期刊名称：Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance / School of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, Birkbeck College
印刷版ISSN：1745-8587
出版年度：2007
卷号：2007
出版社：London University
摘要：We characterize the optimal selling mechanism in a scenario where similar goods
are sold to “high end” buyers through a posted price and to “lower end” buyers
through an auction. We show that the optimal mechanism involves an auction which
is a standard optimal auction (Myerson (1981)) up to a critical type. Types
above the critical type are pooled. Further, the allocation probability jumps up
at the critical type and is the maximal possible for the pooled types. Therefore
other than pooling at the top, the optimal mechanism allocates the object as
efficiently as in a standard optimal auction. We show that posted price selling
followed by auctions with a “temporary” buy-now option implements the optimal
mechanism. Auctions with such an option are in widespread use on eBay.
