The U.S.'s befuddled approach to the war on terrorism

BY JUNE, 2004, virtually all government experts on terrorism agreed that Al Qaeda would strike the U.S. in the coming months. The experts were wrong, again, because Al Qaeda has become decentralized, narrowly focusing on regional targets overseas. It has attacked poorly defended. "soft" targets, indicating these regional groups remain weak against security forces. Key terrorist leaders have been eliminated. Only a few "sleepers" planning attacks have been found in this country, and there have been no international terrorist incidents here since 9/11, more than three years ago.

Al Qaeda no longer is able to launch a large-scale attack in the U.S., but it can intimidate Americans merely by increasing its electronic chatter. Officials sound alarms regularly because they do not wish to be caught unawares if a major incident occurs. They do not have specific information about an impending terrorist event, or even assurance one will take place, but it is better to appear vigilant than complacent.

Terrorism did not start with 9/11, Palestinians hijacked five airliners in four days in 1970. The greatest number of international terrorist incidents occurred in 1987 (665), and the Clinton Administration broke up about 20 cells in the U.S.

During the past few years, acts of international terrorism, excluding intra-Palestinian violence, have declined. According to statistics compiled by the Department of State, 426 incidents occurred in 201)0, 355 in 2001, 205 in 2002, and 208 in 2003.

The number of fatalities worldwide, recently revised upward, continues downward. That number reached 3,547 in 2001, 725 in 2002, and 625 in 2003. In 2003, the greatest number of attacks (80) occurred in Asia, but, not surprisingly, the Middle East accounted for the largest death count (331) and number of wounded (1,492). On the other hand, more international terrorist attacks occurred in Latin America in 2000 (122), 2001 (192), and 2002 (201) than anywhere else the world.

Attacks on multinational oil pipelines in Colombia inflated these figures. Pipeline bombings totaled 178 in 2001, accounting for half the worldwide incidents that year. After pipeline security was enhanced, the number of international terrorist events in Latin America dropped to 20 in 2003.

International terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and property around the globe also have fallen dramatically, from 219 in 2001 to 77 in 2002, and 82 in 2003. Americans comprised less than one percent of the fatalities worldwide last year. This is all commendable. but it is difficult to find a pattern. Attacks against Americans have snaked along, from 199 in 1986 to 139 in 1987 to 167 in 1988 to 147 in 1989. Surges have been unpredictable, although the number of terrorist incidents usually rises during the second half era decade.

The threat from "sleepers" in the U.S. was grossly exaggerated. Statisticians at Syracuse University have found that 6,400 persons were arrested for terrorist-related offenses in this country during the two years following 9/11. Of 2,681 cases concluded by the end of September, 2003, Federal attorneys dismissed charges against half of those incarcerated. Out of the 879 defendants convicted of some crime, 373 were sent to prison, and, of these, 250 were sentenced to less than a year. Twenty-three received five or more years, and just three were incarcerated for 20 or more.

Between Sept. 11, 2001 and Dee. 31, 2003, British authorities arrested 537 individuals under the Terrorism Act of 2000. Ninety-four were chinned with terrorism-related crimes, 71 with other offenses, and 263 were released. Another 109 await judicial action.

Earlier this year, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London luridly announced that Al Qaeda had 18,000 "potential" operatives to strike targets in Europe and the U.S., presumably with weapons of mass destruction. The IISS estimated that at least 20,000 fighters had been trained at camps in Afghanistan, and subtracted 2,000 killed or captured to come up with this figure. Other analysts have put the number of trainees between 5,000-70,000, a range which is not much help. Total Al Qaeda sympathizers taken into custody around the world since 9/11 actually approach 3,500, not 2,000, and the number killed only can be imagined. Then again, persons trained are not a reliable measure of who will commit acts of terrorism. They are far fewer

Al Qaeda has claimed responsibility for several major incidents overseas since Sept, 11, 2001, but Osama bin Laden has been marginalized. Recent acts of terrorism have been planned, financed, armed, and carried out by local Muslim groups, whose only connection to Al Qaeda may be that a few members trained in its camps 10 to 20 years ago.

Al Qaeda reportedly provided funds for the Bali nightclub bombings in October, 2002, but four Indonesians were convicted of robbing a jewelry store to obtain the money.

Over 190 people died and more than 1,400 were injured when cell phones detonated bombs in backpacks on trains in Madrid on March 11, 2004. Muslim terrorists had sold hashish and Ecstasy to criminals to obtain 440 pounds of dynamite to execute the explosions. Drug trafficking paid for the apartment, a vehicle, and the phones used in the bombings. Criminals stole the explosives from a coal mine in the Asturias region of northern Spain.

Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Tawid, has claimed responsibility for at least 25 other acts of terrorism in Iraq, including the explosion at UN headquarters in Baghdad in August, 2003, and bombings in Istanbul that left more than 60 people dead the following November. He has been linked to the Millennium plots in Jordan, Israel, and the U.S.

However, he is not controlled by Osama bin Laden. Some foreign terrorist experts even believe Al Tawid rivals Al Qaeda. Zarqawi has called the Shiites in Iraq more dangerous than the Americans, which is not the way bin Laden sees things. Shiites are "the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom." Zarqawi, who beheaded American civilian Nicholas Berg, largely has avoided American targets to strike tomes cooperating with the U.S. in Iraq.

The Russians insist that Arabs comprise 20% of the armed militants in Chechnya. Field commander Omar Ibn al-Khattab, poisoned in 2002, either was Saudi or Jordanian, and his successor, Abu Walid, was born in Saudi Arabia. Al Qaeda has provided funds to insurgents in the Caucasus, but Chechen Shamil Basaev still directs major operations.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not generate intelligence. The CIA and FBI continue to collect and evaluate information, as they did before 9/11. The DHS may coordinate it, but its frequent alerts and grim warnings have been baffling. Local law enforcement agencies have complained that the DHS does not provide specific information about international terrorist plots in the U.S., just general warnings. This is because the DHS has no reliable information to share.

Furthermore, the DHS has refrained from requiring private companies to improve their security because the Bush Administration dislikes Federal regulation of private businesses. Potential dangers, ranging from unprotected chemical plants to airline flight personnel without security training, are ignored because businesses refuse to pay.

With record Federal budget deficits, Washington must choose how best to allocate resources in the war against terrorism. Journalist Elizabeth Kolbert has noted that the terrorism appropriations bill passed after 9/11 divided 40% of the money equally among the 50 states. The remaining 60% went to the DHS, where Director Tom Ridge disbursed funds to states on a per capita basis rather than by risk assessment. With some creative accounting, residents of Wyoming each ended up with seven times more money than New Yorkers.

Cindy Williams, principal researcher in security studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has pointed out that the largest share of the new money appropriated for national and homeland defense since 9/11 has been devoted to the war in Iraq. For just $5,000,000,000 of the $64,000,000,000 Department of Defense 2004 supplemental appropriation for the occupation in Iraq, the U.S. could inspect 10 times as many shipping containers entering its ports.

Some in Congress wish to equip U.S. aircraft with anti-missile systems. The FBI reported that, in the past 35 years, surface-to-air missiles had hit 29 civilian aircraft, with the loss of approximately 550 lives, but almost all of those planes had flown in war zones. Early in 2004, the U.S. warned airlines in the United Kingdom and France about threats from shoulder-fired missiles, but nothing transpired. Anti-missile defense systems would cost $1-2,000,000 per plane, and the U.S. civil aviation fleet includes 6,800 airliners, for a total expenditure of around $10,000,000,000. Anti-missile systems currently have high false-alarm rates, and dropping flares around airports might set houses on fire.

Putting sky marshals on aircraft may seem reasonable, but nations have resisted, believing weapons on flights present an additional danger. U.S. marshals have been involved in 2,100 incidents, but none has been terrorist-related. Sky marshals never have fired a shot, though they occasionally have drawn their weapons to restrain unruly passengers.

In June, 2004, the Federal government finished searching databases on the 2,700,0000 truck drivers licensed to carry hazardous materials. No one on the list had clear ties to terrorism, but additional checks were to be run on 29 names. Mohamed Elzahabi, who had trained with Al Qaeda, was not among the 29, even though he had a license to haul hazardous waste and to drive a school bus in Minnesota. This problem resulted from confusion coordinating numerous watch lists.

In August, 2004, two Chechen women with explosives strapped to their bodies destroyed two aircraft over Russia, with the loss of 90 lives. This led U.S. authorities to order a more thorough search of airline passengers before departures, but the Chechens had bribed Russian officials to get aboard these planes. Presumably, this is not a problem in this country.

Cyber attacks by Al Qaeda?

If Al Qaeda cannot physically attack targets in the U.S., it may launch cyber attacks. "Frontline" has observed that three network operational centers control the entire Internet in the U.S. Eliminate those, and Internet communications will cease for an extended period. Five or six software systems run the power grids around the world. Penetrate these systems, and the grids will shut down. Former chairman of the White House Counterterrorism Security Group, Richard Clarke, was always apprehensive about "an electronic Pearl Harbor."

