摘要：The purpose of this research is to examine strategic incentives to distort the use of
pollution taxes on intermediate-good production in a successively oligopoly model where both
intermediate-good and final-good trade exist. Since the rent capture e#ects of the pollution tax,
which depends on the trans-boundary externality(a), operate in opposite directions in the
upstream and downstream sectors, the non-cooperative pollution tax level can be stricter or
laxer than the cooperative tax level in accordance with the magnitude of the trans-boundary
externality(a). If a is relatively small (resp. large), then the non-cooperative pollution tax is
necessarily over-corrected (resp. under-corrected) in terms of world welfare. Moreover we
also investigate the e#ect of trade liberalization on the equilibrium pollution tax.
关键词：vertically related market, pollution tax on the intermediate-good, trans-boundary
pollution, rent capture
