出版社：Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
摘要：We study the effects of individual and collective ministerial performance on the
length of time a minister serves in British government from 1945-97, using the
number of resignation calls for a minister as an individual performance
indicator and the cumulative number of such calls as an indicator of government
performance. Our analysis lends support to a ‘two-strike rule’: ministers facing
a second call for their resignation have a significantly higher hazard than
those facing their first, irrespective of the performance of the government. A
minister’s hazard rate is decreasing in the cumulative number of resignation
calls; but conditional on receiving a first resignation call, the hazard rate
increases with the number of calls that all government ministers have faced in
the past. Our message is that collective ministerial performance is a key
determinant of whether a minister survives his first resignation call.