Yet, no terrorist group ever has successfully disrupted government computers or communications. Joshua Green, an editor of Washington Monthly, has described penetrations ("worms, viruses, denial-of-service attacks, and theft") of businesses, which comprise 85% of the Internet, but Federal firewalls have thwarted Al Qaeda. Nonetheless, private companies must pay more attention to their own computer security, and software manufacturers need to eliminate trapdoors and bugs in their products.

Pros. George W. Bush has called Iraq "the central front in the war on terrorism." Conventional wisdom insists that the war, which has gone badly for Washington, has swelled Al Qaeda ranks, but no one in the West really knows. Only small numbers of Al Qaeda appear to be operating in the country anyway, mostly Saudis, Syrians, and Jordanians. Some experts estimate 1,000, but judging from the low number of foreign insurgents captured (100 compared to 6,000 Iraqis), a few hundred may be nearer the mark. In may case, attacks directed at combatant U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq are not counted as acts of terrorism.

No evidence has surfaced that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction after the mid 1990s. No one has found that he engaged in terrorism against the U.S. after 1993, or was in any way involved in the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001. According to journalist Bob Woodward, Saddam exercised "no authority, direction, and control" over Al Qaeda in Iraq, and Al Qaeda certainly had no control over him. The 9/11 Commission reached a similar conclusion.

In a few instances, Al Qaeda and Iraqi agents met, but they did not cooperate. In 1994, bin Laden asked permission to set up a training camp in Iraq, but Saddam did not respond. Prior to the March, 2003, invasion, the CIA discovered, but failed to disseminate, information Iraq had abandoned programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Then-Director George Tenet reported to the President that Saddam Hussein represented "no imminent threat" to the U.S. Evidence of closer relations between bin Laden and Saddam eventually may emerge, or Iraqi weapons of mass destruction found, but solid and substantial proof of a threat should precede an invasion, not follow it. One does not invade to find the reason why.

Woodward reported Tenet told Pres. Bush that if he wanted to take on nations that supported or harbored terrorists, it would be a "sixty country problem." Bush replied, "We'll pick them off one at a time."

This story may not be true, of course, but the President speaks constantly about--though has not defined--the "war on terrorism" and his "Greater Middle East Initiative." The latter is designed to encourage democratic and economic reforms in the Arab world to reduce the poverty that breeds terrorism.

In The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies, a book of case studies on international terrorism. Christopher Hewitt found that incidents of violence actually increase during prosperous economic times. This is not the last word on the connection between poverty and terrorism, of course. Without question, economic depression and political oppression breed violence, though one should be cautious prescribing simple remedies for deep-rooted, long-running problems.

The U.S. must focus on Al Qaeda, Middle East expert Daniel Pipes has estimated that 10-15% of all Muslims are militant, which would mean 120-180,000,000 out of 1,200,000,000. Pipes may have conjured these numbers from thin air, but Muslim and non-Muslim militants are too numerous for the U.S. to take on the whole world, even one nation at a time.

It always will be difficult to obtain advanced information on a terrorist plot, but 9/11 might have been prevented, or the loss of life reduced. International hijackings increased from 11 to 20 between 1999-2000. This should have heightened airport security around the world. The August, 2001, arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, who wanted to learn how to fly a plane but not how to take off or land, should have alerted security that young Muslims might try to hijack an aircraft. Western intelligence agencies had learned that Al Qaeda plotted to crash an aircraft into the G-8 summit in Genoa, Italy, in July, 2001. About the same time, word circulated of plans for an air attack against the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Africa. Mercifully, neither incident occurred, but the threats ought to have motivated Federal officials to defend the U.S., to "build the Ark before the Flood."

There were plenty of warnings. During the spring and summer of 2001, U.S. intelligence monitored Al Qaeda communications: "Unbelievable news in the coming weeks." "Big event ... there will be a very, very, very, very big uproar." "There will be attacks in the near future." Washington Post editor Steve Coll has reported that, between Jan. 1-Sept. 10, 2001, the FBI issued 216 secret, internal threat warnings, including six which spoke about possible attacks against airports or airlines. That spring, the National Security Agency circulated 33 alerts concerning an imminent Al Qaeda attack.

Tenet spoke to Bush about the grave dangers posed by Al Qaeda at least 40 times prior to 9/11. Clarke contends that Tenet cannot be blamed for the disaster: He was coming to the Oval Office "with his hair on fire." Congress has criticized intelligence agencies for this horrendous failure, but the Bush Administration was not especially concerned about bin Laden prior to Sept. 11. It concentrated on building a national missile defense and on deposing Saddam Hussein.

