U.S.-North Korea discussions on nuclear issues: remarks at a State Department news conference, Washington, DC, January 5, 1994 - Transcript

Let me begin by introducing two folks who have been laboring mightily over the past few months working on the subject of bringing North Korea back into the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Tom Hubbard and Gary Samore, who are sitting over here to my left. They've been referred to in various of your columns as working-level. But without confirming that they are the working-level folks doing some of these negotiations, they are people who have been helping all of us as we sought to bring the North Koreans back into adherence and ensure that they carry out their obligations in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

I thought it might be useful if I spent a couple of moments going back to where we began, taking you to where we hope to be, and focusing more specifically on precisely where we find ourselves today. Then I'll take your questions.

In March of 1993, we woke up one morning to discover that the North Koreans had decided to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since then, our goal has been to bring them back into that treaty and into full acceptance of the regime of that treaty, including what we've come to call the International Safeguards Regime.

Following a UN resolution urging all parties to seek a diplomatic solution, the United States began bilateral discussions with the North to resolve this nuclear issue. We've held two rounds of discussions since last spring.

At the first round in June, the North suspended its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and agreed to refrain from any steps that could lead to its either acquiring nuclear material in order to build nuclear weapons or taking nuclear material and reprocessing it to build nuclear weapons.

So they agreed specifically to no reprocessing of nuclear fuel, to no refueling of their reactor without the IAEA being present, and to maintaining what has become somewhat of a term of art--a continuity of safeguards--with respect to their nuclear activities.

So with that as the first round and our accomplishment--that is, they suspended their withdrawal--we went into a second round in July where they reaffirmed their commitment to these constraints and agreed to renew their discussions with the IAEA with respect to carrying out the full range of inspections necessary to assure their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and also to undertake a genuine dialogue with South Korea in order to carry out their agreement--their denuclearization agreement--with respect to the Peninsula.

It was understood that a third round of discussions between the United States and North Korea would take place only if these three commitments were made.

They have carried out their discussions with the IAEA, and we have been working since that meeting in July to ensure that they are maintaining the continuity of safeguards as defined by the IAEA, and that they are prepared to begin a genuine dialogue with the South in order to carry out the denuclearization agreement.

So it's with those immediate goals that we've been working with the North these past few months, and we are very close to having accomplished those requirements in order to begin a third round of discussions. The North Koreans have now agreed to accept the required inspections to ensure a continuity of safeguards at their seven declared nuclear sites, and they are prepared now to begin discussions with the South.

So the most immediate step at this point is for the North Koreans to meet with the IAEA and work out the details of those inspections of the seven declared sites. And through our discussions with the North, we believe that this will happen in the coming few days and, that through those discussions, the inspections will take place that the IAEA believes necessary in order to have confidence that there continues to be a continuity of safeguards.

At the same time, we have reason to believe that the North is prepared now to meet again with the South and, on the basis of those two steps, a third round of discussions could take place. In that third round of discussions, we will be seeking to bring the North Koreans into full compliance with their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the requirement to receive inspections at the two non-declared nuclear sites, and for us to find ways to resolve once and for all our outstanding issues with respect to the nuclear policies of North Korea.

So once we get into the third round, our objectives are as they've been from the start, and that is to gain the North's full cooperation, including the special inspections, and full implementation of the denuclearization agreement reached between the North and the South--and that, itself, will include a bilateral inspection regime.

That's what we will be seeking once we've passed the hurdles of getting into the third round. We believe we are very close to having accomplished what was necessary, in our view, to have that third round of discussions. And let me say again that the North Koreans are prepared to accept the inspections necessary for the IAEA to be able to confirm that there is now a continuity of inspections, by their definition, and that a genuine dialogue is beginning between the North and the South to carry out the denuclearization agreement.

So that's where we began, that's where we're going, and that's where we are at the present time.

COPYRIGHT 1994 U.S. Government Printing Office
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