出版社：Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
摘要：We study the impact of incentive pay, local development objectives and
government constraints on university licensing performance. We develop and test
a simple contracting model of technology licensing offices, using new survey
information together with panel data on U.S. universities for 1995-99. We find
that private universities are much more likely to adopt incentive pay than
public ones, but ownership does not affect licensing performance conditional on
the use of incentive pay. Adopting incentive pay is associated with about 30-40
percent more income per license. Universities with strong local development
objectives generate about 30 percent less income per license, but are more
likely to license to local (in-state) startup companies. Stronger government
constraints are ‘costly’ in terms of foregone license income and startup
activity. These results are robust to controls for observed and unobserved
heterogeneity. Keywords: incentives,
