出版社：Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração
摘要：Game theory’s use to model competition among firms has increased. The article’s goal is to investigate, using this theory, the structure of competition and the strategic decision-making process of the main two Brazilian airlines companies considering the ‘PAX sales’ variable. Data on this strategic variable were collected fromANAC (2007) and the methodological procedures made use of statistical and mathematical methods and scenarios building techniques. Revenue competition is analyzed via measuring market shares, average levels and dispersions of sales in the period from December-2006 to November-2007. Having the trend level as reference, two scenarios are conjectured, specifying strategies by both firms toward decreasing or increasing of sales. Cournot duopoly is structured through the Brazilian domestic airlines market, where TAM and GOL compete with balanced market shares. Stackelberg duopoly is structured considering the Brazilian international airlines market, where TAM dominates the market and GOL is a follower. The results show that in Cournot competition, equilibrium strategic decisions shed light toward reducing PAX sales. Regarding Stackelberg competition, such strategic decisions point to trend of continuity of sales. It is concluded that competition in revenues via PAXsales has to conceive strategic move cautiousness by both companies.
关键词：TAM-GOL duopoly in Brazil ; strategic duopoly competition ; game theory ; non-cooperative games of Cournot and Stackelberg.
