期刊名称:Economics Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, College of Management and Economics, University of Guelph
出版年度:2007
卷号:2007
期号:04
出版社:University of Guelph
摘要:Becker and Fuest (forthcoming) provides a new explanation for the
important and puzzling link between limited liability and corporate
taxation. The authors argue that a corporate tax on all entrepreneurs
with limited liability is optimal when entrepreneurs can o¡èset poten-
tial losses and when asymmetric information exists regarding projects.
qualities. This note considers a model with slightly modi.ed produc-
tion technology. It con.rms that entrepreneurs.abilities to o¡èset losses
and the existence of asymmetric information may a¡èect government
policy. However, it also shows that the optimal taxation policy di¡èers
from that in Becker and Fuest (forthcoming).