Task in Iraq: Subdue — not alienate

WASHINGTON -- The spreading insurgency in Iraq has drastically altered the strategic equation for the U.S. military. One year after U.S. forces fought their way into Baghdad, Americans now find themselves facing more enemies, with fewer effective allies, than they had counted on.

And the military also has two new and demanding missions: Subduing a restive Sunni city of around 250,000 people and the subtle and complex job of neutralizing the militia of a radical Shiite cleric without alienating the rest of the Shiite population.

Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of the U.S.-led force in Iraq, bluntly committed his forces on Thursday to a sustained campaign to do both. The victory that seemed to be sealed when American armor rolled into Baghdad a year ago now appears to hang in the balance as American forces do battle with a diverse array of insurgents and militias.

Just a few weeks ago, the plan seemed clear enough. The U.S. military would train new Iraqi security forces that would help police Baghdad and even restive cities like Fallujah. The number of American operating sites in the Iraqi capital was to be reduced to eight from 26 by mid-April, six of which would be on the outskirts of the city.

But with the upsurge in fighting it is clear that the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and the Iraq police are still too weak to maintain order in contested areas like Baghdad and Fallujah. Reports from Fallujah say the police have stayed out of the fray. According to Defense Department documents there were 77,000 Iraqi police as of February, 47,000 of whom had yet to receive new training.

At the same time, an area that the American-led coalition had once considered to be largely benign, the Shiite-dominated south, has turned into a cauldron as a result of the confrontation with the radical cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr.

A senior administration official said the coalition intended to take military action against the Shiite resistance but planned to move deliberately to try to avoid the impression that this was a campaign against the Shiites. Specially trained Iraqi security forces loyal to the coalition needed to be involved in the effort, he said, particularly when forces are sent into Najaf, a holy city for Shiites. As it might be difficult to find Shiite fighters in the Najaf area to work with American commanders on such a mission, Iraqi security forces might need to brought to the south from other parts of Iraq.

But it is far from clear that the coalition's message will be persuasive to other Shiites, many of whom are showing signs of frustration with the occupation. An escalating fight with the majority Shiite community would seriously challenge if not doom the occupation.

The mission in Fallujah, a Sunni town that has long been a center of resistance, is more straightforward. In that case, the Marines have cordoned off the city and are advancing methodically, looking for insurgent leaders, including those who carried out attacks on four U.S. civilians last week.

The Pentagon has estimated that al-Sadr's forces might number no more than several thousand. Even so, several thousand insurgents who seek sanctuaries in cities and carry out guerrilla tactics can be deadly. According to estimates by the U.S. Central Command, only some 5,000 Baathist, foreign fighters and other insurgents are responsible for the road bombings and other ambushes that have bedeviled U.S. troops in recent months.

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