期刊名称：HIER Discussion Paper Series / Harvard Institute of Economic Research
出版年度：2005
卷号：2005
出版社：Harvard Institute of Economic Research
摘要：Consider a model of location choice by two sorts of agents, called “buyers”and
“sellers:”In the first period agents simultaneously choose between two identical
possible locations; following this, the agents at each location play some
sort of game with the other agents there. Buyers prefer locations with fewer
other buyers and more sellers, and sellers have the reverse preferences. We
study the set of possible equilibrium sizes for the two markets, and show that
two markets of very different sizes can co-exist even if larger markets are more
efficient. This extends the analysis of Ellison and Fudenberg [3] (EF), who
ignored the constraint that the number of agents of each type in each market
should be an integer, and instead analyzed the “quasi-equilibria”where agents
are treated as infinitely divisible.
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