摘要：Monetary policy analysts often rely on rules of thumb, such as the Taylor rule, to describe historical
monetary policy decisions and to compare current policy with historical norms. Analysis along these
lines also permits evaluation of episodes where policy may have deviated from a simple rule and
examination of the reasons behind such deviations. One interesting question is whether such rules
of thumb should draw on policymakers¡¯ forecasts of key variables, such as inflation and unemployment,
or on observed outcomes. Importantly, deviations of the policy from the prescriptions of a
Taylor rule that relies on outcomes may be the result of systematic responses to information captured
in policymakers¡¯ own projections. This paper investigates this proposition in the context of Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) policy decisions over the past 20 years, using publicly available
FOMC projections from the semiannual monetary policy reports to Congress (Humphrey-Hawkins
reports). The results indicate that FOMC decisions can indeed be predominantly explained in terms
of the FOMC¡¯s own projections rather than observed outcomes. Thus, a forecast-based rule of thumb
better characterizes FOMC decisionmaking. This paper also confirms that many of the apparent
deviations of the federal funds rate from an outcome-based Taylor-style rule may be considered
systematic responses to information contained in FOMC projections. (JEL E52)
