摘要：Using data on U.S. universities, we show that universities that give higher
royalty shares to faculty scientists generate greater license income,
controlling for university size, academic quality, research funding and other
factors. We use pre-sample data on university patenting to control for the
potential endogeneity of royalty shares. We find that scientists respond both to
cash royalties and to royalties used to support their research labs, suggesting
both pecuniary and intrinsic (research) motivations. The incentive effects
appear to be larger in private universities than in public ones, and we provide
survey evidence indicating this may be related to differences in the use of
performance pay, government constraints, and local development objectives of
technology license offices. Royalty incentives work both by raising faculty
effort and sorting scientists across universities. The effect of incentives
works primarily by increasing the quality (value) rather than the quantity of
inventions.
