期刊名称：Economics Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, College of Management and Economics, University of Guelph
出版年度：2008
卷号：2008
期号：03
出版社：University of Guelph
摘要：Existing literature usually considers earnings manipulation to
be a negative social phenomenon. We argue that earnings manipulation can
be a part of the equilibrium relationships between .rms.insiders and out-
siders. We consider an optimal contract between an entrepreneur and an
investor where the entrepreneur is subject to a double moral hazard problem
(one being the choice of production e¡èort and the other being intertemporal
substitution, which consists of transferring cash .ows between periods). In-
vestment and production e¡èort may be below socially optimal levels because
the entrepreneur cannot entirely capture the results of his e¡èort. The oppor-
tunity to manipulate earnings protects the entrepreneur against the risk of
a low payo¡è when the results of production are low. Ex-ante, this provides
an incentive for the entrepreneur to increase his level of e¡èort and invest
e¡é ciently.
关键词：earnings manipulation, intertemporal substitution, design of
securities, property rights, moral hazard
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