出版社：Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
摘要：We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an
active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and
Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve on the outcome that the parties
would achieve without it. The institutional role of the court is to maximize the
parties’ welfare under a veil of ignorance. In Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite
(2006) the possibility of “menu contracts” between the informed buyer and the
uninformed seller is described but not analyzed. Here, we fully analyze this
case. We find that if we maintain the assumption that one of the potential
objects of trade is not contractible ex-ante, the results of Anderlini, Felli,
and Postlewaite (2006) survive intact. If however we let all “widgets” be
contractible ex-ante, then multiple equilibria obtain. In this case the role for
an active court is to ensure the inefficient pooling equilibria do not exist
alongside the superior ones in which separation occurs.
关键词：Optimal Courts, Informational Externalities, Ex-ante Welfare, Informed
Principal, Menu Contracts
