期刊名称：Journal of Automation, Mobile Robotics & Intelligent Systems (JAMRIS)
印刷版ISSN：1897-8649
电子版ISSN：2080-2145
出版年度：2008
卷号：31
页码：473-495
出版社：Industrial Research Inst. for Automation and Measurements, Warsaw
摘要：Reasoning about agent preferences on a set of alternatives, and the aggregation
of such preferences into some social ranking is a fundamental issue in reasoning
about multi-agent systems. When the set of agents and the set of alternatives
coincide, we get the ranking systems setting. A famous type of ranking systems
are page ranking systems in the context of search engines. In this paper we
present an extensive axiomatic study of ranking systems. In particular, we
consider two fundamental axioms: Transitivity, and Ranked Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives. Surprisingly, we find that there is no general social
ranking rule that satisfies both requirements. Furthermore, we show that our
impossibility result holds under various restrictions on the class of ranking
problems considered. However, when transitivity is weakened, an interesting
possibility result is obtained. In addition, we show a complete axiomatization
of approval voting using ranked IIA
