期刊名称：HIER Discussion Paper Series / Harvard Institute of Economic Research
出版年度：2006
卷号：2006
出版社：Harvard Institute of Economic Research
摘要：We generalize the Antràs and Helpman (2004) model of the international
organization of production in order to accommodate varying degrees of
contractual frictions. In particular, we allow the degree of contractibility to
vary across inputs and countries. A continuum of firms with heterogeneous
productivities decide whether to integrate or outsource the production of
intermediate inputs, and from which country to source them. Final-good producers
and their suppliers make relationship-specific investments which are only
partially contractible, both in an integrated firm and in an arm’s-length
relationship. We describe equilibria in which firms with different productivity
levels choose different ownership structures and supplier locations, and then
study the effects of changes in the quality of contractual institutions on the
relative prevalence of these organizational forms. Better contracting
institutions in the South raise the prevalence of offshoring, but may reduce the
relative prevalence of FDI or foreign outsourcing. The impact on the composition
of offshoring depends on whether the institutional improvement affects
disproportionately the contractibility of a particular input. A key message of
the paper is that improvements in the contractibility of inputs controlled by
final-good producers have different effects than improvements in the
contractibility of inputs controlled by suppliers
Loading...
