摘要：We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that
agents myopically adjust their actions in the direction of better-responses within a given
institution. We offer results both under complete and incomplete information. First,
we show that a necessary condition for assymptotically stable implementation is a small
variation of (Maskin) monotonicity, which we call quasimonotonicity. Under standard
assumptions in economic environments, we also provide a mechanism for Nash implementation
which has good dynamic properties if the rule is quasimonotonic. Thus,
quasimonotonicity is both necessary and almost sufficient for assymptotically stable
implementation. Under incomplete information, incentive compatibility is necessary
for any kind of stable implementation in our sense, while Bayesian quasimonotonicity
is necessary for assymptotically stable implementation. Both conditions are also
essentially sufficient for assymptotically stable implementation. We then tighten the
assumptions on preferences and mutation processes and provide mechanisms for stochastically
stable implementation under more permissive conditions on social choice
rules.
