期刊名称:HIER Discussion Paper Series / Harvard Institute of Economic Research
出版年度:2006
卷号:2006
出版社:Harvard Institute of Economic Research
摘要:Opening up to global trade and investment is often thought to trigger
institutional improvement by raising the expected benefits of institutional
reform and reducing incumbents' incentives and ability to preserve the status
quo. However, recent experience is not entirely consistent with this
conventional wisdom. We suggest an explanation based on variation across
countries in firms’ reliance on ambient institutions. Large, well established,
or state controlled firms depend less on an economy’s institutions than do
small, incipient, or purely private sector firms. Multinational firms likewise
can use their global organizations to sidestep weak local institutions. Firm
heterogeneity of this sort can thus contribute to markedly different
institutional responses to liberalization. Our framework also suggests that
institutional development might occur in stages. In an economy whose basic
institutions are sound, individuals rationally invest in entrepreneurial
capability and firms rationally invest less in institution substitutes.
Economies with firms that rely more on ambient institutions or with more
potential entrants who would rely on those institutions are more likely to
experience further institutional improvement following accession to the global
economy. Economies with fewer firms or potential entrants dependent on sound
institutions, in acceding to the global economy, may exhibit scant institutional
improvement, and perhaps even institutional deterioration. Political
rent-seeking is not necessary for the latter outcome, but expands the range of
conditions under which it ensues.