期刊名称：HIER Discussion Paper Series / Harvard Institute of Economic Research
出版年度：2005
卷号：2005
出版社：Harvard Institute of Economic Research
摘要：We present a tractable framework for the analysis of the relationship between
contract incom- pleteness, technological complementarities and the division of
labor. In the model economy, a firm decides the division of labor and contracts
with its worker-suppliers on a subset of activities they have to perform.
Worker-suppliers choose their investment levels in the remaining activities
anticipating the ex post bargaining equilibrium. We show that greater contract
incompleteness reduces both the division of labor and the equilibrium level of
productivity given the division of labor. The impact of contract incompleteness
is greater when the tasks performed by di¤erent workers are more complementary.
We also discuss the e¤ect of imperfect credit markets on the division of labor
and productivity, and study the choice between the employment relationship
versus an organizational form relying on outside contracting. Finally, we derive
the implications of our framework for productivity di¤erences and comparative
advantage across countries.
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