期刊名称：Philosophical Frontiers : A Journal of Emerging Thought
印刷版ISSN：1758-1532
电子版ISSN：1758-1540
出版年度：2008
卷号：3
期号：01
出版社：Progressive Frontiers Press
摘要：This paper is a refutation of the Molinist contention that God has
Middle Knowledge of subjunctive conditional propositions that state what an agent
would freely do, if instantiated in particular possible states of affairs. The Molinist
holds that his account of God’s prevolitional knowledge of these counterfactuals is
sufficient to ensure that there is no conflict between divine providence and human
free will. In this paper, I contend that the Molinist thesis is deficient because it can
provide no adequate account of how God could have knowledge of this kind. I
argue against Saurez and Kvanvig’s proposal that divine knowledge of the possible
agent’s creaturely essence is sufficient for perfect foreknowledge of what that agent
would in any specific circumstance. I then proceed to refute Flint’s suggestion that
Lewis’s possible world semantics can be used to show that these counterfactuals are
grounded in the nearest possible world.
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