期刊名称：Economics Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, College of Management and Economics, University of Guelph
出版年度：2008
卷号：2008
期号：10
出版社：University of Guelph
摘要：We compare misrepresentations of performance under a target-based compensation system with those under a linear piece-rate and a tournament-based bonus system using a laboratory experiment with salient incentives. An anagram game was employed as the experimental task. Results show that whether one considers the number of over-claimed words, the number of work/pay periods in which over-claims occur, or the number of participants making an over-claim at least once, target-based compensation produced significantly more cheating than the other two systems. This supports Michael Jensen’s (2003) argument that targets encourage cheating and should be eliminated in favor of other types of pay-for-performance.
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