Phantom Soldier: the Enemy's Answer to U.S. Firepower

Phantom Soldier: The Enemy's Answer to U.S. Firepower. H. John Poole. Posterity Press, 2001. 338 Pages. $14.95, Softbound.

The middle of the 20th century seems to have marked a watershed in patterns of warfare. Before that time, and most notably in the 19th century, non-Western armies wanting to fight Western armies had to adopt Western military discipline, tactics, training, and technology to avoid defeat.

Since the end of World War II, this pattern has begun to change. Western armed forces fighting non-Western opponents have been defeated, as were the French in Vietnam and in Algeria, the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the Americans in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. Author H. John Poole, a former U.S. Marine Corps staff NCO and small-unit trainer, reveals numerous aspects of the Oriental and other non-western ways of warfare in which Soldiers, during heavy fighting, have "disappeared." These Oriental "phantom Soldiers"--whether they were the "hidden" Japanese defenders of Iwo Jima in 1945; the Soldiers of no fewer than 10 Chinese divisions who infiltrated into North Korea in 1950 without being detected by U.S. reconnaissance aircraft; or the vanishing "besieged" North Vietnamese Army units in Hue City in South Vietnam in 1968--have learned their craft well and are formidable adversaries.

This interesting study is divided into three main sections: 'The Eastern Way of War," "The Differences in Tactical Technique;" and "The Next Disappearing Act." Drawing heavily upon the writings of Sun Tzu, Liu Tao, Mao Tse-tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, and other philosophers and practitioners of the military art, the author describes differences in Eastern and Western strategy and tactics and their application. "While the West doggedly applies what it has learned about itself in peacetime," notes the author, "the East flexibly applies what it learns about itself and its adversary during the actual fighting."

Eastern tactics are revealing and interesting. Eastern infantry units are versatile--equally adept at guerrilla, mobile, and positional warfare--and small-unit commanders are permitted to exercise significant flexibility and initiative. The Oriental commander, according to this study, is able to maximize the fighting capacity of his unit by adjusting its formation or battle array, advantageous positioning, responsiveness, and controlling the enemy. Deceptive measures and delaying techniques, in urban, defensive, and offensive situations, are also described and assessed in detail using many historical examples, maps, and diagrams.

The March 2002 outcome of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan strongly suggests the U.S. Army needs better and more flexible leadership and more imaginative and inspired--and less rigid and dogmatic--tactics and training. The Eastern warrior, a master of stealth, deception, and flexibility--as characterized in the thought-provoking Phantom Soldier--and his tactics, are worthy of study and possible emulation and should not be underestimated.

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