期刊名称：IoES Working Paper Series / Institute of Economic Studies, University of Iceland
出版年度：2006
卷号：2006
出版社：niversity of Iceland
摘要：Fishery economists and fishery scientists have forcefully argued that access to fisheries
has to be restricted so as to increase stock size, harvest and/or profitability compared to
what would be the results of free access. Fisheries economists have pointed out that
management by Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs for short) fares better than other
systems of management considered. It is the purpose of this paper to ask what kind of
resource stewardship would best serve different stakeholders in an ITQ fishery. The
stakeholders in question are big-vessel quota holders, hook-and-line quota holders, seamen¡¯s
unions and processors. It is shown, utilizing a simple model, that optimal management
strategies differ for different stakeholders. Fishery managers may find themselves in the line
of fire between the groups. The final outcome may well be decided by the political weight of
each group.
Loading...
