出版社：Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies ; CEEOL
摘要：In this paper, we set out to examine an efficient fiscal-policy framework for a
monetary union. We illustrate that fiscal policy’s bias toward budget deficit
only temporarily ceased at the end of the 20th century as European countries
endeavored to qualify for euro-zone membership, which compelled strict limits on
budgetary deficits. We then explore which mechanisms might instill a sense of
fiscal disciple in governments. We find that most mechanisms suffer from the
incentive-incompatible setup whereby governments restrict their own
fiscal-policy freedom. We argue that even multilateral fiscal rules, such as the
EU’s Stability and Growth Pact, suffer from the same endogeneity flaw.
Consequently, we argue that a fiscal rule must incorporate an external authority
that would impartially assess fiscal-policy developments. Using U.S. debt and
bond-market data at the state level, we show that financial markets represent a
good candidate as, vis-à-vis the American states, they do differentiate state
debt according to the level of debt. We thus argue for a fiscal institution –
what we call the Fiscal Sustainability Council– that would actively bring
financial markets into the fiscal-policy process, and we explain the technique
whereby this could be effected.
