出版社：University of Trieste, Department of Philosophy
摘要：Famously, Sidgwick claimed that an argument in favour of Utilitarianism might be provided
by listing and defending the self-evident axioms underlying it. This paper focusses on those
axioms. In particular, it aims to show which specific intuitions Sidgwick presented, and to
shed light on their mutual connections. It turns out that Sidgwick maintained that six
philosophical intuitions constitute the self-evident grounds for utilitarianism. Moreover,
many of those intuitions seem to be specifications of a negative principle of universalization
(according to which differential treatments cannot be based on unreasonable grounds). This
claim is defended against many rival interpretations.
The argumentative function of those intuitions in defending utilitarianism. They are a
substantial part of the overall argument for utilitarianism Sidgwick presented in the Methods.
In particular, they are the positive counterpart of the negative move consisting in Sidgwick¡¯s
rejection of common-sense morality and its philosophic counterpart, dogmatic intuitionism.
Unfortunately, some of these intuitions fail to meet the conditions for self-evidence Sidgwick
himself established.
