期刊名称：HIER Discussion Paper Series / Harvard Institute of Economic Research
出版年度：2007
卷号：2007
出版社：Harvard Institute of Economic Research
摘要：We analyze a class of imitation dynamics with mutations for games with any finite number of actions, and give conditions for the selection of a unique equilibrium as the mutation rate becomes small and the population becomes large. Our results cover the multiple-action extensions of the aspiration-and-imitation process of Binmore and Samuelson and the related processes proposed by Benaïm and Weibull and Traulsen et al., as well as the frequency-dependent Moran process studied by Fudenberg et al.. We illustrate our results by considering the effect of the number of periods of repetition on the selected equilibrium in repeated play of the prisoner's dilemma when players are restricted to a small set of simple strategies.
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