摘要：This paper examines the political dynamics surrounding the reform of postal savings/banking institutions,
focusing in particular on the case of Japanese postal savings reform. The paper compares pressures for reform
in Japan to those faced elsewhere, showing that external pressures for reform as well as efficiency-based
arguments for reform have been particularly weak in the Japanese case. The paper also engages in a
diachronic analysis, highlighting the ways in which the nature of the political battle over postal savings
reform has changed in Japan over the years. Focus is placed in particular on the changed political dynamics
that have emerged in recent years under the Hashimoto and Koizumi administrations, leading postal
privatization to eventually occupy a top place on the political agenda. This analysis helps underscore the
weaknesses in conventional explanations that focus exclusively on the clout of postmasters as the source of
delayed reform and raises alternative explanations for the earlier delay. The paper argues that Japanese
citizens have historically proven more willing to entrust their funds to postal savings than to private banks due
to a combination of two factors: the nature of private sector financial regulation in Japan (often referred to as
the ¡°convoy approach¡± to regulation) that led private banks to focus little on retail banking, and the relatively
high degree of competence observed in the administration of the postal system in Japan over the postwar
period by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) relative to the MPT¡¯s counterpart
government agencies elsewhere in the world. Finally, the paper highlights the consequences of delayed reform
by examining new problems faced by the government in carrying out major reforms, now that political will to
reform appears to be in place.
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