The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam. They Did Everything but Learn from It - Book Review

By David M. Toczek. Greenwood Press, 2001. 224 Pages, $62.00.

The Battle of Ap Bac on January 2, 1963 was a minor engagement in the long war. The combatants were less than a regiment of ARVN soldiers with a few helicopters and armored personnel carriers against a battalion of Viet Cong guerrillas. The results of the isolated incident that lasted less than a day were ambiguous, interpretation subject to the spin doctors of both adversaries. However, this seemingly marginal event took on a larger consequence both at the time and in retrospect.

The Viet Cong proclaimed their dubious success as a great victory over the enemy. General Paul Harkins, the commanding officer of the Military Assistance Command--Vietnam, and Ambassador Frederick Nolting downplayed the performance of the ARVN in what they dismissed as an insignificant engagement. American military junior officers working directly with the ARVN believed that Ap Bac indicated the extensive American training effort was not producing adequate results.

The small American press corps covering Vietnam echoed the junior officer's concerns, and some commentators, even at this early stage, magnified the battle as a metaphor of the war. This perspective would grow as America sank deeper into the conflict of the years to come.

Toczek, an assistant professor of history at the United States Military Academy, dispassionately avoids the histrionics and exaggerations on both sides of the question as he calls Ap Bac "an interesting historical paradox," and says that "its greatest importance lies in its perceived unimportance by American policy makers." He continues that American senior leadership missed the warning signal of the failed military policy that Ap Bac indicated. He makes a very. good case.

The author provides a very detailed account of all aspects of the battle, certainly the most comprehensive treatment of the conflict in print. Frankly, this rendering is a bit dry for most readers. The most interesting parts of the book are the two introductory chapters, "The Background" and "The Belligerents," which trace the development of the ARVN, the American advisory effort in the 1950s and early 1960s, and the military strategies of both the U.S./ARVN and the Viet Cong. Ronald Spector's Advice and Support: The Early Years of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1941-1960; James Collins's The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army; and other sources cover this period in exhaustive detail, but Toczek offers a very handy, brief capsule for the general reader.

Although this sound and judicious study is not groundbreaking or particularly exciting, it is a worthy contribution to the literature on the war.

COPYRIGHT 2002 U.S. Army Infantry School
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