期刊名称：Economics Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, College of Management and Economics, University of Guelph
出版年度：2008
卷号：2008
期号：12
出版社：University of Guelph
摘要：In recent years .nancing through the creation of an independent
project company or .nancing by non-recourse debt has become an
important part of corporate decisions. Shah and Thakor (JET, 1987)
argue that project .nancing can be optimal when asymmetric infor-
mation exists between .rm.s insiders and market participants. In con-
trast to that paper, we provide an asymmetric information argument
for project .nancing without relying on corporate taxes, costly infor-
mation production or an assumption that .rms have the same mean
of return. In addition, the model generates new predictions regarding
asset securitization.
asymmetric information, non-recourse debt, project .-
nancing, asset securitization
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