摘要：“We must create a self-dependent empire and substantially expand our
pivot. Former territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania constitute our
natural borders and crossing them would present no challenge <…>. Europe
and, I think, the United States too need our empire – both powers will soon
realise it. After all, all their actions indicate they have already realised it, although
not to the extent to which we are prepared to go. What good is having
our own empire for us? We need it in case the U.S. and Russia collapse.
Europe will then remain the power field and we must be one of those powers
controlling Europe.” These are a few excerpts from Gintaras Beresnevičius’
book “Forging an Empire. Sketches of Lithuanian ideology”, which received
somewhat ironic but generally positive appraisals a few years ago.1 The critics
were apparently captivated not so much by the idea of the Lithuanian empire
as such but by the idea as an intellectual provocation. However, only the foreign
policy makers succumbed to the provocation and began talking about Lithuania’s ambition to become the regional leader.2 The pride taken in the
recent publication of the Russian edition of Professor Edvardas Gudavičius’
“History of Lithuania” reveals that the public opinion seems to be more enticed
by the retrospective – supposedly, now the Russians will finally be able
to read about the medieval empire of Lithuania in their own language.3 It’s
a pity though. The metaphor of empire is becoming entreched in the expert
debates regarding the condition of the international system as a serious
methodological instrument both in the analyses of the international power
distribution and for predicting further development of the international
system.
