Modernity: The Development of Nationalism in Western Europe (Oxford, 1994), 221.

(29) Kedourie, Nationalism, 109; Fred Halliday, "The Perils of Community: Reason and Unreason in Nationalist Identity," Nations and Nationalism 6:2 (April 2000), 153-71.

(30) Lucian M. Ashworth, "Bringing the Nation Back In? Mitrany and the Enjoyment of Nationalism," in Lucian M. Ashworth and David Long, eds., New Perspectives on International Functionalism (New York, 1999), 71.

(31) Michael Freeman, "The Right to National Self-Determination: Ethical Problems and Practical Solutions," in Desmond M. Clarke and Charles Jones, eels., The Right of Nations: Nations and Nationalism in a Changing World (Cork, 1999), 45-64; David Miller, On Nationality (New York, 1995); Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, 1993).

(32) Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York, 1944); Anthony Smith, National Identity (Reno, Nev., 1991); Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging.

(33) Colin Bird, The Myth of Liberal Individualism (New York, 1998); Ernst B. Haas, Nationalism, Liberation, and Progress: The Rise and Decline of Nationalism (Vol. 1) (Ithaca, N.Y., 1997); Neil MacCormick, Legal Rights and Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy (Oxford, 1982); Neil MacCormick, "Liberal Nationalism and Self-Determination," in Clarke and Jones, Rights of Nations, 65-87; Miller, On Nationality; Tamir, Liberal Nationalism.

(34) Eric Kaufman, "Liberal Ethnicity: Beyond Liberal Nationalism and Minority Rights," Ethnic and Racial Studies 23:6 (Nov. 2000), 1086-119.

(35) Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society (University Park, Penn., 1992).

(36) Norbu, Culture and Politics, 8.

(37) Jeff Spinner, The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality in the Liberal State (Baltimore, 1994).

(38) Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (London, 1984), 71-75.

(39) Bill Kissane, The Not-So Amazing Case of Irish Democracy," Irish Political Studies 10 (1995), 43-68.

(40) Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society, 2; Desmond M. Clarke and Charles Jones, "Introduction: Liberalism, Nationalism and Self-Determination," in Clarke and Jones, Rights of Nations, 1-25; Freeman, "The Right to National Self-Determination," 53; David Johnston, The Idea of Liberal Theory (Princeton, 1994), 191; Spinner, Boundaries of Citizenship, 3; Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 8.

(41) Liah Greenfield, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 11.

(42) Barry Holden, Understanding Liberal Democracy (London, 1993), 16-18.

(43) Clarke and Jones, "Introduction," 3; MacCormick, "Liberal Nationalism and Self-Determination," 73; Miller, On Nationality, 10-12; Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 31.

(44) Nicholas Buttle, "Critical Nationalism: A Liberal Prescription?" Nations and Nationalism 6:1 (Jan. 2000), 111-27.

(45) Andrew Vincent, "Liberal Nationalism: An Irresponsible Compound," Political Studies 45:2 (June 1997), 295.

(46) Buttle, "Critical Nationalism," 114-15.

(47) Halliday, "Perils of Community."

(48) Freeman, "Right to Self-Determination," 53.

(49) Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (New York, 1995). See also Arblaster, Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, 66-70; Grillo, Pluralism and Politics of Difference; John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, 1993); Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven, Conn., 1997); and Spinner, Boundaries of Citizenship, 3.

(50) Peter L. Berger, "Conclusion: General Observations on Normative Conflict and Mediation," in Peter L. Berger, ed., The Limits to Social Cohesion: Conflict and Mediation in Pluralist Societies (Boulder, Colo., 1998), 352-72; Crawford Young, The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay (Madison, Wis., 1993).

(51) Michael MacGreil, Prejudice in Ireland Revisited (Maynooth, Co. Kildare, 1996).

(52) Conor Ward and Andrew Greeley, "Development and Tolerance: The Case of Ireland," Eire-Ireland 25:4 (Winter 1990), 7-17.

(53) Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society, 219; Miller, On Nationality, 195.

(54) Louis L. Snyder, Contemporary Nationalism: Intensity and Persistence (Malabar, Fla., 1992), 9.

(55) Michael Sandel, Democracy's Discontent (Cambridge, 1996), 294.

(56) Tom Garvin, "The North and the Rest: The Politics of the Republic of Ireland," in Charles Townsend, ed., Consensus in Ireland: Approaches and Recessions (Oxford, 1988), 95-109.

(57) Cairns and Richards, Writing Ireland, 153-54.

(58) Hayes, "`Local Differences,'" 128-31.

(59) Bruce Arnold, What Kind of Country: Modern Irish Politics, 1965-1983 (London, 1984); Terry Eagleton, "Postcolonialism: The Case of Ireland," in David Bennett, ed., Multicultural States: Rethinking Identity and Difference (New York, 1998), 125-34.

(60) Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York, 1981), 247.

TIMOTHY J. WHITE is a professor in the Department of Political Science and Sociology at Xavier University in Cincinnati, where he teaches courses in Irish Studies. In the 2000-01 academic year he was the Irish American Cultural Institute's Visiting Professor at the National University of Ireland-Galway. He has published numerous articles on socioeconomic change and political culture in Ireland. He is currently researching the role of the pharmaceutical industry in Irish economic growth.

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