出版社：Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
摘要：Equilibrium of the housing market depends on a complex set of interactions
between: (1) individual location decisions; (2) individual housing investment;
(3) collective decisions on urban growth. We embed these three elements in a
model of a dynamic economy with two sources of friction: ill-defined property
rights on future land development and uninsurable shocks affecting labor
productivity. We characterize the feedback between the households desire to
invest in housing as a hedge against the risk of rent fluctuations and their
support for supply restrictions once they own housing. The model generates an
inefficiently low supply of housing in equilibrium. The model also rationalizes
the persistence of housing undersupply: the more restricted the initial housing
supply, the smaller the city size selected by the voting process. We use the
model to study the effects of a number of policies and institutional changes.