Now the Administration is overreacting. A senior Federal counterterrorism official announced in late May, 2004, that a "steady drumbeat of information" indicated "they are going to attack us and hit us hard." The FBI predicted large-scale attacks in the U.S. sometime during the summer or autumn. About the same time, Attorney General John Ashcroft identified seven Al Qaeda members who, he said, were operating inside the country. All seven had been on the wanted list for more than a year, so this was old news. Photos of Adrian El Shukrijumah had appealed in newspapers during a nationwide manhunt in March, 2003, without success. Better to look for him in or around Guyana.

In February, 2004, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller described "strong indications" that Al Qaeda still planned to hit U.S. facilities it had previously targeted, including the White House and the Capitol. He insisted that the Al Qaeda terrorist network "retains a cadre of supporters within the United States," and is seeking to recruit more. While most are engaged in fundraising, recruitment, and logistics. Mueller admitted, others have been involved in operational planning. Ridge joined the chores in July.

In June, Nuradin Abdi was indicted for planning to blow up a shopping mall in Columbus, Ohio. The alleged plotters had no explosives and no idea which mall to attack. This may have been another false trail, but Abdi knew Iyman Faris, an Al Qaeda member sentenced to 20 years in prison in 2003 for plotting to sever cables on the Brooklyn Bridge and to derail trains around Washington, D.C. Fails had pied guilty under threat of being declared an enemy combatant and imprisoned indefinitely. Although a mall bombing might terrorize Middle America, such an attack is unlikely to cause mass casualties, and malls seem unrewarding and improbable targets.

Post-9/11 realities

Are terrorists really in place, ready to strike? Aside from the 9/11 hijackers, Al Qaeda never had a significant presence in the U.S. Hamas and Hezbollah engaged in fundraising in the U.S., but these organizations have not targeted Americans for almost a decade. Eleven members of Lashkar-e-Toiba were arrested in this country, but, as far as anybody knows, the group seeks to expel India from Kashmir, not to attack Americans. It must be noted, however, that Abu Zubaydah, No. 3 in Al Qaeda, was captured at a Lashkar-e-Toiba hideout in a villa near Faisalabad at the end of March, 2002.

Experts endlessly have repeated that it is not so much a question of whether terrorists will detonate a radioactive device, but when. Yet, Al Qaeda may have abandoned plans to do so. Jose Padilla has been in custody since 2002 for allegedly planning to set off a "dirty bomb" in the U.S. When Padilla proposed the idea to Al Qaeda leaders, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Zubaydah considered the plan impractical. They showed greater interest in his scheme to blow up apartments and hotels in Chicago using natural gas.

Aside from the terrorist danger, we pose a serious threat to ourselves. The Capitol hurriedly was evacuated in June, 2004, when a private plane whose transponder was not operating entered restricted air space over Washington, D.C. The Federal Aviation Administration quickly realized the plane posed no danger, but its personnel did not inform the Security Coordination Center. An F-16 nearly downed the aircraft, which happened to be carrying the governor of Kentucky.

Some have portrayed this incident as a success, since jet fighters were launched and the Capitol evacuated according to plan, but neither should have occurred. Moreover, why was a plane with a faulty transponder allowed to fly in the first place?

That same month, the FAA believed a Singapore Airlines jetliner en route to Los Angeles had been commandeered after a hijacking-in-progress code accidentally was transmitted. Four hours passed before airport police and Federal agents were informed.

Two-thirds of the original Al Qaeda leaders have been arrested or eliminated. American bombs killed Muhammad Atef, chief of military operations, in Afghanistan in late 2001. Pakistani security forces captured Zubaydab in 2002 after U.S. intelligence tracked calls from his cell phone. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who planned 9/11, was seized the following year in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Riduan Isamuddin ("Hambali"), chief of Jemaah Islamiyah and the suspected planner of the 2002 Bali bombings, remains in U.S. custody, as does Saudi Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, alleged mastermind of the USS Cole ship bombing. In March, 2004, Saudi security forces killed Khaled All Hajj, considered the most dangerous Al Qaeda operative on the Arabian Peninsula. He had been linked to May, 2003, bombings at housing complexes in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which left 23 persons dead, mostly Westerners. In mid April, an air strike killed Saudi-born Abu Walid, second in command to Shamil Basaev in Chechnya. Walid allegedly plotted the February, 2004, bombing in the Moscow subway that killed 10, and distributed foreign funds among the Chechens. In June, 2004, the Saudis fatally shot Abdulaziz al-Muqrin, who had directed deadly Al Qaeda operations in Saudi Arabia following the killing of Yusuf al-Ubayri. Also in June, Algerian troops shot dead Nabil Sahrawi, leader of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, near Algiers. Violence in the 12-year civil war began to decline in 2003. Amjad Farooqi, Al Qaeda's commander in Pakistan, conspired on two occasions to assassinate Pres. Pervez Musharraf and arranged the murder of journalist Daniel Pearl. Authorities killed Farooqi northeast of Karach in late September.

