摘要：We examine an interesting puzzle in monetary economics between what monetary
authorities claim (namely, to be forward looking and preemptive) and the poor
stabilization properties routinely reported for forecast-based rules. Our
resolution is that central banks should be viewed as following "Calvo-type"
inflation-forecast-based (IFB) interest rate rules that depend on a discounted
sum of current and future rates of inflation. Such rules might be regarded as
both within the legal frameworks and potentially mimicking central bankers'
practice. We find that Calvo-type IFB interest rate rules are, first, less prone
to indeterminacy than standard rules with a finite forward horizon. Second, in
difference form, the indeterminacy problem disappears altogether. Third,
optimized forms have good stabilization properties as they become more forward
looking, a property that sharply contrasts that of standard IFB rules. Fourth,
they appear data coherent when incorporated into a well-known estimated dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the euro area.
