期刊名称：HIER Discussion Paper Series / Harvard Institute of Economic Research
出版年度：2006
卷号：2006
出版社：Harvard Institute of Economic Research
摘要：We use a simple real options framework and empirical data to establish that
although Japanese banks hold borrowers’ shares, their interest is more aligned
as a contractual claimant than a residual claimant of corporations. We then
explain why the Japanese model of corporate governance was useful during the
'catching up' growth of that country's postwar reconstruction decades, but
became problematic subsequently. The interests of shareholders, creditors,
workers, and managers are more readily aligned because such growth entails
investment in known-technology physical capital- intensive projects with highly
predictable cash flows. Once on the technological frontier, 'keeping up' growth
requires risk taking and a tolerance for 'creative destruction'. This is better
accommodated by entrusting corporate governance to firms' true residual
claimants, their shareholders
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