摘要：This paper considers a model of information-based bank runs where a central bank
sets its lender of last resort (LOLR) policy in order to maximize welfare. To
mitigate the risks associated with overinvestment by the banking sector, the
central bank sets prudential liquidity requirements for the banking sector in
the form of a ratio of liquid assets to deposits. Liquidity requirements then
provide a buffer against early deposit withdrawals, but they also allow the
central bank to manufacture a distribution of costs to LOLR funding with an
expected value equal to 0. It is shown that liquidity requirements, along with
an appropriate LOLR policy, become welfare improving if the banking sector is
characterized by high-profit opportunities, low leverage, and a relatively
volatile deposit base. Otherwise, forgone productive investment due to liquidity
restrictions may result in a disproportional cost to the banking sector relative
to the insurance value of LOLR.
