出版社：Center for European, Governance and Economic Development
摘要：The ways of decision making within the EU have significantly changed in the last
decades: the rule of unanimity has been more and more substituted by majority
voting in order to speed up decision-making processes in a Union of 27
heterogeneous member states. A third possibility is now offered by the Lisbon
Treaty including a constitutional right of withdrawal: A member state
encountering a loss in its benefits caused by a decision made by majority voting
may now demand compensating transfers by using the right of withdrawal: It might
threaten to leave the EU if the compensation is denied. Are member states
becoming as powerful as they are under the rule of unanimity because they use
the right of withdrawal as a threat point? Using a game theoretic approach we
show that normally compensating transfers will be lower under majority decisions
with exit option compared to decisions requiring unanimity; under certain
conditions however transfers could also be as high as in the case of unanimity.
In practise, the EU will offer compensating transfers depending on how credible
a member state threatens to leave the Union. By using cheap talk a member state
may increase the credibility of its outside option and therefore receive higher
transfers
