出版社：Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
摘要：Tenured public officials such as judges are often thought to be indifferent to
the concerns of the electorate and, as a result, potentially lacking in
discipline but unlikely to pander to public opinion. We investigate this
proposition empirically using data on promotion decisions taken by senior
English judges between 1985 and 2005. Throughout this period the popular view
was one of ill-disciplined elitism: senior judges were alleged to be favouring
candidates from elite backgrounds over their equally capable non-elite
counterparts. We find no evidence of such illdiscipline; most of the
unconditional difference in promotion prospects between the two groups can
simply be explained by differences in promotion-relevant characteristics.
However, exploiting an unexpected proposal to remove control over promotions
from the judiciary, we do find evidence of pandering. When faced by the prospect
of losing autonomy, senior judges began to favour non-elite candidates, as well
as candidates who were unconnected to members of the promotion committee. Our
finding that tenured public officials can display both the upsides and downsides
of electoral accountability has implications for the literature on political
agency, as well as recent constitutional reforms.
