出版社：Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração
摘要：This study investigates the relation between control and ownership structure, value and performance of Brazilian public companies listed in the São Paulo Stock Exchange during the period of 1998-2002. The aim of this research is to investigate the agency conflicts that arise from the separation of ownership from control in the meaning of corporate governance. The ownership structure variables used are the voting concentration, property concentration and excess-votes of controlling shareholders. The main hypothesis is that ownership variables are determinant of value and performance, testing for endogenous problems, concerning the Brazilian context where the separation of control rights from cash-flow rights are widely used by the issuing of non-voting shares. The empirical evidence comes from Ordinary Least-Square, Random Effects and Fixed Effects models, suggesting a quadratic relation between voting concentration and value and a negative linear relation between excess-votes and value. Property concentration has weak influence on value and performance variables and endogenous effects do not appear to be influential in the models.