Astonishingly, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri remain at large. In August, 2003, Iranians spirited al-Zawahiri, disguised as an Iranian Shiite cleric, to Turkey, where he stayed for several days at an Iranian safe house. He could be hiding near the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia. Egyptian Saif al-Adel, who commanded the force which downed American Black Hawk helicopters at Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993, may be residing in Irma, as is bin Laden's son, Saad.

Others must be hunted down. Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Al Qaeda's chief financial officer, has eluded capture. Tawfiq bin Atash, who plotted failed suicide missions against ships in the Strait of Gibraltar, had a role in the 1998 African embassy bombings, and participated in the 2000 Cole attack, continues to evade his pursuers. He was arrested in Yemen in 1996, but released. Fawaz bin Mohammed al-Nashmi coordinated the May, 2004, Khobar, Sandi Arabia, attacks that left 22 dead and drove the price of oil to over $42 a barrel.

Intelligence services insist bin Laden is hiding in southern Waziristan, along the Afghan-Pakistani border. On the other hand, he last spoke on videotape in December, 2001. Subsequent tapes showing bin Laden roaming a rugged mountainous landscape were file footage with voiceovers, suggesting he had left the area. Mohammed Atef and al-Zawahiri visited Aceh province in Indonesia in June, 2000, to arrange the transfer of Al Qaeda headquarters to Southeast Asia. Bin Laden may have headed there.

Judging by events mentioned in the audio-and videotapes broadcast by Al Jazeera, he is three weeks by boat from Qatar, where the television station is located. That means he is not sequestered near the Persian Gulf or in a port, such as Karachi, because tapes from there would have reached Qatar sooner.

Bin Laden would not be living in a cave or in the jungle. He probably is residing leisurely on the estate of a wealthy Muslim around Banda, the capital of Aceh province. He has access to current news and equipment, not available in remote Waziristan, to produce technically sophisticated videotapes.

If nations ever followed Washington's lead in the war on terrorism, they do not now. The Australian government rejected a proposal to establish its own department of homeland security in March, 2004. In April, a German court reversed the guilty verdict of 29-year-old Moroccan Mounir el-Motassadeq, and called for a new trial after Washington refused to allow an associate, Ramzi Binalshib, to testify. Motassadeq was one of only three people ever charged in the 9/11 conspiracy, but it is possible none ever will be convicted.

That same month, the Indonesian Supreme Court reduced the sentence of Abu Bakar Bashic spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, from three years to 18 months. The group had coordinated the Bali nightclub bombings in 2002 and the suicide assault against the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, which left 12 dead in 2003. Such lenient treatment appeased conservative Muslims prior to a national election. Five Britons permitted to return home from detention at Guantanamo later were released without charge. Prison authorities at the island base insist that about 50 of the 595 remaining prisoners are providing useful intelligence.

In July, these prisoners were afforded the right to challenge their detention before a U.S. military tribunal. They will not be allowed their own lawyers, and findings will favor government evidence.

The railway explosions in Madrid in March, 2004, led to the defeat of Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar and withdrawal of 1,300 Spanish troops from Iraq. This was the first time Al Qaeda had struck in Europe, and the first time a terrorist attack ever toppled a government. That same month, the European Union approved proposals to exchange more information about terrorism, but rejected plans to form a central intelligence agency. Antonio Vitorino, EU commissioner of Justice and Home Affairs, insisted current antiterrorist laws sufficed, if enforced.

Nations know best the threats that exist within their borders, and how, politically and militarily, to deal with them. The U.S. can share intelligence and offer encouragement, but its future role is limited and its stake in fighting terrorism is no greater than the countries themselves.

In the meantime, the U.S. remains safe from major acts of international terrorism. It can stay secure for a modest price, without resorting to coercive or repressive measures. Combating terrorism does not require or justify suspending civil liberties or abrogating human rights; for, as everyone should realize by now, ensuring the rule of law and protecting human rights are the very reasons the U.S. is fighting terrorism.

John L. Scherer, a Minneapolis, Minn.-based freelance writer, edited the yearbook Terrorism: An Annual Survey in 1982-83 amt the quarterly Terrorism from 1986 to 2001.

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